

## **Form and Figure: Paul Ricoeur and the Rehabilitation of Human Work**

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My reference to “Form and Figure” in the title of this paper refers to a continuity I wish to explore between the kind of ontological transformation proposed by metaphor and the productive power of human work. The correlation I wish to draw can be expressed as that of the *poetics of the word* to the *poetics of work*. In a poetics of the word, meaning is constituted at two levels: the literal and metaphorical. I relate the literal level of meaning to the productive, or *formative*, capacity of work that responds to necessity and survival, and the metaphorical level of meaning to the *figurative* power of work that I shall argue gestures beyond necessity to open new possibilities of being-in-the-world.<sup>1</sup> By this analysis, I intend to appreciate a greater capacity in work that not only sustains life but in fact has a kind of responsibility towards being-itself, or what might be described as work’s “metaphysical calling.”<sup>2</sup> To be sure, Ricoeur does not offer a systematic exposition of human work as he does for the metaphor, and so my correlation of the two relies on extrapolating a philosophy of work from his philosophical corpus.<sup>3</sup> My argument is divided into two sections: the first will correlate the literal and figurative levels of metaphor to work, while the second will explore the necessity for metaphor and work to be unified but kept distinct.

### **Metaphor and Human Work**

My thesis here is that the poetics of the word and work refer to a fundamental kind of activity that is *poiesis*. Both work and metaphor

are not only a manner of producing but of “bringing forth” into reality such that our relationship to reality is refigured by them, ultimately disclosing new interpretations of the meaning of being. In following this argument, let us traverse the course Ricoeur sets out by which literal sense gives rise to metaphorical meaning.

With the word, this literal level is the sense of a word that lies in potential, only to be activated in speech or in writing. It refers to “any lexical value whatsoever.”<sup>4</sup> There exists a range of connotations ready to be employed according to the “arrow of meaning” that directs interlocution and written discourse. The literal level of discourse reflects the “immediate” sense in which communication is public. Nonetheless, Ricoeur cautions that we should not see the literal as the “proper” mode of language since this suggests anything non-literal would be a deviation of meaning. Such a reduction hinders us from seeing language as mediating beyond the literal to something more, something entirely new.<sup>5</sup> Hence, the *immediate* literal can be opposed to the *mediating* figurative. I shall turn to this figurative dimension in a moment, but let us first compare literal meaning to the necessity of work.

Similar to language, the literal level of work is that which is most obvious and therefore that which is most often identified as work itself: one works in order to live. Nothing is more literal than so-called brute existence where in “the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread” [*Genesis* 3:19]. For Marx, the literal level is what constitutes human practice itself, for it is the inalienable capacity to work by which one produces, or makes, oneself.<sup>6</sup> As we shall see, nonetheless, there is a danger to this conflation of life and work that Ricoeur refers to as “the triumph of work in a void.” For now we should note that the literal level of work occurs as a formative function where production creates or forms things by which human beings then realize themselves. This is Marx’s notion of objectification on which Ricoeur comments: “Only when I do something is there a work, a deed, something public and common to others, such that I realize or actualize myself. Only then do I really come to exist.”<sup>7</sup> Absent from Marx’s philosophy, however, is any definite direction of this self-realization. He ambiguously describes the human end in *Das Capital* as freedom that has no content.<sup>8</sup> The problem in Marx is that the process of self-realization, which in turn becomes self-legislating, cannot remain merely a form of neutral practice dedicated to human production. Human practice inevitably moves beyond neutral and necessary production and commits to an ethics of meaning and value. Here is precisely Habermas’ critique of Marx: he

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fails to distinguish between instrumental (*techné*) and practical reason (*phronesis*).<sup>9</sup> Practical reason is that which is addressed to goods and symbolic meaning, or as Habermas writes, “The practical includes all areas of action that have a symbolic structure, a structure that both interprets and regulates action. The technical and the practical represent a twofold division in the field of human action.”<sup>10</sup> Marx’s reduction of human practice to instrumentality leads to the loss of practical reason, and this loss of the expressly self-reflexive domain of thinking is radicalized in his repudiation of theoretical reflection (*sophia*). For Marx any referent of work that lies beyond production threatens to become ideological by placing *theoria* before practice. In this respect, human use is merely recaptured within an instrumental and technical framework of ends.<sup>11</sup>

But does work merely fulfil an instrumental, formative purpose? In other words, is there something else in the notion of form that is not simply something ready-to-hand for human use and consumption? It would appear that Marx’s notion of the self, although reformulated after a suspicion arising from class struggle, is itself unreceptive to the ongoing processes of reality. Marx assumes that humans merely use and produce in order to realize themselves; but does reality, or being-itself, have any significance in this relationship?<sup>12</sup>

In pursuing this question, Ricoeur’s analysis of metaphor’s hermeneutical nature allows us to alight upon a remarkable similarity between word and work: namely, how meaning comes from a pre-existing sense in order to realize a new possibility. Because the so-called “twist”<sup>13</sup> of metaphorical meaning relies on the pre-existing range of literal meanings and connotations in order to form a non-literal meaning, metaphor is by no means a radically free act.<sup>14</sup> Rather, it is indebted to the very givenness of language (*logos*) itself that, for many thinkers like Plato and Aristotle, constitutes the intelligibility of the cosmos.<sup>15</sup> It is because metaphor’s novel meaning is indebted to the language that precedes it that its referent therefore bears on reality itself and is, indeed, responsible to reality. Ricoeur refers to this in terms of how the literal, or first level of sense, activates the secondary or metaphorical sense: “If it is true that literal sense and metaphorical sense are distinguished and articulated within an interpretation, so too it is within an interpretation that a second-level reference, which is properly metaphorical reference, is set free by means of the suspension of the first-level reference.”<sup>16</sup> For Ricoeur, this suspension is decisive since the metaphorical *suspends* in order to preserve and refigure the

literal. Moreover, this suspension has greater implications for the overall aim of interpretation. It discloses the nature of interpretation as a suspension of the ego in order to realize a new self-understanding. Interpretation is not a self-projection of meaning but an encounter with something entirely new, or “the disclosure of *new modes of being*.”<sup>17</sup> This kind of encounter, says Ricoeur, “gives to the subject a new capacity of knowing himself.”<sup>18</sup> In this way, the emergence of meaning through the act of interpretation is correlative to the emergence of self-interpretation that “gives a *self* to the ego.”<sup>19</sup>

We can observe a similar function in work where the formative production of things is not an act of creation *per se* but a re-articulation of what is already there.<sup>20</sup> We find in work a metaphysical depth according to the Greek terms *hylē*, or matter, and *morphe*, or form. Human production, or *poiesis*, is the means by which the already existing matter is given form *as* something. Human *techne*, or know-how, is an addition to the primordial *phusis*, or nature. In *phusis*, a flower blooms of its own accord while in *techne* the natural forest is seen through human eyes and human possibilities as wood, that is, material for building.<sup>21</sup> Indeed, a specific kind of wood is sought out according to this *techne* which is good for a specific kind of building: the wood for house-building is not good for chair-building, for example. The translative feature of work that turns matter *into* a thing, that is, what constitutes the “as” structure of hermeneutic interpretation that Heidegger brings to our attention in *Being and Time* (I.v.§32.), cannot be underestimated. The “as” structure of interpretation liberates a thing from its literal sense because it is in being-with things that we interpret them “as” something. We know a table by virtue of our comportment to it as a place to gather, eat, pray, or have a seminar. The “as” of a thing is not a representation but a definite interpretation of a thing whose meaning is in fact present, or as Heidegger would say, a meaning that is presencing.<sup>22</sup> Indeed, if the nature of a product of work is to endure for human use, then this enduring, or what Ricoeur refers to as sedimentation, is persistently open to a process of re-interpretation that frees it for potential meaning beyond its initial inception and thus beyond its literal form.<sup>23</sup>

It is precisely at this moment when the literal form of a thing gestures beyond itself to something greater, that we can find a fundamental similarity shared by work and metaphorical meaning. Here, I come to a fuller expression of my distinction between form and figure. I suggest that work has two functions: a primary *formative* function;

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and a secondary *figurative* function, or what constitutes the ontological event by which “we experience the metamorphosis of...reality.”<sup>24</sup> Like the metaphor, the secondary, figurative meaning of work cannot be understood until the primary, formative meaning is engaged. “It is by living in the first meaning,” writes Ricoeur, “that I am led by it beyond itself; the symbolic meaning is constituted in and by the literal meaning.”<sup>25</sup> With work, this means that the basic needs for survival and metabolism are fulfilled before an interpretation of greater ontological significance can be engaged. This seems a point of common sense to a large degree, but it maintains at the same time a crucial link backwards where the figurative meaning cannot forsake or leave behind the literal. Indeed, one can say that the figurative does not destroy or make obsolete the literal form. Rather, it sustains the literal by virtue of a figurative meaning free of the limitations of necessity. In this respect, necessity is meaningful only because there is something greater than brute existence that would redeem necessity according to its “dependence on the spirit glimpsed in its teleology” and “on the sacred glimpsed in its eschatology.”<sup>26</sup>

Even in something like insurance, there is the relation between the metaphoric gesturing of the underwriter whose signature signifies approval of a risk. Whatever business or person is insured is also affirmed within a social nexus of risk and negligence, security and financial dissolvability. An insured entity is not only affirmed in the underwriting process, but so is a general comportment to reality itself. Hence, the discourse and thinking of the insurance industry is adopted into everyday life, a life that is above all characterized by the uncertainty that insurance would seek to remove. Cannot one say that life is translated into the discourse of insurance (e.g., indemnity, premium, negligence) by the gesturing of the underwriter’s pen? Nothing appears to escape the gesture of the human hand through which thoughts and actions become embodied...for better or worse.<sup>27</sup>

I suggest that because the uniquely human engagement with things is never only necessary that the human relation to the necessary is itself that which can be refigured. That is to say, the necessary is not left behind but placed within a larger ontological milieu in which it is connected to the philosophical and theological hope for the potential of humankind. In this sense, we can read back onto work, at the level of necessity, a kind of potency that instills and elevates work itself. If work is often seen as the use of hands to make and alter, then it is this use of the hands which is essentially a *gesture* to something greater than the realm of necessity. Indeed, as Heidegger notes: “Only a being who

can speak, that is, think, can have hands and can be handy in achieving works of handicraft.”<sup>28</sup> The gesture embodies, according to Ernst Cassirer, “a constructive process” of interpretation that bears meaning within a “structural whole.”<sup>29</sup> Similarly, Ricoeur explicitly mediates the extension of simple human gestures to an ontological depth that bears on an interpretation of reality. He writes,

The first meaning I read in my body, insofar as the body is a mediation of appearance, is not that it is finite, but precisely that it is open onto. . . . The body opens me onto the world even when it isolates me in suffering. . . . It opens me to others insofar as it expresses, that is to say, displays the interior upon the exterior and becomes a sign for others, decipherable and offered to the reciprocity of consciousness.<sup>30</sup>

The implications, on the one hand, of what lies in work in the act of gesturing, and on the other hand, of the ontological significance of this gesturing, suggests something quite radical. Work should not be defined by the criteria of efficiency and necessity alone. Indeed, as Marcuse, Heidegger, and Tillich have argued, efficiency is not an end in itself but is always efficient for something.<sup>31</sup> Alasdair MacIntyre states this well when arguing that efficiency and utility are not neutral values but by virtue of purporting to be “value-free” impose a specific discourse of meaning, and therefore, inevitably become involved in moral decisions that turn whatever neutral status its authority had into an exercise of power.<sup>32</sup>

A reflection on how work can be actualized beyond the values of efficiency and utility obviously lies outside this paper’s remit, but we can note that such a path would attempt to think work within “the joy of labor” and the natural calling to our talents and inclinations as a vocation. In lieu of such a rehabilitative project, I wish to bring to mind a caution that needs to be maintained in any reconstruction of a philosophy of work: namely, that the celebration of work can easily descend into a reduction of all things *into* work.

Ricoeur rightly notes that the identification of work with all areas of human activity tends “toward the very indeterminate notion of a militant and non-contemplative form of human existence,” or work that “triumphs in a void.”<sup>33</sup> Heidegger, similarly, refers to technology according to which things are “unnaturally” set forth at one’s disposal in order to secure an aim.<sup>34</sup> My hesitancy to identify

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work with human existence resists the reduction of life to necessity and toil; and moreover, it repudiates the idea that any hope for humanity lies simply in the cessation of such necessities. It was Count Zinzendorf who once expressed so horribly this reduction when he said, "One does not only work in order to live, but one lives for the sake of one's work, and if there is no more work to do one suffers or goes to sleep."<sup>35</sup>

### Work and the Word

In what way can this reduction of all things into work be prevented? I suggest it lies in seeing that human work is not reflective in and of itself. For Plato and Aristotle, *techné* is not a self-reflexive form of knowledge since it aims at an end, such as house-building, but not the contemplation on the use of such things.<sup>36</sup> Work therefore requires a constant re-invocation of human reflection.

This limitation refers to Ricoeur's distinction between *poiesis* as art, or rendering, and *poiesis* as work, or making.<sup>37</sup> "Rendering" refers to the artistic act of surrendering to the very vision that bodies forth in poetry, painting, and so on. It has no commitment to necessity and practical use, and this occurs to the extent that what is involved in the creative act is not determined by material necessity and the intention to form a practical-structural version of the world: "Tell a creator, say Van Gogh or Cézanne, that he is fabricating a world-version. He will not recognize himself in this account of what he is doing . . . The painter – at least this kind of painter – understands himself as the servant – if not the slave – of that which has to be said, depicted, exemplified, expressed."<sup>38</sup> "Making," on the other hand, refers to the capacity to fabricate according to what has been given within a structural whole of production without requiring a reflection on the nature and meaning of the production itself. It is driven by a set of techniques whose aim is production for human use and not a reflection on the nature and significance of use. It is in this respect that for *techné* necessity therefore appears as the most evident and meaningful principle in making. What should also be noted in terms of this kind of making is that while work embodies a world through its fabrication, this world is also that which is coming to pass into something else through and in human use. This vitality of work is never one that sets itself apart from human existence but seems to be synonymous with it. Work, as Heidegger would say, disappears in our actual engagement in it because all effort and attention is directed at "the in order to" of a project of

work.<sup>39</sup> It is reflection, on the other hand, whose meditation seeks to put such transparencies under its gaze. In the end, work requires reflection in order to prevent it from becoming closed in upon itself. But at the same time, work not only requires reflection but provokes it and therefore becomes pervaded by it. There is, according to Ricoeur, “a power to the spoken word which traverses and penetrates everything human, including the machine, the utensil, and the hand.”<sup>40</sup>

One can see, for example, that the nature of work is to open the world to inter-communication and discourse: by the interaction of different communities linked by the trade of commodities and ideas, by the transmission of techniques from one generation to the next, and by the inheritance of knowledge in artifacts embodying ritual and sanctity. This ability to transmit itself refers to a feature of work that is already metaphorical and is therefore irreducible to necessity alone: it exists as one thing and yet bears the meanings and intentions of another. For example: in the building of a temple, as Heidegger observes, space is made on the earth for the *temenos*, or sacred space surrounding the temple.<sup>41</sup> And conversely, the sacred space endures by virtue of the temple that gathers it. But its space is not only that of sanctity that invokes, celebrates, and allows for propitiation. It is also, by virtue of its being demarcated against the space that is not the *temenos*, a place to be questioned, either within the immediate community that erected it or by scholars arriving centuries later and attempting to understand the sacred in relation to the profane. The *noema* of the work-act, according to Ricoeur, remains sedimented as a trace that is re-interpreted through historical and social time.<sup>42</sup> In short, if human effort moves within an economy of work, this economy is also one of discourse, or the word.<sup>43</sup>

Furthermore, the public structure that work creates is not isolated from the communal encounter with finitude. The meaning of a particular kind of use is never totally transparent but enacts a particular interpretation of existence. For example, one can distinguish between the *focus* of the act of hammering in a particular task (as in nailing a plank) and the *enframing* that has allowed and determined such an activity (as in nailing a plank to a fence that divides property).<sup>44</sup> The focus of any particular task is open to a larger milieu that bears relations of ontological significance (or enframing) and is therefore not readily apprehensible. In the cited example, the construction and maintenance of a fence bears a definite interpretation of the “*socius* of the neighbor” that “innovates a hyper-sociological mutuality between one person and another.”<sup>45</sup> The fence divides, encloses, and attests to the private space



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away from and elevated above the public sphere. It gives status to the suburban developments and the gated communities of contemporary America over against a social discourse of participation.<sup>46</sup> But in the activity of mending the fence, none of this is readily associated with the simple, practical activity that requires nothing but direct focus on how and what to nail.

Thus, we cannot forget work is inevitably linked to the philosophical and theological hope that seeks to redeem humankind. In the *nexus* of work, one might say that the entirety of human *praxis* is connected as if one effort, constituting a civilization that responds to a metaphysical calling. In other words, and according to Ricoeur, *theoria* is the *raison d'être* of *praxis*.<sup>47</sup> The response to this calling bears witness to the meaning of being in such a way that it allows the question of being to emerge within a distinct and unique relation for the public. If work is performed in the eyes of another, we cannot forget that this includes the gaze of being-itself, or as Heidegger would say, the gods who look upon human beings.<sup>48</sup> Work as *poiesis* gives to humankind an earth to dwell upon but not the completion of the dwelling act. It would seem that work therefore occasions the unique kind of human dwelling that finds its greatest activity in the stillness of contemplation.<sup>49</sup> Ricoeur refers to this domain of human existence as contemplation “without resistance,” by which he means it is a domain of human being that cannot be reduced to pragmatic ends. It concerns “the gaze which would make itself present to everything in the instant, vision without effort because it is without resistance, possession without duration because it is without effort. To identify existence with work amounts to excluding pure contemplation from the properly human condition.”<sup>50</sup> In this same spirit, Hannah Arendt remarks at the conclusion of her study of work, labor, and action: “if . . . no other measure but the extent of sheer activity were to be applied to the various activities within the *vita activa* [that is, the life of *praxis*], it might well be that thinking as such would surpass them all.”<sup>51</sup>

The necessity of placing the questioning, or “dubitative,”<sup>52</sup> capacity of the word along side the rendering power of work does not identify inherent shortcomings in either human reflection or action. Rather, it is in this relationship that we catch sight of the hermeneutical nature of existence in which we reflectively apprehend a possibility of being that we subsequently attest to in terms of the world we render in work. One can begin with either pole of this dialectic—word or work—but to omit one in pursuing the other has consequences that we perhaps

know all too well in the vanity of words and the one-dimensionality of the modern work ethic. The dialectic of *the possibility of being* and *the actuality of work* hopes in some way to redeem human toil, not by eliminating it or reducing it but by transforming it. But this is only to say, after Heidegger, that ontological possibility is actuality; and in this sense, for human civilization the imperative of work should always be accompanied to the end by the question.

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## Notes

<sup>1</sup> See Ricoeur on Heidegger; “Writing as a Problem for Literary Criticism and Philosophical Hermeneutics,” *A Ricoeur Reader: Imagination and Reflection*, ed. Mario J. Valdés (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), 332. It should be noted that possibilities of being do not merely refer to a range of choices but the phenomenon of possibility itself that is presented to humankind as a distinctive apprehension of being-towards-the-future and so determines the way in which one perceives how to live. “It is rather,” states James Dodd, “to have as an issue the manner in which one is to be, to have an understanding of what is at stake in being oriented to it;” “The Philosophical Significance of Hope,” *The Review of Metaphysics* 58:1 (Sept. 2004): 125.

<sup>2</sup> Ricoeur, “Emmanuel Mounier: A Personalist Philosopher,” *History and Truth*, trans. Charles A. Kelbley (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1965), 137. Cf. Ricoeur on the sacred; “Existence and Hermeneutics,” *The Conflict of Interpretations*, ed. Don Ihde (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974), 22.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Domenico Jervolino, “Gadamer and Ricoeur on the hermeneutics of praxis,” *Paul Ricoeur: The Hermeneutics of Action*, ed. Richard Kearney (London: SAGE, 1996), 72. Another point of reflection on this occurs in Ricoeur’s lectures on ideology and utopia. See, in particular, George Taylor’s comments about symbolic action in his “Introduction,” *Lectures on Ideology and Utopia*, ed. George H. Taylor (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), xix-xxxv.

<sup>4</sup> Ricoeur, *The Rule of Metaphor*, trans. Robert Czerny, Kathleen McLaughlin, and John Costello (Routledge, 1977), 222.

<sup>5</sup> Ricoeur, *The Rule of Metaphor*, 222.

<sup>6</sup> “Faire et en faisant se faire;” Ricoeur, “Work and the Word,” in *History and Truth*, 198.

<sup>7</sup> Ricoeur, *Lectures on Ideology and Utopia*, 39. Cf. Ricoeur’s notion of “finite tasks”; “Work and the Word,” *History and Truth*, 212. For Marx on objectification, see *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, trans. Martin Milligan (Amherst: Prometheus Books, 1988), 107-8.

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<sup>8</sup> For criticisms of Marx's "empty" concept of freedom and the failure of Marx's philosophy of work to mediate practice beyond a response to necessity, see: Julius Loewenstein, *Marx against Marxism*, trans. Harry Drost (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976), 86-90; James O'Rourke, *The Problem of Freedom in Marxist Thought: An Analysis of the Treatment of Human Freedom by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Contemporary Soviet Society* (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1974), 39; and Ricoeur, *Lectures on Ideology and Utopia*, 10 and "Structure and Hermeneutics," *The Conflict of Interpretations*, 53 n17.

<sup>9</sup> Ricoeur, "Habermas (1)," in *Lectures on Ideology and Utopia*, 221-4.

<sup>10</sup> Habermas as quoted in Ricoeur, in *Lectures on Ideology and Utopia*, 226.

<sup>11</sup> My argument here in part reflects a larger interpretation of the history of philosophy in which Aristotle's intellectual virtues (i.e., *sophia*, *phronesis*, and *techné*) are seen as hermeneutically united as opposed to separate virtues that bear little or no relation to one another. For the former view see, for example, Gadamer, "The Idea of Practical Philosophy," trans. P. Christopher Smith, *The Idea of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 159-78 and Catriona Hanely, *Being and God in Aristotle and Heidegger* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), 161-9. Within the Anglo-American Classical scholarship, this debate is referred to as the "inclusivist v. intellectualist" debate. What I refer to as hermeneutical unity of the three virtues corresponds to the former, whose main proponent is J.L. Ackrill. For an account of this debate see Timothy Roche, "Ergon and Eudaimonia in Nicomachean Ethics, I: Reconsidering the Intellectualist Interpretation," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 26 (1988): 175-94.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Herbert Marcuse, *Reason and Revelation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1941), 113; Jeff Hearn, "Gender: Biology, nature, and capitalism," *The Cambridge Companion to Marx*, ed. Terrell Carver (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 224; and Sean Sayers, *Marxism and Human Nature* (London: Routledge, 1988), 166-8.

<sup>13</sup> Ricoeur, "Word, Polysemy, Metaphor," *A Ricoeur Reader*, 77-81. This is a term Ricoeur borrows from Monroe Beardsley.

<sup>14</sup> Ricoeur, *The Rule of Metaphor*, 60.

<sup>15</sup> E.g., *Gorgias* 507e-508a and *Nicomachean Ethics* X7.1177a12-24. Cf. Louis Dupré, *Passage to Modernity: An Essay in the Hermeneutics of Nature and Culture* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 17.

<sup>16</sup> Ricoeur, *The Rule of Metaphor*, 261.

<sup>17</sup> Ricoeur, "Metaphor and the Main Problems of Hermeneutics," *A Ricoeur Reader*, 316.

<sup>18</sup> Ricoeur, "Metaphor and the Main Problems of Hermeneutics," 316.

<sup>19</sup> "Appropriation," *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences*, ed. John B.

Thompson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 193. *Italics* in original.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Ricoeur's questioning of whether or not *poiesis* is adequately described as making; "Nelson Goodman's *Ways of Worldmaking*," *A Ricoeur Reader*, 210-11.

<sup>21</sup> Heidegger, "On the Essence and Concept of *Phusis* in Aristotle's *Physics* B, I," *Pathmarks*, ed. William McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 209-10. David Roochnik notes that the original meaning of *techne* most likely referred to woodwork (e.g., house-building), thus relating to the original meaning of *hyle* as woods or forest; *Of Art and Wisdom: Plato's Understanding of Techne* (University Park: Penn State University Press, 1996), 18-20.

<sup>22</sup> For Heidegger presence refers to occurrent entities (e.g., the metaphysics of presence) and is therefore pejorative. Presencing refers to a dynamic mode of being in which something discloses itself, that is, has its own manner of being that cannot be reified into mere presence. Of course, what is central to Heidegger's thesis is how things have their manner of presencing according to their passing away; e.g., *Basic Concepts*, trans. Gary E. Aylesworth (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 96-103. Cf. Iain D. Thomson, *Heidegger on Ontotheology: Technology and the Politics of Education* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 34.

<sup>23</sup> "The Conflict of Interpretations: Debate with Hans Georg-Gadamer," *A Ricoeur Reader*, 228. Cf. Richard Rojcewicz, *The Gods and Technology: A Reading of Heidegger* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2006), 217.

<sup>24</sup> Ricoeur, "Word, Polysemy, Metaphor," in *A Ricoeur Reader*, 85.

<sup>25</sup> Ricoeur, *The Symbolism of Evil*, trans. Emerson Buchanan (Beacon Press, 1967), 15- 16. He refers to this according to the symbol, but it is clear that this same feature is shared by the metaphor. Cf. *The Rule of Metaphor*, 280; "The Function of Fiction in Shaping Reality," *A Ricoeur Reader*, 115-128. The difference between the two, generally speaking, is that symbol is pre-reflective [*The Symbolism of Evil*, 10-18] while the metaphor is not and is formed according to a "semantic lacuna" that the author fills in [Karl Simms, *Paul Ricoeur* (London: Routledge, 2003), 65].

<sup>26</sup> Ricoeur, "Existence and Hermeneutics," *The Conflict of Interpretations*, 24.

<sup>27</sup> For an application of Ricoeur's metaphorical/symbolic understanding of work in relation to commodification and intellectual property in U.S. law, see George H. Taylor and Michael J. Madison, "Metaphor, Objects, and Commodities," *Cleveland State Law Review* 54 (2006): 141-74. I am thankful to Dr. Taylor for providing me with a copy of this article which affirms many of the central points in my paper in more detail.

<sup>28</sup> Heidegger, *What Is Called Thinking?* trans. J. Glenn Gray (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), 16.

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<sup>29</sup> Ernst Cassirer, *An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy on Human Culture* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), 142.

<sup>30</sup> Ricoeur, *Fallible Man*, trans. Charles A. Kelbley (New York: Fordham University Press, 1986), 19.

<sup>31</sup> E.g., see Herbert Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man, Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society* (London: Routledge, 1964); Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology*, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), 26-7; and Paul Tillich, *The Spiritual Situation in Our Technological Society*, ed. J. Mark Thomas (Macon: Mercer University Press, 1988).

<sup>32</sup> Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory*, 2nd edition (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1984), 26-7, 74. And, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1988), 323-3. Cf. Martha Nussbaum, *The Fragility of Goodness: Luck Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy* (Cambridge University Press, 1986), 321. For an analysis of technology in relation to the managerial structure of work and how the two together impose a predetermined interpretation of the meaning of work, see Mark Okrent, "Work, Play, and Technology," *Philosophy and the Problems of Work*, ed. Kory Schaff (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), 73-91; also in *Philosophical Forum* 10:2-4 (Winter-Summer 1978-79).

<sup>33</sup> Ricoeur, "Work and the Word," in *History and Truth*, 198. The modern notion of leisure as "free time," for example, is based upon the negative concept of freedom in which the time which is free is the time unhindered or occupied by the obstacle of work. Free time describes the nebulous duration that can be privately determined by individual desire, but inevitably, it has its meaning only in and relation to work. If this is the case, then free time will in some way be measured by the criterion that defines work—i.e., usefulness. Cf. Ricoeur, "The model of the text: meaningful action considered as text," *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences*, 202.

<sup>34</sup> I refer to Heidegger's notion of technology drawing out the "longest possible duration" of things; *Basic Concepts*, 14. For a detailed consideration of the force and subtlety of Heidegger's thinking on technology that has not been surpassed today despite the proliferation of the philosophy of technology, see David Lewin, "Freedom and Destiny in the Philosophy of Technology," *Blackfriars* 87:1011 (September 2006): 515-33.

<sup>35</sup> Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (Minneapolis: Dover Publications, Inc., 2003), 264 footnote 24.

<sup>36</sup> E.g., see Roochnik, *Of Art and Wisdom*, 158 and Rojcewicz, *The Gods and Technology*, 191.

<sup>37</sup> Ricoeur, "Nelson Goodman's *Ways of Worldmaking*," in *A Ricoeur Reader*, 210-11.

<sup>38</sup> Ricoeur, "Nelson Goodman's *Ways of Worldmaking*," in *A Ricoeur Reader*, 211. Cf. Heidegger on the self-sufficiency of an artwork, "The Origin of the Work of Art," *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. Alfred Hofstadter (New

York: Harper & Row, 1971), 29-30.

<sup>39</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, §15. For example, when one hammers something, the hammer disappears in this process for the focus is directed to driving a nail.

<sup>40</sup> Ricoeur, "Work and the Word," in *History and Truth*, 199.

<sup>41</sup> Heidegger, "Origin of the Work of Art," in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, 41-2.

<sup>42</sup> Ricoeur, "The model of the text: meaningful action considered as text," in *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences*, 206-07.

<sup>43</sup> Ricoeur, "Work and the Word," in *History and Truth*, 219.

<sup>44</sup> I have adopted in part Max Black's terms "focus" and "frame" that he uses to describe how metaphor is always open to a larger range of meaning (frame) that is manifested in the particular metaphor (focus). See, for example, Simms, *Paul Ricoeur*, 70.

<sup>45</sup> Ricoeur, "The *Socius* of the Neighbor," *History and Truth*, 101.

<sup>46</sup> This is, of course, the inverse of the ancient Greek privilege to participate in the *polis*. Cf. Paul Halmos, "The Ideology of Privacy and Reserve," *Mass Leisure*, ed. M. Marrus (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1974), 132.

<sup>47</sup> Ricoeur, "Work and the Word," in *History and Truth*, 218.

<sup>48</sup> Heidegger, *Parmenides*, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 108; cf. Rojcewicz, *The Gods and Technology*, 8, 50.

<sup>49</sup> For the notion of dwelling, see Heidegger, "Building, Dwelling, Thinking," in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, 154.

<sup>50</sup> Ricoeur, "Work and the Word," in *History and Truth*, 199.

<sup>51</sup> Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 325.

<sup>52</sup> Ricoeur, "Work and the Word," in *History and Truth*, 205-8.