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It has often been remarked that throughout his writing career Paul Ricœur (1913–2005) engaged with theorists and scientists from a wide range of social sciences. One of these figures is the German sociologist Max Weber. There are many reasons why scholars of Ricœur and of Weber might want to explore the relation between the work of these two authors: Both ruminated on questions of modernity and rationalization, both reflected on the state and the means of authority and power, both developed a view on responsibility in the face of real-life politics and the intellectual challenges of their time (most notably those of Nietzsche), both sought to clarify the interpretive methodology in social sciences, both had a keen interest in the history of religion, etc. Such an encompassing comparison holds the promise of a clarification of their shared scholarly interests, but also of the work of each author separately. But this would be an enormous project. In this article, I limit my view to Ricœur’s reception of Weber, and to complete two essential preparatory steps towards such a study: I argue that Ricœur developed significant components of his sociopolitical thought through critical engagement with aspects of Weber’s social theory and I will demonstrate how this appropriation of Weberian ideas took place. The current state of scholarship still lacks such a construction.¹

I describe three main domains in which Ricœur redeployed insights from Weber: political responsibility and the definition of the state, significant categories for understanding social interaction, notably ideology and authority, and the social ontology implied by this view on action and, finally, the role of explanation in the interpretive social sciences.
The State and Political Responsibility

In his seminal paper, “Politics as a Vocation,” Weber sees responsibility as intertwined with the complexity of history without promises, the need to think about the means of action, and finally, the internal tensions of ethics itself. At least, such are the main points of a first reception of “Politics as a Vocation” by Ricœur in “Non-Violent Man and His Presence to History” (1947). Since nothing guarantees a good outcome of actions undertaken even with good intentions, Ricœur maintains that a principled ethics of pacifism cannot stand the test of critical scrutiny—the form of peace-oriented political action that he still supports has to engage with the requirement of historical efficacy and affirm itself in relation to “progressive violence.” Weber is not mentioned here, but through his debate with Merleau-Ponty, Ricœur responds implicitly to Weber.

In “The Political Paradox” (1957), Ricœur first articulates his general view on political philosophy. The political paradox is derived from the relation between the political and politics: people can thrive collectively only if they give expression to the political by means of politics, yet, at the same time, politics lends itself to pathologies of its own. The rationality of the political requires the institutional means of politics, but exactly those means can degenerate and can be turned against the citizens.

In this view of the political, the state takes a key role: the state is that entity by which a historical community accords itself the capacity to make decisions, as Ricœur says, following Eric Weil. But the state acquires a considerable measure of ambiguity, since it is simultaneously to be understood, in Weberian terms, as “the authority which holds a monopoly over lawful physical constraint” (according to Ricœur’s paraphrase). This amalgamation of Weil and Weber was maintained in Ricœur’s understanding of the state for years to come.

In Ricœur’s view, the most appropriate response to this understanding of the political and of the state is not to dream of the withering away of the state, as in Marxism, nor the minimalist state (as in radical liberalism). This limitation is a technology because of the Weberian understanding of the state in terms of its powerful means: citizens should not counter the state with principles (alone), but with mechanisms which would allow people to exercise politics both through and against the state.

Whereas Weber’s theme of responsibility is present in “The Political Paradox” only in the shadow of Ricœur’s borrowing from “Politics as a Vocation,” it is explicitly thematized in “Ethics and Politics” (1959). In this review, Ricœur merely introduces the main themes of “Politics as a Vocation”: the state and legitimate violence, which already refers obliquely to the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility, the machinery of the big political parties, and charismatic leadership. But decisive for Ricœur’s reading of
“Politics as a Vocation” is what he calls the “paradox of two ethics.” According to Ricœur, Weber juxtaposes an “absolute ethics” (exemplified by the ethics of the Gospel) and the “law of action,” which recognizes the futility of the pursuit of purity and engages with the consequences of action. Since a paradox maintains two contradictory theses, Ricœur’s reading of the difficult conclusion of “Politics as a Vocation” is that Weber holds on to both Gesinnungsethik and Verantwortungsethik. Moreover, Ricœur accords an affirmative function to responsibility and a negating function to conviction. The negating function amounts to setting limits, as can be deduced from Ricœur’s rendering of words attributed to Luther and cited by Weber: “This far, but no further [Jusqu’ici, mais pas plus loin.]” Finally, Ricœur sees this paradoxical tension between affirmation and negation as a test [épreuve] to which one has to respond with a choice, to get beyond a dilemma that cannot be solved by knowledge, but must be solved by passion, a sense of proportion and responsibility.

As a reading of Weber, this is modest in size and quite debatable in content; yet, it is instructive for Ricœur’s own understanding of (1) the conflictual composition of ethics, the yes and the no, requiring to be overcome in ways which no science can prescribe; and (2) the relation between ethics and politics, as domains of uncertainty, but also as domains of real force, where the stakes in history are generated. Or, as Ricœur would articulate it in a later publication:

[W]e cannot have a unified conception of morality [. . .], because we are pursuing incompatible things: on the one hand, a certain purity of ends and intentions, on the other hand, a certain efficiency of means. These two words, purity and efficiency, can, moreover, deteriorate one into another: purity-purism, efficiency-Machiavellianism. But precisely moral life is based on a dialectic of the absolutely desirable and the achievable optimum. One cannot escape this tension. On the contrary, the more this tension is recognized, the more it is a sign of moral health.

In the same passage Ricœur explicitly attributes this insight to Weber.
of these texts, he associates the possibility of utopian thought to the negative leg of the ethical dialectic. This in turn formed the structure of his studies on the social imaginary in the 1970s in the *Lectures on Ideology and Utopia*. But perhaps most plainly, this model of thinking through ethical dilemmas forms the structure of the “little ethics” of *Oneself as Another* where the ethical desire to live the good life with and for others in just institutions is constantly at odds with the moral elimination of what cannot be accepted as a universalisable principle. This irresolvable tension, however, has to be solved in practice. Therefore, a third leg to this ethics is needed, and Ricœur calls this “leg prudence” (a reinterpretation of Aristotle’s *phronesis*). What Ricœur thinks about prudence amounts to a large degree to his view on responsibility. Finally, even though Weber is not mentioned in *The Course of Recognition*, the pattern of conflictual ethics is still easily visible in the way Ricœur sets up the tension between the struggle for recognition and states of peace.

**Understanding Action: Ideology, Authority, Social Ontology**

From the early 1970s, Ricœur intensified his research into the linguistic and symbolic mediation of action. This élan, which would eventually be fully consolidated in the narrative mediation of action in *Time and Narrative 3* (1985) and the linguistic and narrative mediation of action in the hermeneutics of human capabilities in *Oneself as Another* (1990), finds its first provisional expression in important essays of the 1970s.

However, this significant aspect of Ricœur’s movement from text to action as a theme of hermeneutics has to be understood as part of Ricœur’s long-standing engagement with practical philosophy. The question of the intertwinement of action with language could be seen as a necessary prerequisite for thinking ethics, as Ricœur comments retrospectively. And ethics, we have already seen, is integrated by Ricœur in a complex way with the reality of society and politics.

It is in this complex web of philosophical concerns that a new interest in Weber emerged for Ricœur. Now Weber’s exposition of the basic concepts of sociology drew Ricœur’s attention. However, rather than the entire *Economy and Society*, it is the general framework of an understanding approach to action and, in particular, a number of key notions that stimulated Ricœur’s thought. Of these, acting in anticipation of other’s expectations, domination, authority, and legitimacy are the most important. Three interrelated aspects of Ricœur’s reception in this respect could be identified.

**Weber in Relation to Ideology**

This turn in Ricœur’s reception of Weber is performed in “Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology” (1973), Ricœur’s response to the Gadamer-Habermas debate. Recognising that this debate concerns not only the
foundations of social sciences, but the “fundamental gesture of philosophy,” Ricœur attempts to overturn the idea that hermeneutics and critique of ideologies represent mutually exclusive alternatives.

First, Ricœur explores Gadamer’s central idea of the “rehabilitation” of prejudice. This “rehabilitation” has to be undertaken in the face of the Enlightenment condemnation of authority, as instrument of domination and violence. Here Ricœur remarks: “Let us not forget that this concept of authority is also at the center of Max Weber’s political sociology: the state is the institution par excellence that rests on the belief in the legitimacy of its authority and its right to use violence in the last instance.”

This note is significant for three reasons: (1) It establishes a two-way bridge between hermeneutics and sociology, allowing the concerns raised by the most critical theorists to pass from the one side to the other. (2) It takes up Weber’s definition of the state, insisting this time on the fact that the legitimacy of the power of the state depends on belief in this legitimacy (which would be Weber’s equivalent of authority based on recognition). Whereas Ricœur’s reference to the same definition of the state in “The Political Paradox” was not concerned with this dimension of “belief in legitimacy,” this belief did become central in the Lectures on Ideology and Utopia (1975). (3) What is at issue in this quotation—namely authority—is presented just as much as a question for Habermas as it is for Gadamer. We will see that Ricœur often made Weber a partner in debates with Habermas or the broader Marxist tradition.

Thus, later in the same essay, Ricœur turns to Habermas, amongst other things to review Habermas’s idea of modern ideology. According to Habermas, the modern state serves primarily to compensate for malfunctionings of the industrial system. Science and technology legitimate the growth and flourishing of this system, rather than promote the interests of the dominant class. This means that “the subsystem of instrumental action has ceased to be a subsystem, and that its categories have overrun the sphere of communicative action,” on which Ricœur comments: “Therein consists the famous ‘rationalization’ of which Max Weber spoke: not only does rationality conquer new domains of instrumental action, but it subjugates the domain of communicative action. Weber described this phenomenon in terms of ‘disenchantment’ and ‘secularization’.”

It is precisely this dominance of (and domination by) instrumental action that is vested with authority and legitimized by the science and technology of the contemporary industrial system. This insertion, drawing on Weber’s sociology of religion and “Science as a vocation” (via Habermas’s “Technology and Science as ‘Ideology’”), is significant for a number of reasons.
• Ricœur subsequently continued to enter into debate with Habermas. However, instead of giving such an important place to a diagnosis of modernity, Ricœur rather emphasises the philosophical anthropological aspect of action.34

• Nevertheless, the similarities in the diagnosis of modernity by Weber and Habermas open the door for Weber to enter whenever Ricœur enters into a debate with Habermas.

• Together with the reference in the context of Ricœur’s Gadamer reading, Weber is inserted in themes that would henceforth grow in importance in Ricœur’s writings, notably ideology and authority. A main direction of his appropriation of Weber is thereby established.

One can measure the importance of these first new steps by turning to the 1974 article “Science and Ideology.” Now Ricœur searches for a fuller understanding of ideology, namely as “the broader phenomenon of social integration, of which domination is a dimension but not the unique and essential condition.”35 In fact, he proposes three integrated notions of ideology, according to three functions of ideology: integration, domination and distortion, or concealment [dissimulation].

The most general function of ideology—integration—is an attribute of social relations and interaction, the understanding of which Ricœur explicitly derives from Weber.36 In fact, Ricœur simply takes over the basic principles of Weber’s interpretive sociology: (a) for human agents actions have meaning; (b) in social action such meaningful actions are mutually oriented; (c) these two facts confer a degree of predictability and thus stability on the system of meanings (or meaningful actions). It is, following Ricœur, “at this level of the meaningful, mutually oriented, and socially integrated character of action that the ideological phenomenon appears in all its originality. It is linked to the necessity for a social group to give itself an image of itself, to represent and to realize itself, in the theatrical sense of the word.”37 Ricœur explains this claim in five points:38 ideology as self-presentation serves (i) as the anchoring of every society in a memory of its foundational event (ideology as its justification for existence); (ii) as a kind of motivation for collective action and institutions; (iii) as a simplified interpretation of each social group, its history, and world; (iv) as an idealized rationalization of collective ideas; and, finally, (v) as a greater or lesser conservative inertia. Since these five workings of ideology are mostly unconscious and cannot be exhaustively thematized, the ideas transmitted through ideology cannot be critical.39 Hence the function of dissimulation can be demonstrated to emerge gradually from the integrating ideological fiber of society, without it ever being possible to purge society from ideology as integrator.

But the dissimulating function would hardly make sense if it were not for the second function of ideology, namely for domination. Again, Weber is used
to clarify. All forms of rule require legitimation (as Ricœur reminds us in line with his note on Weber in 1973), of which Weber gave a well-known fourfold typology. Ricœur elaborates:

If every claim to legitimacy is correlative with a belief [croyance] on the part of individuals in this legitimacy, the relation between the claim issued by the authority and the belief that responds to it is essentially asymmetrical. I shall say that there is always more in the claim that comes from the authority than in the belief that is returned to it. I see therein an irreducible phenomenon of surplus value, if by that we understand the excess of the demand for legitimation in relation to the offer of belief. Perhaps this is the real surplus value: all authority demands more than our belief can bear, in the double sense of supplying and supporting. Ideology asserts itself as the transmitter of surplus value and, at the same time, as the justificatory system of domination.

This passage renders perfectly a central idea of Ricœur’s later writings on ideology. It also explains how Ricœur learned from Weber that all forms of legitimation of authority depend on ideology-integration, and no legitimation of authority can be a purely transparent rational procedure.

If one looks closely, Ricœur uses Weber, on the one hand, to identify two meanings of ideology, corresponding to social integration and the legitimization of authority, and, on the other hand, to identify the difference between the two. It is only at this point that Ricœur can introduce a third notion of ideology, which is Marxist: ideology as distortion or concealment, whereby people misunderstand the image for the real as much in idea as in practice. In terms of such an understanding, the Marxist notion of ideology is not the notion of ideology, but a description of one specific dimension of a broader phenomenon called ideology: “What Marx offers that is new stands out against this prior backcloth of a symbolic constitution of the social bond in general and the authority relation in particular; and what he adds is the idea that the justificatory function of ideology is preferentially applied to the relation of domination stemming from the division into social classes and the class struggle.” Thus Ricœur connects the critique of the distorting functioning of ideology to the integrating function of ideology. The way in which he coordinates them has the effect that this critique is not possible without granting the premise of the prevalent social reality of ideology-integration. And by coordinating these two meanings of ideology, Ricœur already gives a sense of his own coordination of Marx and Weber.
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Weber is called on a third time in this article, now on a methodological level, when Ricœur reflects on the possibility of a science of ideologies which would itself be situated outside of ideology. Does it suffice if, in view of the need to explain social realities, scientists focus on the unconscious forces of reality, to escape the power of ideology? Ricœur’s response includes a strong endorsement of Weber:

If we compare the Marxism of Althusser with the sociology of Weber, we see that explanation in terms of the subjective motivations of social agents is replaced by the consideration of structural totalities in which subjectivity has been eliminated. But this elimination of subjectivity on the side of historical agents in no way guarantees that the practicing sociologist has himself risen to a subjectless discourse. The epistemological trap is set therein. By a semantic confusion, which is a veritable sophism, explanation in terms of structures rather than subjectivities is construed as a discourse that would be conducted by no specific subject. At the same time, vigilance in the order of verification and falsification is weakened. The trap is all the more formidable in that ultimately the satisfaction obtained in the sphere of rationalization operates as an obstacle and a mask with respect to the demand for verification. Yet it is precisely that which the theory denounces as ideology: a rationalization that screens reality.44

This passage provides a good summary of Ricœur’s own view on the limits of critique and the position of scientific or philosophical work that his broader understanding of hermeneutics and action can accommodate.45

From Lectures on Ideology and Utopia to The Just

The basic structure of Ricœur’s reception of Weber in the 1970s had already been established when he gave his 1975 lectures on ideology and utopia. Building on we examined in the previous section, the aim of these lectures is to examine ideology and utopia as two opposing but complementary functions of “social and cultural imagination”46 and the whole series is a debate with Marx, Marxism, and the broader socialist tradition on these two key phenomena.47 Just as in “Science and Ideology,” Ricœur takes over Marx’s view of ideology as distortion, but inserts it in a broader view of the “symbolic structure of social life.”48 Again Weber serves as an ally in explaining how domination exercises its authority by a means other than force or violence.49 However, Ricœur now explores the foundational function of ideology as integration with the help of Clifford Geertz.50

Lectures 11 and 12 of the Lectures on Ideology and Utopia are the longest discussion of Weber in Ricœur’s published work. The overall theme remains
the question of the legitimation of authority, however, Ricœur reveals more of the game he plays in reading Weber. First, Weber is used to overcome a mechanistic or causal understanding of the relation between the social basis and superstructure: “Is not a system of legitimation a form of motivation and not causation?”

Ricœur accords a specific place to this question in the overall exploration of ideology in these lectures: (a) Since it is impossible to assume a scientific, nonevaluative view on ideology, both social scientist and cultural imaginary has to understand itself in the evaluative tension between ideology and utopia; (b) Ricœur takes over Marx’s idea that “the ruling ideas of an epoch are the ideas of a ruling class,” however, if we want to understand this claim, it is Weber, not Marx, who can help us to do so, despite the fact that Weber does not deal with the question of ideology as such; (c) Only when this has been done does Ricœur clarify the relation between critique and ideology in debate with Habermas; and (d) defends the thesis that ideological distortion depends on society’s fundamental symbolic structure, an argument for which he mobilizes Geertz as his interlocutory partner.

If, then, ideology as distortion can be understood only in a context of domination or authority, how is authority to be understood? Not mechanistically, but in terms of the motivation of action. This motivation is required to fill the “credibility gap” that opens between the recognition of legitimacy that people willingly give authority and the greater claim to legitimacy made by that authority (as Ricœur maintains in the 1974 article). Of this view Ricœur says: “This interpretation is my own and not available in Weber, so it is a footnote to Weber, but perhaps a footnote that makes its own contribution to Weber’s model.” Let us look more closely at this “contribution.”

In the framework of the lecture, Ricœur builds up this reading of Weber by situating it within the interpretive sociology of Economy and Society. Social action is approached as interaction, as informed by mutual expectations and subject to different types of motivation (instrumental rational, value rational, effectual, and traditional), all four of which play divergent roles in relations of rule or authority.

From this most general action-theoretical starting point, Ricœur explains a number of intermediary concepts to work his way toward an understanding of the exercise of power. Action takes place within a social ordering, which already presupposes legitimation (which in turn depends on the forms of meaningful action of social agents) and which is presupposed in the exercise of power. Of this social order, each agent has a representation (Vorstellung). The most salient variables of this order are (a) integrative or associative social ties, (b) the degree of group closure or identity, and (c) the distinction between rulers and ruled which creates a social hierarchy and power relation. The “rulers” could evidently also be a ruling body which is to be found a variety
of different institutions of society and which can enforce a specific social order. From this power hierarchy results the fact that social action in the form of obedience can be directed at the system of rule or formalized authority (rather than to other individual agents).

These intermediary categories describe the social framework through which motivation and hence also legitimation infuse social action. There is no reason to assume that spontaneous motivation of agents to obey would provide sufficient legitimation for all the command exercised by formalized authority. Of course, the formalized system of authority, and the state in particular, can back up its authority to command by taking recourse to violence (the instrumental ability of the state being one of its defining moments, as Ricœur affirmed with “Politics as a Vocation” in “The Political Paradox,” as we saw above). However, this does not mean that violent means are the foundation of the power of the state; authority is rather based on the belief or credence accorded by the citizens to its claim to its legitimate issuing of commands. That is why politics occupies itself with issuing this claim to authority and generating buy-in for it, or belief in it. However, even without a state, there would be social hierarchies, and thus the question of the legitimacy of their exercise of power. In all these cases, legitimacy depends on the motivational aspect of social interaction.

The motivation to believe the claims to legitimate rule has various bases, and corresponds, as we have seen, with a typology of claims of legitimate rule. Still, Ricœur knows that when he uses this Weberian framework as a starting point for an exploration of the question of ideology, and specifically ideology as compensation for the deficit in belief accorded to legitimate authority, that he is gradually going beyond Weber’s explicit ideas and making his own contribution. This compensation—what Ricœur calls by the Marxian term surplus-value (Mehrwert)—is ideology’s supplement to what the spontaneous motivation of action cannot sufficiently account for, and that cannot simply be caused by force. Just as Marxist theories explain how capital appears to generate value, while in fact that surplus-value is generated by labor, so—Ricœur argues—power makes the belief in its legitimacy appear to come from its own legitimacy, while it is in fact accorded by the surplus of belief of the ruled. Or, more formally put, “there is always more in the claim of a given system of authority than the normal course of motivation can satisfy, and therefore there is always a supplement of belief provided by an ideological system.” And this provision can be achieved (following Weber again) by rational, traditional, or charismatic means, often in combination with each other. There is nothing which says whether such surplus value of legitimacy corresponds to real legitimacy or not. It is, in fact, from this ambiguity that the distortive function of ideology emerges—the distortive function that justifies misuse of power or social “diseases,” a point Ricœur develops (throughout the second half of the lecture) and considers Habermas has dealt with much better. Among these degenerative developments is the freezing or
reification\(^72\) of symbolic relations which make the relation between structures of domination and the dominated appear deterministic.\(^73\)

But for ideology to create surplus value of belief in legitimacy, a system of social ideas has to be in place. This is the nonpejorative notion of ideology that Ricœur explores, after his lectures on Weber, in the lecture devoted to Geertz.

In conclusion, we may again come back to Marx, since it gives us a good idea both of some further developments of Ricœur and of his self-limitation in this lecture series. Whereas the Marxist emphasis on class is based on an insistence on a historical view of society, Weber, according to Ricœur, “advances an a-temporal analysis of some fundamental questions; his typology attempts to be transhistorical.”\(^74\) Ricœur defends this position against those who would reproach Weber for overly general theorizing or theorizing without sufficient critical impulse: neither detailed description, nor critique can be undertaken without proper concepts for our description and by which comparisons between different social contexts and political philosophers from different eras are made possible.\(^75\) In fact, the step from his reading of Weber to his own view becomes quite small, when he asserts that “to justify the lack of a historical dimension in Max Weber, I would say that he addresses himself to what is the less historical in the structure of human societies because he relies on a certain identity of motives.”\(^76\) And this does not exclude the possibility of identifying biases in Weber’s proposal of concepts.\(^77\) While Ricœur remains profoundly engaged with questions of temporality (his Time and Narrative is published in three volumes), he retains a substantial loyalty to this transhistorical approach of Weber’s, for instance in the form of the general anthropology in Oneself as Another (without ever denying the significance of era-specific social phenomena\(^78\)).

At the same time, Ricœur willingly acknowledges the freedom of his interpretation of Weber—he concludes his second Weber lecture as follows:

Some may claim that my reading of Weber, just as my reading of Marx, does violence to his text. By doing apparent violence to Marx, though, I think that I actually succeeded in reading The German Ideology better.\(^79\) Marx does say that the class is not a given but a result of action, of interaction, a result that we do not recognize to be a consequence of our action. While orthodox Marxists may contend that my reading does violence to The German Ideology, my own stance is that this reading recognizes a dimension of the text. In fact, I would claim to have done more violence to Weber than to Marx. I forced Weber, I compelled him to say what he did not want to say: that it is through some ideological process that we take hold of our own motivation in relation to power. In Weber, we never
have the idea that something is repressed in this experience, that our communicative competence, to use Habermas’ vocabulary, is lost. Weber does not see that it is because this competence is lost that we can only describe types or structures.80

A few years later, Ricœur renders the general argument of the Lectures on Ideology and Utopia again in compact form in “Ideology and Utopia” (1983).81 The paper “The Fundamental Categories in Max Weber’s Sociology” (2000),82 republished in Reflections on the Just, contains a few new references but remains, in content and argument, quite close to the exposition we have just explored and I thus do not discuss it further. It is of more interest how many of the themes explored above find their way back in the two volumes of essays, The Just and Reflections on the Just: see, for instance, the themes of legitimation in the study of Boltanski and Thévenot’s On Justification, “The Plurality of Instances of Justice,”83 of the symbolic order of society in “Autonomy and Vulnerability,” and of authority in “The Paradox of Authority” and in “Antoine Garapon’s Le Gardien des Promesses.”84

However, Weber is also directly discussed in Reflections on the Just, particularly in Ricœur’s review of “Bouretz on Weber.”85 Here, Ricœur comments on the point Pierre Bouretz focused on: the question of disenchantment of the world (touched on in a commentary on Habermas in 1973, as discussed above). Buying into Weber’s description of modern rationality, Bouretz nonetheless searches for a way to escape the nihilist axiological consequences drawn by Weber.86 Bouretz takes up this task by examining the history of religions and the way rationality comes to oppose itself most clearly in modernity.87 Consequently, aspects of this process of rationalization have to be examined, such as the tension of the aspiration to value-free science with Weber’s own assessment of his era, the formation of spheres of rationalized activity (economics, politics, law). In this context, an array of Weberian notions are touched on by Ricœur in a way unlike in his previous discussions of Weber, yet, as one would expect from this text, which is an introduction to a book, it is Bouretz’s reading of Weber which enjoys centre stage, and one does not learn much more about Ricœur in this respect.

Intersubjectivity, Social Ontology, and Critique

In the previous two sections, I have demonstrated the place of Weber’s basic concepts of social action in a context of politically relevant themes. However, Ricœur also developed his view on action and social ontology in a more general register, and here, too, Weber played a role. The essay from which I illustrate this point is “Hegel and Husserl on Intersubjectivity” (1977).88

Skipping Ricœur’s presentation of Hegel’s objective spirit, we find a reading of its equivalent in the form of Husserl’s explication of the
constitution of the other in the fifth of the *Cartesian Meditations*. This explication takes the object of its study as a starting point, from whence to proceed by means of a “backward questioning” (*questionnement à rebours* or *Rückfrage*) in order to explore how that object has been passively constituted—“[w]hat is self-evident, […] is transformed into an enigma.” In the case that concerns us, what “is self-evident” is the other with whom I interact meaningfully (or who precedes me or comes after me) as other I’s or as analogical I’s. From the “analogical apperception” of the other, Husserl advances by describing how the constitution of the other involves reciprocity between an I and another. Subsequently, the constitution of a world common to the I and the other can be explored. In the same movement, the constitution of higher entities (personnalités d’ordre supérieur, i.e., institutions) is explored without ever according these entities a reality independent of the interaction between I’s and others (as is the case with Hegel’s objective spirit). These elements of Husserl’s view on intersubjective constitution “outline […] the a priori network of interpretive sociology,” according to Ricœur. Or even more explicitly: “one understands the end of the fifth *Cartesian Meditation* concerning higher-order communities by pairing them up with a Weberian type of interpretive sociology (*verstehende Soziologie*), which, precisely, does without Hegelian spirit. Husserl and Max Weber have to be thought together, interpretive sociology filling [*offrant un remplissage*] in this transcendental void with empirical data.” And Ricœur goes further: only Husserl coupled with Weber could provide a response to Hegel.

So significant is Weber to this task that Ricœur then again passes in review the basic constitution of social action as he finds it in *Economy and Society*: action is action in as far as it is meaningful; it is social in as far as it is directed at others. We have seen how he has commented on this already, in earlier texts. Now Ricœur insists on the individual as “bearer of meaning” and claims that “there is no foundation other than singularities.” Everything that seems to be a collective agent is really only action with others, motivated as they are by goal rationality, tradition, or affect. What is all too easily reified into collective entities is rather the effect of foreseeable probability in the action of others.

A major point of significance of this study has to be highlighted—this relates to Husserl’s “uncompromising refusal to hypostatize collective entities and in his tenacious will to reduce them in every instance to a network of interactions.” What seems initially to be a study of general theoretical concerns now reveals its critical import. It amounts to a disruptive interpretation of social monoliths of power and of the distortive communication which make their power possible. Ricœur draws egalitarian conclusions from the fact of mutual constitution, but we have every reason to think that the empirical filling of such relations is often more violent.

This critical potential of genetic phenomenology into which Ricœur binds Weber recalls the context of the relation between hermeneutics and the
critique of ideology in the 1973 article (discussed above). It is also pursued in a number of essays in which Ricœur thematizes the “backward questioning” (Rückfrage). In “Le ‘questionnement à rebours’ (die Rückfrage) et la réduction des idéalités dans la Krisis de Husserl et L’idéologie allemande de Marx” (1978), Ricœur explores in Husserl and Marx the “reduction of the sphere of idealities to that of reality, whereby the latter is partially or completely equated with practice.” Here, Weber plays only a minor role. Ricœur explores, following Marx, how an ideal notion such as universality emerges from praxis, only increasingly to gain autonomy from praxis. This autonomization occurs in the service of the interests of the dominant class, a social phenomenon which, Ricœur argues, Weber also had in mind. Weber demonstrates how an instance of domination claims legitimacy, but requires belief in that legitimacy, which can be given only through motivated belief of those who are dominated. Hence, exactly as we have seen in the previous sections, this credibility deficit has to be overcome, with a motivational theory which corrects the causal model offered by Marx.

Ricœur’s linking of Husserl with Weber in “Hegel and Husserl on Intersubjectivity” thus points to a similar link between Husserl and Marx—however, Ricœur never develops this link further. That is, unless, one considers this project to be accomplished and incorporated as one of the objectives of his hermeneutics of human capabilities (in Oneself as Another) without its ever being stated in these terms.

Social Scientific Understanding Requires Explanation

A last domain in which Ricœur accords a significant role to Weber is in social theoretic epistemology. Ricœur had a long-standing engagement with the question of the relation between understanding and explanation, to which I refer again at the end of this section. Let us first go directly to an instantiation of this engagement in the relevant section of Time and Narrative, where Ricœur deals with this difficult relation in the context of the narrative character of historiography.

In the section “Historical Intentionality,” Ricœur is concerned with “the indirect derivation of historical knowledge, beginning from narrative understanding [l’intelligence narrative]” by which to coordinate historical explanation with narrative understanding. To bring about this coordination successfully, one has to recognize both a fundamental correspondence between stories and historiography (see the first part of Time and Narrative), and a threefold epistemic “break [coupure]” of historiography in respect of narratives in general, by which historiography gains an explicative function over and above the explanation already contained in narratives. This epistemic “break” consists, then, of “the autonomy of explanatory procedures, the autonomy of the entities referred to, and the autonomy of the time—or rather of the times—of history.”
Ricœur aims at clarifying the first of these three elements by revisiting the question of causality in history. The specificity of historical explanation resides in the “singular causal attribution or imputation \([\text{imputation causale singulière}]\)”\(^{108}\) in which Ricœur identifies a mediation between explanation in the nomological sense, and explanation by “emplotment \([\text{mise en intrigue}]\),” in the form of what he calls a “quasi-plot \([\text{quaðiniâge}]\).”\(^{109}\) Weber’s essay “Critical Studies in the Logic of the Cultural Sciences”\(^{110}\) is, according to Ricœur, the most insightful study on this issue (but requires some completion from Aron,\(^ {111}\) which I do not examine here). The core of this form of imputation consists of a “what if?” argumentation or, more elaborately formulated “the constructing \([a]\) by our imagination of a different course of events, \([b]\) then of weighing the probable consequences of this unreal course of events, and, \([c]\) finally, in comparing these consequences with the real course of events.”\(^{112}\)

This counterfactual reasoning enables the historian to isolate from a myriad of causal factors which culminate in a specific event the causal difference that it would have made if a specific, individual event had been different. It subsequently enables the historian to establish a necessary, or at least a probable, connection between that individual event and its consequence. And since this connection is understood to be causal (in other words, causality is attributed to it), it finally leads to an explanation of the historical meaning of the event.

As I have already shown, for Ricœur it is important to situate this procedure of singular causal imputation between two kinds of explanation: explanation by emplotment and nomological explanation (in the sense usually understood in science).

- While Weber did not develop the idea of explanation by emplotment, Ricœur identifies it as being implied in the weighing of alternative scenarios in the estimation of probability. Clearly, this procedure by imagination leans in the direction of emplotment. Besides, all causal relations have to make sense in a plot-like form.

- On the other hand, identifying factors that lead to an event, weighing their relative importance, and having knowledge of how people are disposed to act under certain typical circumstances, belong rather to the scientific side of reasoning. Although the grading of probabilities is not, in this case, quantifiable, this still represents the closest point of singular causal imputation to scientific explanation. It also accords this explanation the status of being objective, as far as this is possible. Or to put it another way, a causal succession of events narrated in fiction lacks this disciplined and argued effort to establish probability.\(^ {113}\)
This principle of the quasi-plot based on singular individual imputation also holds when the place of collective entities in historical explanation is considered (and the subsequent discussion in Time and Narrative 1 clarifies the nature of such collective agents or “quasi-characters”). According to Ricœur, for instance, Weber establishes a link of singular causal imputation between aspects of Protestant ethics and capitalism.114

By according a specific place to historical explanation in the broader framework of a hermeneutics of narrative understanding, Ricœur works out in detail one of his standing hermeneutic concerns, namely to find an appropriate coordination of the mistakenly opposed intellectual pursuits of explanation and understanding. A classical formulation of Ricœur’s stance is “Explanation and Understanding” (1977).115 The principle, as applied to historiography, is found as far back in his work as the 1952 article, “Objectivity and Subjectivity in History,”116 but in this early text there is no mention of Weber or his “understanding explanation [explication comprehensive].”117 At the other end of his oeuvre, in Memory, History, Forgetting, Ricœur refers to Weber’s understanding of singular causal imputation,118 but he simply takes over his own findings from Time and Narrative 1 and does not explicitly take his discussion of, or debate with, Weber any further in the section “Explanation/Understanding.”119

Whereas Ricœur’s appropriation of Weber is set here in contexts where the methodology of historiography is the direct theme, one has to note that the significance of the findings transcends the limits of this framework. Ricœur’s conclusion here has a bearing on all social scientific methodology in as far as these (a) work with quasi-characters (i.e., entities bigger than individuals) and (b) coordinate understanding of human action by means of a detour through the explanation in emplotment and singular causal imputation.120

Finally, this paragraph deals with issues of epistemology and of methodological procedure. However, it is possible to relate the issue of singular causal imputation back to a concept of everyday action, by which an agent (individual or collective) identifies themself as capable of acting, namely through attestation.121 Without attestation to one’s ability to act, no responsibility is possible, and in this way one may say that at least this methodological point is not entirely unrelated to the questions of practical philosophy. Finally, one may well ask whether this acceptable form of causal explanation in social science cannot be reintroduced in Marx’s understanding of ideology, where Ricœur explicitly rejects it as mechanistic, but a response to this question has to wait for a separate study.

Conclusion

I have now reconstructed Ricœur’s appropriations of Weber. By so doing, I have argued that Ricœur developed significant components of his
sociopolitical thought through critical engagement with Weber’s social theory. I have argued that this reception consists of different layers, each time focussing on different aspects of Weber’s writings. By indicating the continuities from Ricœur’s first engagements with Weberian ideas to Ricœur’s later texts, I argued that these critical appropriations of Weber became sedimented in standing aspects of Ricœur’s thought, later taken for granted (except for the exceptions indicated). Finally, the reconstruction of Ricœur’s reception of Weber, helped me to make the case that Ricœur’s relation to Weber is to be understood as a plural reception on specific issues, rather than a systematic debate.

Only if one takes up Ricœur’s reception of Weber from the philosopher’s early post-World War II essays—as I argue one should—does one get the broadest view on the significance of this reception for Ricœur’s thought. Thus, we saw that Weber contributed to Ricœur’s understanding of the dilemmas of responsible action. Later Weber’s instrumentalist view of the state became a standard component of Ricœur’s own understanding of the state, even when he always relativized Weber’s view by connecting it to that of Weil. In both these forms “Politics as a Vocation” became a remaining reference for Ricœur.

Following Ricœur’s intensified attention to the symbolic nature of action in the 1970s, Weber’s basic concepts of meaningful social interaction, of Economy and Society, drew Ricœur’s attention. This path of reflection starts in the difficult Gadamer-Habermas debate in which the status of critique is a major stake. Weber helps Ricœur to develop an understanding of ideology which fans out from an insurmountable social given, through the creation of belief in political power, to the distortion of reality. This work with Weberian concepts helps Ricœur to appropriate aspects of the Marxist critique of ideology, while qualifying its status. At the end of this period, Ricœur coupled Weber with Husserl in a very Schützian social ontology. But even in this more detached reflection, the critical objectives of theorizing meaningful action remain apparent, in the suspicious desubstantialising interpretation of social entities.

Finally, we see the value Ricœur attaches in Time and Narrative to the possibility of explanation in historiography and the social sciences—a form of explanation which he would keep in balance with the vocation of the same sciences to interpret and understand. The idea of “singular causal attribution” is the key to this problem, in that it is a form of causal explanation which allows for coordination with narrative understanding.

All three major themes, once worked out, were carried over by Ricœur into his later work, with almost no further changes.

One could, and should, certainly take this study further by reflecting on the ways in which Ricœur’s own hermeneutics (in all its variants), his views on religion, modernity, politics and action, could be deployed in a critical
rereading of Weber. And, likewise, one could remobilize the whole of Weber’s oeuvre in a critical scrutiny of Ricœur’s work. I hope that someone will do so in future. For such studies one would need to understand Ricœur’s reception of Weber first, and that is the aim to which this article has limited itself.

1 Gilles Marmasse’s and Roberta Picardi’s, *Ricœur et la pensée allemande. De Kant à Dilthey*, (Paris: CNRS, 2019) does not have a chapter on Weber, but the subtitle holds the promise of a follow-up which might include Weber.


3 See my commentary on his early developments in the philosophy of history in E. Wolff, *Lire Ricœur depuis la périphérie* (under review), chapter 3, §1.


9 Ricœur, “The Political Paradox,” 255.


11 Ricœur, “Éthique et politique” [1959], in Lectures 1, 235-240, here 239.

12 I have commented in detail on peculiarity of this rendering in Wolff, *Political Responsibility for a Globalised World*, 229-233.
15 Sometimes Ricœur refers very briefly to another point of “Politics as a Vocation,” namely the question of attribution of guilt after the War. See Memory, History, Forgetting, trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 598n20.
17 Cf. Ricœur, Plaidoyer, 51.
18 Ricœur, “State and Violence” [1957], History and Truth, 234-246; here 245-246.
20 And parallel texts like Paul Ricœur, “Ideology and Utopia,” in From Text to Action, 308-324.
22 And even after Oneself as Another, he can still articulate these tensions with explicit reference to Weber: see Ricœur, “Postface au Temps de la responsabilité” [1991], in Lectures 1, 271-294; here 287-288.
24 This is evidenced, for instance, in the lecture series “Sémantique de l’action” (1971) or “Le discours de l’action” (1971-1972), following the references of Frans Vansina (and Pieter Vandecasteele), Paul Ricœur: Bibliographie primaire et secondaire 1935-2008 [Primary and secondary bibliography 1935-2008] (Leuven: Peeters, 2008), 139. Note that this theme is present in his work at least since Ricœur, “Work and the Word” [1953], in History and Truth, 197-222.
27 Ricœur, “Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology,” in From Text to Action, 270-303; here 270.
29 Ricœur, “Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology,” 278 (translation modified).
32 Ricœur, “Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology,” 305.
34 Cf. Ricœur, “Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology,” 302. For Ricœur’s view on the possibility of a diagnosis of modernity, see Time and Narrative 3, 207-216; and Memory, History, Forgetting, 293-342.
37 Ricœur, “Science and Ideology,” 249.
45 This position is further supported in subsequent writings from the same period, such as Ricœur, “Hegel and Husserl” and “Practical Reason” [1979], in From Text to Action, 188-207.
This is a continuation of a fluctuating interest in Marx and Marxism stretching back as far as Ricœur’s early pre-World War II articles. The authors engaged in the Lectures do not exhaust Ricœur’s work on contemporary Marx-literature—see Ricœur, “Le Marx de Michel Henry,” [1978] in Lectures 2: La contrée des philosophes (Paris: Seuil, 1992), 265-293. However, there is no reference to Weber in this text.

Ricœur, Lectures, 8, cf. 181, 198.

Cf. Ricœur, Lectures, 13.

Cf. Ricœur, Lectures, chapter 15.

Cf. Ricœur, Lectures, 14, 68, 157, 179.

Ricœur, Lectures, 89 (text corrected), similarly 106-107, 154, 198, 254.

See Ricœur, Lectures, 181-182.

Cf. Ricœur, Lectures, 181.

Ricœur, Lectures, 181.

Ricœur’s real opponent is a certain Marxist orthodoxy. His reading of Marx in the first lectures of this series attempts to point to the compatibility of some of Marx’s texts with the idea of social symbolism that Ricœur will subsequently elaborate on with Weber and Geertz (cf. Lectures, 183).

Cf. Ricœur, Lectures, 200.

Cf. Ricœur, Lectures, 182.

Ricœur, Lectures, 183; likewise: “We are looking for something that is not in the text, and so must read between the lines,” Lectures, 202 (my emphasis).

Cf. Ricœur, Lectures, 186

Cf. Ricœur, Lectures, 188.

Ricœur, Lectures, 199. This is a notable divergence from the idea of “self-presentation” of society used in the same argumentative context in the earlier essay, cf. citation (above) of Ricœur, “Science and Ideology,” 249.

Cf. Ricœur, Lectures, 189, 191.

Cf. Ricœur, Lectures, 199. One notices the similarity to a theme already found in “The Political Paradox.”

Cf. Ricœur, Lectures, 192.

Cf. Ricœur, Lectures, 195. This point is implicitly directed at the Marxist thesis of the withering away of the state, a thesis already critiqued in “The Political Paradox.”

Cf. Ricœur, Lectures, 201.

Ricœur, Lectures, 202.

Cf. Ricœur, Lectures, 209.

Ricœur, Lectures, 208. Such diagnostic parlance, which nowadays is promoted by authors such as Axel Honneth, is rather rare in Ricœur’s sociopolitical philosophy.
For his reading of Habermas, see Ricœur, Lectures, lectures 13 and 14.

The question of liveliness vs freezing evokes the same point in his book of the same period, Paul Ricœur, The Rule of Metaphor. Robert Czerny et al. trans. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986). Both have in common the question of creativity or stagnation in the symbolic mediation of action and our understanding of the world. The issue was again raised in the last chapter of Time and Narrative 3.


Ricœur, Lectures, 195.

Cf. Ricœur, Lectures, 196.

Ricœur, Lectures, 197.

Cf. Ricœur, Lectures, 197 and 211 on his bias against a certain understanding of rationality.

Cf. Ricœur, Lectures, 196.

It is not clear whether Ricœur means “better than Marx articulated his arguments” or “better than scholars have done thus far.”

Ricœur, Lectures, 214-215.


Ricœur, “Antoine Garapon’s Le Gardien des Promesses” [1996], in Reflections on the Just, 72-90, 91-105, and 156-167, respectively.


Ricœur, “Bouretz on Weber,” 150.


Paul Ricœur, “Hegel and Husserl on Intersubjectivity,” in From Text to Action, 227-245.


Ricœur, “Hegel and Husserl on Intersubjectivity,” 240.
Ricœur, “Hegel and Husserl on Intersubjectivity,” 240. In Lectures, 191, Ricœur claimed: “I am interested more in Weber’s conceptual framework than in his content” (my emphases). This is not a contradiction: this citation refers to the liberty with which Ricœur interprets Weber in the Lectures, which does not have any bearing on the coordination of Husserl’s phenomenology and Weber’s interpretive sociology undertaken by Ricœur in “Hegel and Husserl on Intersubjectivity.”

Cf. Ricœur, “Hegel and Husserl on Intersubjectivity,” 240-241. This coordination of Husserl with Weber clearly corresponds with the social theoretic project of Alfred Schütz (as is recognized by Ricœur, en passant, in “Hegel and Husserl on Intersubjectivity,” 239).

Ricœur, “Hegel and Husserl on Intersubjectivity,” 241. One can only be surprised to see how this Weberian position is summarily set aside; cf. Ricœur, Time, and Narrative 1, trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 261n17; Oneself as Another, 200; and The Just, 45.


Cf. Ricœur, “Hegel and Husserl on Intersubjectivity,” 242. At this point one can just mention the complete absence of Durkheim in this essay—as is largely the case throughout Ricœur.

Ricœur, “Hegel and Husserl on Intersubjectivity,” 244. Here Ricœur gives himself the sophisticated philosophical and socio-theoretic means by which to head his own critical call: “on the contrary, are we not forced to say that things are much more complicated and confused? The Manichaeeism in history is foolish and wicked” [compliquons, compliquons tout; brouillons leurs cartes; le manichéisme en histoire est bête et méchant]. (History and Truth, 96).


Ricœur, “Le ‘questionnement à rebours,’” 326.

In a way similar to the article under discussion, “L’originaire et la question-en-retour dans la Krise de Husserl” (1980), in A l’école de la phénoménologie (Paris: Vrin, 1986), 285-295 (here 286), Ricœur compares Husserl (Crisis) and Marx (German Ideology) on the reduction of idealities and ideologies to praxis.

Elsewhere, I have demonstrated how the hermeneutics of human capabilities can be used as a heuristic for human suffering, by reducing the suffering back to the praxis or actional context which results in de-capabilization—see E. Wolff, Between Daily Routine and Violent Protest (forthcoming 2021), “Conclusion,” §2.

104 Paul Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative* 1, 93, similarly 175.
105 Cf. Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative* 1, 93.
106 Cf. Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative* 1, 175-177.
107 Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative* 1, 181.
109 Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative* 1, 181.
112 Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative* 1, 184 (my numbering).
113 Cf. Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative* 1, 185-186.
115 Published in *From Text to Action*, 125-143.
117 Ricoeur, “Bouretz on Weber,” 149 (the translation reads: “interpretive understanding”).
120 Cf. Johann Michel devoted a substantial part of his *Homo interpretans* (Paris: Hermann 2017) to the relation of explanation and interpretation; Ricoeur’s use of Weber in this regard is discussed in the section “La sociologie et l’interprétation objective,” 308-320, here 311-313.
121 Cf. Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, 21-23.