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The Phenomenology of Pain and Pleasure

Henry and Levinas

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What is the essence of pain and pleasure? How do they appear and in which way do they affect us? It would be surprising if phenomenology of all disciplines would lack adequate answers to these basic questions, but this is nevertheless what Michel Henry and Emmanuel Levinas argue. Phenomenology prides itself on having progressed beyond the empiricist reduction of experience to associations of sense data through its analysis of intentionality, which reveals the way in which experience is meaningfully structured. According to Henry and Levinas, however, it is precisely the central role ascribed to intentionality that leads to phenomenology’s misunderstanding of the immediate and affective life of pleasure and pain.

We will explore how Levinas and Henry give a phenomenological analysis of pain and pleasure without reference to the foundational concept of intentionality. In doing so, we hope to bring them together in a novel way. Levinas and Henry have most often been juxtaposed in regard to their similar and different roles in what has become known as “the theological turn in French phenomenology.” Both thematize God within their respective phenomenological projects, but they hold opposing views on the question of immanence and transcendence, the alterity of the other person, along with the Jewish or Christian understanding of God. Still, their criticism of philosophy has much in common, as they both criticize ontology, the concepts of autonomous subjectivity, and the neglect of fundamental passivity. Yet, there is another juxtaposition between them, one that is far less explored in the commentary literature, namely that concerning pain and pleasure and phenomenology’s one-sided investment in intentionality. The lack of attention to the role of pain and pleasure is surprising given the fundamental role it plays in Levinas and Henry.

Through their critique of intentionality, Levinas and Henry are able to open the phenomenology of pain and pleasure by exploring their non-intentional appearance. The interrogation of their phenomenalities lead,
however, to new problems or dilemmas – we will focus on two. First, it seems that pain and pleasure stand in a peculiar relation to the external world. On the one hand, pains and pleasures are intuitively oriented to the external world we enjoy or suffer from. On the other, however, pain and pleasure are classic examples of subjective states whose reality belongs to the subjective experience of them, so that we can imagine undergoing them without any reference to externality. Second, concerning their relation, pain and pleasure seem at the same time both similar and different; they share being regarded as subjective experiences – as affections or sensations – but appear as opposites or structurally different when it comes to their particular phenomenality. Faced with these two dilemmas we will see that Levinas’ and Henry’s responses diverge.

While at first such endeavor seems to have limited value, limited to the regional analyses of pain and pleasure, they also raise profound questions about both phenomenology and our affective life. If traditional phenomenology is not able to capture pain and pleasure given its method and notions, one will have to reassess the status of those methods and notions. And if the meaning of phenomenality, intentionality, and interiority needs to be modified, it will lead to a revision of our very understanding of phenomenology as such. Even more significantly, pain and pleasure along with suffering and enjoyment are not just some affective tonalities among others, but the constitutive tonalities for existence as such; life is fundamentally shaped by these affectivities. As we will eventually claim, pain and pleasure even make up the fundamental condition for our ethical relation to the other.

**Intentionality and affectivity**

Both Henry and Levinas hold that intentionality is restricted to the objects manifest in the transcendent world, and for this reason does not apply to the region of sensibility, affectivity, and our interior life as a whole. Henry, like Levinas, defends what seems like a truism, namely that pain is a mode of our affectivity understood as some form of impression, charged with feeling, that draws our attention towards itself. For Henry, intentionality cannot account for this affectivity because it implies a distance between what appears to intentionality and the appearance as such. There can be no such distance in pain and pleasure, for these affects are not cast in front of us and aimed at. However, the intentional objects which intentionality ek-statically orients us to, do not give themselves, Henry claims, with any internal feeling or affective tonality of their own. Intentionality illuminates the world “without making a distinction between things and persons, in terrifying neutrality” – which, we note, echoes Levinas’ description of “there is.” As long as we remain intentionally directed to the world, we do not encounter suffering or joy. But since we do suffer and enjoy, the visible world that intentionality aims at
cannot be the sole region of phenomenology. The neglect of the duplicity of appearance characterizes what Henry calls the “ontological monism” of Western thought that does not recognize any appearances apart from worldly, visible manifestations.5

More radically, Henry believes that intentionality is not the essence of manifestation, and therefore cannot play the fundamental role phenomenology assigns to it in the first place. This is precisely because of the way intentionality operates with a gap between directedness and the world. Phenomenology takes the content of consciousness for granted without accounting for how it manifests itself as lived and felt. Although it appeals to the appearance of the world, it leaves unexplained how the content – the impressions or hyle – comes into being.6 We need to go back to the fundamental understanding of the phenomenon, namely that which shows itself from itself, in its absolute immediacy without distinctions. If the appearance of the world remains in front of us and at a distance, one might think that intentionality compensates for the distance. But when we ask how phenomenology phenomenalizes itself, it turns out that it does not show itself either. True, we can turn a new intention back on an existing intentional ray through reflection, but for the new intention to be given to us, we would need a third one to perceive it, and so on – which leads to the absurdity of an infinite regress.7 Phenomena may show themselves in front of an intentional gaze, but they never show how they show themselves, and thus leave their self-manifestation completely obscure. If not through intentionality, how do phenomena originally occur? What is their true source which makes them manifest and self-revealing?

Henry argues that the problem of phenomenology’s foundation is solved when we grant the impressional contents of joy and suffering their autonomous weight, independently of constitutive processes. This is so because impressions mark the immediate presence of an appearance that is not only given to a distinct subjective pole. Impressions reveal themselves to themselves – they are self-revelatory: “for there is no possible impression … unless it touches itself at each point of its being, in such a way that, in this original self-embrace, it auto-impresses itself.”8 Impressions do not obey the distance of intentionality which forever throws its meaning in front of itself, for impressions are immediately given as inherent parts of the affectivity that ceaselessly furnishes our immanent, subjective life. Impressions and affections are not caused but affect themselves. Only as auto-affections and as auto-revealing can phenomena appear from themselves, to themselves, and as immanent to the affected self.

Levinas similarly criticizes the theory of intentionality for misunderstanding the way in which the affective dimension of life is lived, and does so in regard to a similar problem that Henry identifies, namely the objectification of affectivity: “The idea of intentionality has compromised the idea of sensation by removing the character of being a concrete datum from
this allegedly purely qualitative and subjective state, foreign to all objectification.”9 Phenomenology was led to compromise affectivity as an object due to its own novel discovery, namely that experience cannot be accounted for as a set of received sense data that consciousness later synthetizes. Rather, in accordance with the thesis of passive synthetization, we find that consciousness is directed to objects that are given to consciousness, instead of being consciously produced through judgments. For this reason, phenomenology emphasizes how sensations are given with the objects of consciousness; “color is always extended and objective, the color of a dress, a law, a wall; sound is a noise of a passing car, or a voice of someone speaking.”10 The theory of intentionality objectifies sensations by apprehending them always as the quality of a substance, the correlate of a constituted “consciousness of…”

Like Henry, Levinas does not dismiss the theory of intentionality, which he sees as correctly accounting for our relation to objects. Intentionality is, however, unable to describe the unique way in which affective content is given: “This critique of sensation failed to recognize the plane on which the sensible life is lived as enjoyment.”11 The dimension of affectivity does not regard the perception of an object, but the sensation of a quality, and this sensibility materializes not as “consciousness of…” or grasping “this as that”, but according to its own logic – as pleasant, painful, tiresome, comfortable, etc. It seems that Levinas is extending this critique not only to Husserl but also to Merleau-Ponty when the latter says of sensation that “this elementary perception is already charged with a sense…The perceptual something is always in the middle of some other thing, it always belongs to a field.”12 While Merleau-Ponty would argue that e.g. the sensation of touching a smooth wooden surface cannot be isolated but must always be understood within its field (e.g. as “the wood of that table”), Levinas would retort that the enjoyment of this touch isolates the sensation, savoring the wood’s texture without regard for what it is a texture of, “a breaking up of the form of a phenomenon which becomes amorphous and turns into ‘prime matter’.”13 Enjoyment does not relate to substances, but to qualities. These qualities cannot be reduced to their role in accompanying objects in order to make them perceivable, but provide a unique meaning of their own: “Rather than taking sensations to be contents destined to fill a priori forms of objectivity, a transcendental function sui generis must be recognized in them (and for each qualitative specificity in its own mode).”14

For both Henry and Levinas, the affectivity of sensibility provides something which seems absent in theoretical intentionality, namely an account of why life is experienced as personal.15 The theoretical vision of intentionality seems to belong to an anonymous observer, whereas the subject undergoing the affects of pain and pleasure are deeply and personally immersed in life. Levinas calls it “the love of life,” arguing that it makes up “The personality of the person, the ipseity of the I.”16 Henry similarly argues
that this personal and lived dimension of experience cannot go unnoticed by phenomenology, as it explains a crucial aspect of experience:

how it happens that the modalities of one’s own life are revealed each time to the one who experiences them, why and how they are precisely one’s own, in their sometimes overwhelming original presence, in their real and indeed singular existence.\(^{17}\)

The flesh is the way in which life itself comes into being, and this is why it is never anonymous but always belongs to a self or ipseity. In the affectivities of pain and pleasure, life is not anonymous but personal. Their phenomenality is that of an intimate investment rather than the indifferent distance characteristic of the objects of intentionality.

In their appeal to immediacy and interiority, however, a difference between the two authors starts to emerge, a difference which is already visible in the above privileging of certain terms. For we have elected to use the term affectivity, which is to privilege Henry’s nomenclature. Levinas does use it, but he also employs another term, sensibility, a term Henry would be suspicious to invoke.\(^{18}\) Henry would furthermore be suspicious due to an important point of difference between the two concerning the question of exteriority.

**Henry on pain and pleasure**

Henry holds that there is no life without affection, indeed auto-affection, which means that a privileged way to explore the non-intentional life is to start with what he regards as its main affective tonalities, namely suffering and joy. At central junctures, he invites us to regard the most elementary of impressions, where pain serves as the paradigmatic example. For Henry, such impressions are not empirical sensibility that we receive, but self-revelations: they are unavoidably charged with the feeling of pain and, more fundamentally, affectivity of suffering. Pain as impression comes close to Husserl’s notion of original hyle, except that for Henry, it is not functionally interlinked with any intentional form, but simply given as such. We usually think of pain as a signal reacting to a worldly cause that afflicts our physical body. Such an outward-oriented intentionality is, however, unable to register pain since pain is not manifest in the world, but only reveals itself in the invisible milieu of our interior life. Whatever causes our pain, it will only appear to a subject able to feel it.\(^{19}\) The feeling of pain is therefore not an event taking place on the objective body at all but only reveals itself in the immediacy of our immanent flesh. To the flesh, pure pain appears without spatial or temporal distance.

Intentionality establishes a distance over its intentional object, and this secures the freedom of the subject. In pain, we are deprived of this freedom since there is no division between the pain and the suffering of it – and the same holds for pleasure.\(^{20}\) It is for this reason Henry arrives at a significant
insight, also central to Levinas, namely that the impossibility of escape is central to suffering pain. There is no other that can suffer one’s own auto-affection, and there is no place one can withdraw or escape to. Pain reveals itself without the possibility of distance:

driven against itself, overwhelmed by its own weight, it is incapable of instituting any form of stepping-back from itself, a dimension of flight thanks to which it might be possible for it to escape from itself and from that which was oppressive about its being. In the absence of any divide within suffering, the possibility of turning one’s gaze upon it is ruled out.21

Regarding our first problem raised in the introduction concerning the exterior and the interior, we see that Henry’s reduction to pure pain deliberately leaves out any traces of exteriority. Indeed, the suffering of pain consists in the fact that it is riveted to its own immanence with no way out. This follows analytically from the essence of immanence: “In the essence there is nothing transcendent.”22 With no outside or distance, immanence is also totally bound to itself and incapable of freedom. Pain neither points beyond itself, nor does it stem from anything except its own undergoing, as pure auto-affection. We believe Henry is right to underline that pain, at least with a certain intensity, can reveal itself within us as indifferent to its cause or intentional objects, rendering the world irrelevant. Still, we wonder if Henry does not go too far in purifying the immanence. If the closed circle of auto-affection is a milieu where “there is nothing in it of the opposed,” one might wonder if Henry does not leave out precisely what makes pain aversive and negative, namely the disturbing sting of pain that invades us.23 We will return to this later.

First, however, let us pause and ask if we draw a too simplified picture of Henry. Admittedly, there are also passages where Henry seems to modify the exclusion of transcendence and otherness, passages where he explicitly seems to invoke them. He can write that “there is still within this ordeal something other, … suffering is always more and other than itself.”24 The quotation is from one of Henry’s last works, I am the Truth, and one could suspect that he changed his view on suffering in this later stage of his authorship. Upon closer scrutiny, however, it becomes clear that he in fact sticks to his earlier convictions, for while the otherness he has in mind is certainly connected to the emergence of suffering, it does not designate any intrusion from the external world or transcendence breaking into immanence, but rather the divine Life itself, that is, what generates and upholds the immanence in the first place. “Otherness” here signifies a life that we have not produced ourselves, a life that is given prior to our affirmations and negations. What he has in mind is the fundamental suffering that stems from our utter passivity as life itself comes into itself in the immanence of the flesh. That the very arrival of life can appear as suffering in the first place is because life is always shot through with affectivity, from beginning to end. Despite its appearance, Henry does not invoke some disturbing externality of sorts, and
pain therefore still only reveals itself in the homogenous milieu of immanence.

What about pleasure and joy? The same overlap between the impressional pain and the fundamental affectivity of suffering is echoed in Henry’s account of pleasure and enjoyment: the revelation of pleasure is conditioned by a transcendental life that is already affective in essence. Max Scheler believes it is possible to provide analyses of what he calls sensory feelings, such as pleasure, but for Henry, it is insufficient to appeal to sensation since sensation cannot feel its own pleasure but needs a further transcendental condition for it to appear to someone. Pleasure cannot be rooted in sensory feelings or our involvement with the world, but must stem from the immanent, fundamental tonalities of suffering and joy that are given prior to and independently of the world. Unsurprisingly, Henry portrays pleasure in much the same way as pain, and not accidentally so, because they both are rooted in the same essence of affectivity.

Henry’s answer to our second problem regarding heterogeneity and homogeneity starts to appear: there is, for Henry, at the very least a basic commonality between pain and pleasure. Henry’s conception of their relationship is admittedly quite complex. Affectivity follows the passivity of absolute immanence, and for this reason, the affection of suffering is inscribed in this passivity in the sense that the affectivity of suffering remains inexorably riveted to itself, weighed down by its own weight, impotent and without exit. We cannot stop being ourselves. This auto-affectivity is not added on to life but is inscribed in the essence of life from the beginning – life as Archi-passibility. Suffering is given as a basic affective mood or tonality of this passive affectivity. So, however, is joy, for the very same passivity that makes us suffer life can also give rise to joy. For passivity, Henry argues, not only means being burdened and bound, but also implies the generosity of the joyful appearing of life – life revealing itself prior to any activity. Henry speaks of this joyous revelation as an experience of the self in the arrival of Life or, as his earlier thought presents it, of Being:

The power of feeling is not an abstraction or the idea of a power or capability; it is an experience, the experience of the self of Being in the enjoyment of self… That which arises in the triumph of this arising, in the shining forth of presence, in the Parousia, and finally, when there is something rather than nothing, is joy.

That there is something rather than nothing – Parousia of Being – is not the birthplace of philosophical wonder, as Leibniz and Heidegger have it, but the passive overflowing of life in joy. Henry makes it clear that Parousia, does not precede or lead to joy, but is given as joy, the joy as the affectivity inscribed in the advent of Being.

Enjoyment and suffering are two Janus-faces, two different tonalities of the same essence. Despite their fundamental oneness, Henry underlines time
and again that impressions and affections always appear with a concrete and determined tonality.\textsuperscript{28} But here we raise the question of whether Henry can redeem both the claim that there is one essential unity of affectivity and at the same time insist that every affection is distinct in its irreducible tonality. Does Henry not have to choose between either keeping the essential unity of affection, where the distinction relies only on accidental differences, or preserving essential distinctions of suffering and joy by giving up the claim to the unity of the two? Evidently, Henry will not give up their essential unity: “The unity of suffering and joy is the unity of Being itself, viz. the unity of the single and fundamental ontological event, … in this suffering, Being, senses itself and necessarily experiences itself in suffering and in the enjoyment of this suffering.” Stronger still, he says: “It is one and the same phenomenological content, one single tonality which is thought of as suffering and joy.”\textsuperscript{29} Given this single tonality at its root, there is no wonder that suffering and joy slip into one another, as we can enjoy our suffering and suffer for the same reason that we enjoy.

How, then, can he account for how our lives undergo variations of suffering and joy through time, along with all the other shades in-between? Henry believes he can preserve a dichotomy in our basic modes of affection without breaking their inner unity. Since the change of moods and tonalities that we undergo cannot respond to external circumstances, it must rely on a movement or transition within the essence of affectivity itself. There is, Henry claims, a kind of dialectic between suffering and joy spread out in time, but one that does not play itself out against any dialectical difference: it transforms itself from within, changing within the bounds of the same original essence. This means that the changes we undergo have their foundation in the passing of our immanence, and that this immanence, far from being static, is determined as a transition – precisely between our basic affection of suffering and joy.\textsuperscript{30} Henry sees this insight captured in the Beatitudes of the Gospels, which he paraphrases as: “Blessed are those who suffer.”\textsuperscript{31} Suffering does not only share the essential structure with enjoyment, but invites a paradoxical transition to enjoyment: “And when suffering reaches its limit point, in despair, as Kierkegaard puts it, ‘the self plunges through its own transparency into the power which established it,’ and the intoxication of life submerges us. Happy are those who suffer.”\textsuperscript{32} Suffering leads us to the joyous insight that life itself is passively given.

Henry’s analysis leads from impressions of pain and pleasure into the ultimate condition of life which is given as affectivity. But does Henry’s account describe how pain and pleasure are lived? One may feel that pain and pleasure have been deprived of their natural circumstances and turned into something basically interchangeable, perhaps identical in essence. Must we not assume that pain and pleasure, suffering and joy are irreducibly different due to their most obvious phenomenalization – as separated as ice and fire, or more appropriately, as evil and goodness?
Levinas on pleasure and enjoyment

While agreeing with Henry that pain and pleasure are irreducible to intentionality, objectification, and vision, Levinas does not operate with the same sort of dichotomy between affectivity and externality that Henry does. In stark contrast, Levinas sees externality as playing a crucial role in both pleasure and pain. How, then, does he avoid the neutralization of these affectivities that Henry feared would be the consequence of determining them in view of the external horizon of the world, where the “there is” hums its monotonous tune without regard for human existence?33

Beginning with enjoyment, Levinas does indeed maintain that pleasure opens up an interiority whose independence vis-à-vis the external world is characterized by an affectivity incompatible with the structure of “consciousness of...” In his alternative formulation of “living from...,” however, Levinas forefronts rather than omits a reference to the external world which we “live from,” that is, which constitutes and conditions us rather than the other way around. As Raoul Moati describes it, enjoyment is the inverse of intentionality, a situation in which consciousness does not constitute its object but is in fact nourished by it.34 For Levinas, the interior immanence of enjoyment must be understood with reference to our needs, that is, the way in which we are dependent on the world. The wonder of enjoyment for Levinas is precisely how this dependency turns into an independency: “Living from... is the dependency that turns into sovereignty, into happiness – essentially egoist.”35 The concretization of an interior egoism whose pleasures are in a sense above and beyond the order of substances is, for Levinas, not in opposition to, but made possible by the ego’s dependence on an exterior world.

In his treatment of enjoyment, therefore, Levinas in fact reverses Henry’s direction of thought: the phenomenality of enjoyment, far from excluding a reference to the exterior, in fact obsessively directs itself towards it. The hedonist is a world-oriented being: “Theophile Gautier’s line ‘I am one of those for whom the external world exists’ expresses that joyous appetite for things which constitutes being in the world.”36 To enjoy is to lose oneself in the variety of pleasures that the world provides without losing oneself – in stark contrast, it is the victorious accomplishment of egoism. This seems to be a very obvious characteristic of the phenomenality of enjoyment. Someone enjoying a piece of strawberry cheesecake is not closed off from the world in the interiority of enjoyment, but rather intently turned toward the cake itself and all its enjoyable aspects (the softness of the cream, the crunch of the biscuit base, etc.). This immersion in the cheesecake is not a loss of self but the triumph of the ego, whose outward orientation is wholly egoistic – the ego is pleasantly lost and thus affirmed in the cheesecake it satisfies itself with. The
interior and exterior relate here without contradiction, which could perhaps be said to be the very definition of enjoyment for Levinas.

Henry argued that the externalization of our interior affections renders them in anonymous neutrality, thus depriving them of the lived tonality that characterizes them as affections. This is, however, clearly not the case for Levinas’ hedonist. Rather than some detached humming of an uncaring universe, I relate to the exterior in enjoyment in terms of loving it; “Life is love of life, a relation with contents that are not my being but more dear than my being.” I am not the contents I enjoy, but they do not reach me in their insignificance; this is the world I love to live in, because it provides the possibilities of satisfaction. The orientation of Gautier’s hedonist is that of a worldly man who knows which localities provide the best environment for leisure during which seasons of the year, what wine to pair with whatever meal, the superior clothing material for one’s pajamas, etc. The external world is here not rendered in its neutrality and indifference toward me, but matters to me in the way it suits me, and feeds my appetite.

But how can we explicate enjoyment without prioritizing the affectivity of this enjoyability, which, as Henry would say, is the only place it manifests itself? What is enjoyment apart from the feeling of enjoyment? The crucial point to maintain here is that enjoyment precisely in its interior, affective phenomenality contains a reference to externality in its outward orientation. Paradoxically, the relation to externality is, argues Levinas, stronger in the subjective feeling of enjoyment than in the intellectual determination of an objective, external world. Enjoyment is not marred by the doubt about the external world. It is satisfied when it is satisfied, and the question of whether it is “really” in touch with the strawberry cheesecake it enjoys makes no sense to it: “To fill, to satisfy, is the sense of the savor, and it is precisely to leap over the images, aspects, reflections or silhouettes, phantoms, phantasms, the hides of things that are enough for the consciousness of…”

Enjoyment craves and achieves satisfaction. This is why enjoyment is so apt in thought experiments about simulation, like Robert Nozick’s experiment machine: enjoyment is the example par excellence of something that could possibly be simulated, for its simulation is virtually indistinguishable from its realization. The complete disregard for the intellectual worry about the external world does, however, not remove the external reference in the phenomenality of pleasure’s realization. Gautier’s line is again so precise in this context: the utterance “I am one of those for whom the external world exists” refers ironically to the intellectual dilemma that enjoyment simply sidesteps. Giving the despairing Cartesian a pitying yet humorous look, the hedonist continues his nonchalant walk toward his favorite café: Reality certainly exists enough for him so long as they are serving that delicious strawberry cheesecake today.

Rather than constituting an opposition between interiority and exteriority, Levinas sees in enjoyment the pre-reflective overcoming of this conflict: Enjoyment is the way in which I relate to something other and
external that simultaneously is for-me. The otherness of the world is neither the radical transcendence of the Other, nor the Hegelian negation of everything that is not-me, but rather the relative otherness of a world that first reaches me in its agreeability. In enjoyment, something which is other arrives in such a way that it suits and interests me. It is therefore in one sense immanent: “I am myself, I am here, at home with myself, inhabitation, immanence in the world.” I do not go beyond myself in my relation to the world but dwell in it. At the same time, however, that in which I dwell is not me, but something other than me; but “other” precisely in that relative sense of being an agreeable externality.

It is thus with reference to the phenomenality of enjoyment that Levinas includes a relative externality in his account of affectivity. We hold that Levinas, in so doing, presents a better phenomenological analysis than Henry. By focusing on the constitutive problems of phenomenality as such, Henry ironically draws attention away from the sensual phenomenality of enjoyment itself. Since his primary interest lies in the essential conditions of appearing in general, he does not invest much time in the descriptive account of the differences between the distinctive modes of givenness that belongs to the phenomena of pain and pleasure. Moreover, his skepticism towards traditional phenomenology’s ability to account for the phenomena as they are given leads him to radicalize phenomenological reductions to the point where all empirical sensation, things, and the visible world are left out from the pure immanence of self-affectivity.

Henry seems to think of the exploration of such immanent life as the transcendental foundation of everything, eventually enabling the visible world to appear. Nevertheless, his manner of closing the immanence in on itself causes a problem for this aspiration. As Renaud Barbaras observes: “Although he discovers auto-affection at the heart of all givenness at a distance, Henry never heads down the opposite path to discover how auto-affection leads into intentionality, how we can go from immanence to transcendence.” Henry fails to do so for good reasons, for having cut the ties to all exteriority, Henry has blocked his way back to the phenomena from which traditional phenomenology starts out and returns. Henry opens Incarnation by describing how human beings “feel the difficulty the rise in the sloped lane brings, or the pleasure of a cold drink in summer, or of a light breeze on their face.” We wonder if Henry by the end of the work, has forgotten the reference to “the sloped lane,” the “cold drink” and “the light breeze” – that is, concrete externality – which Levinas believes the phenomenality of affectivity implies.

Henry’s problem concerns not only the relation between the affectivity of the flesh and the externality this phenomenality implies; it also concerns the flesh itself. As Emmanuel Falque aptly points out, it seems that Henry’s analysis leads to the forgetting of “the very weight of our own bodies.” This is not the case for Levinas’ analysis of enjoyment, which explicitly raises and
investigates the ambiguity in the experience of enjoyment as pure affectivity on the one hand, and materiality on the other, an ambiguity captured in the formula of “an independency borne of dependency.” Enjoyment is, on the one hand, a kind of pure affectivity in the style of Henry, for it is concretized interiorly as the satisfaction of an ego. Pleasure is phenomenally egoistic, and this can only take place as an affective, lived interiority. On the other hand, however, the externality I live from continues to constitute this phenomenality. The happiness of the ego is not risk-free or frictionless: one must make sure to chew one’s food properly precisely due to its characteristics as an external object that is also independent of me.

This refers not only to the external danger posed by the object of enjoyment, but also the fragility of my own body, which in and due to its enjoyment must risk itself. The body is, for Levinas, this duality of a living egoism elevated above the world in its happiness, but nevertheless fastened to the earth in its materiality: “Life is a body, not only lived body [corps propre], where its self-sufficiency emerges, but a cross-roads of physical forces, body-effect.” In the happiness of its affectivity, in the personal experience of life as lived, the ego feels itself as a body that not only enables but also resists the happiness of the ego. The phenomenality of enjoyment is misunderstood without this friction and the irreducible reference to externality it entails:

The body is the elevation, but also the whole weight of position. The body naked and indigent identifies the center of the world it perceives, but, conditioned by its own representation of the world, it is thereby as it were torn up from the center from which it proceeded, as water gushing forth from rock washes away that rock…The body naked and indigent is the very reverting, irreducible to a thought, of representation into life, of the subjectivity that represents into life which is sustained by these representations and lives of them; its indigence – its needs – affirm ‘exteriority’ as non-constituted, prior to all affirmation.

Life is certainly a “gushing forth” from the fountain of life itself, but its gushing is always already conditioned by its own materiality. This, however, does not annul the gushing. The ego needs the world, but is happy that it needs it: this is the ambiguous paradox resolved in the happy hedonist sitting down at a café for a slice of strawberry cheesecake. Out of its dependence on nourishment, humanity erects restaurants and establishes culinary traditions that serve nothing else than the pleasure of biting into a piece of cake.

**Lévinas on pain and suffering**

Turning to pain and suffering, we find that Henry and Lévinas both converge and diverge with regard to this phenomenon as well. Lévinas are, on the one hand, clearly similar in the way they think that pain and suffering engulf us in interiority, in passivity, and with no way out. Lévinas
agrees with Henry that pain fastens me to myself in an insuperable way. As Henry writes, “it is given over to itself, immersed in itself, submerged by itself, and crushed under its own weight,” which leaves us trapped: “There is no possible way out.” To be in pain is to be hopelessly trapped within it. Levinas agrees; “It is not that the sufferings with which life threatens us render it displeasing; rather it is because the ground of suffering consists of the impossibility of interrupting it, and of an acute feeling of being held fast.” The painfulness of pain consists in the refusal to slip away from it, in the way it rivets me to myself. Pain is thus very clearly an interior phenomenon, characterized by the way it traps me inside myself. As Levinas explains with regards to the suffering of nausea, the fact that I can be consciously aware of its possible end does nothing to alter the interior phenomenality of this suffering, which consists in being nailed to it, and wishing for an end that, in the moment of pain, is not there.

It is, however, this second characteristic – that we wish for its end – that separates Levinas’ analysis from that of Henry. We noted above that Henry does not account for the motivation to escape, but for Levinas, this second moment is indispensable to its appearance. Although pain cannot be explicated without reference to how it fastens me to my interiority, it also cannot be explained without reference to the protest against staying there: “this revelation of being – and all it entails that is weighty and, in some sense, definitive – is at the same time the experience of a revolt.” To be in pain is not only to find this pain inescapable, but also to want this escape, and the latter is needed for the acute status of the former. To say that pain is impossible to escape only has sense insofar as such an escape is sought after, and it is this conflict or tension that more than anything characterizes pain. When Henry writes that suffering is “a suffering without horizon, without hope”, then it seems necessary to add that being without a horizon or hope is insufferable precisely because a yearning toward such a hope or horizon makes up the phenomenality of pain. Pain is thus not only constituted by a simple, undifferentiated immanence, but by the tension between its presence and the need to escape it.

Henry and Levinas are both close and far away from each other here. For both philosophers, imprisonment in interiority stems from the lack of distance between me and my suffering. As Henry writes, “Between suffering and suffering, there is nothing,” for it is this impossibility of distance that constitutes the acuity of pain. In very similar terms, Levinas describes nausea as precisely this identity of myself with it: “For what constitutes the relationship between nausea and us is nausea itself.” To be nauseated is nothing else than to be trapped in it for there to be no difference between me and being nauseous. But for Levinas, it is equally important to emphasize that this identity between me and my pain is not tautological: “it takes on a dramatic form.” To present pain only in its immanent, homogenous simplicity is to forget the dramatic tension which makes it undesirable and
therefore painful. Furthermore, rather than being some pure auto-affectivity of the flesh, Levinas sees in pain precisely the encumbered-ness of physicality; “I am going to lay stress on the pain lightly called physical, for in it engagement in existence is without any equivocation...physical suffering in all its degrees entails the impossibility of detaching oneself from the instant of existence.” Henry wants to stress the immanent, non-materiality of the affectivity of pain. Levinas, on the contrary, sees in the experience of pain, as he also did with pleasure, the acute feeling of belonging to our physical bodies, to be embodied; “a feeling of identity between our bodies and ourselves.”

When we look at Levinas’ later writing on pain and suffering, he turns his attention not so much to imprisonment and escape, but to how pain breaks into our interiority in the first place. Here, it turns out that not only enjoyment but also pain is inextricably linked to exteriority – not as a homely exteriority, for sure, but as something unwelcome and invasive, turning against me. Where sensation is ruled out as still worldly in Henry’s account, sensation is indispensable to Levinas’ account of pain. As it is employed in Levinas’ later phase, sensibility signifies our fundamental exposure, the unmediated manner in which we at once remain open and vulnerable to exteriority. We are fundamentally exposed to pleasure and pain. “The immediacy of the sensible,” Levinas notes, “which is not reducible to the gnoseological role assumed by sensation, is the exposure to wounding and to enjoyment.” But he can also speak of the onset of pain in terms of sense impressions, the raw data which make up the basic content of consciousness. Pain initially presents itself as a conscious content similar to how Husserl speaks of color, sound, contact, and other sensations. But where such content normally will be taken up in our intentional perceptions, pain strongly resists it. There is no way, Levinas holds, that the sensation of pain can be taken up into intentionality or become integrated into the Kantian “I think.” Sensation of pain is the very exception to the unifying of consciousness, for pain announces itself in its refusal to be integrated, as the resistant “non-integratable.” It is thus charged with its own direction as “in-spite-of-consciousness.” Pain therefore not only evades sense-giving, but opposes it. Pain, then, is evidently not just the opposite face of enjoyment and pleasure, as Henry has it, but signifies a completely heterogenous phenomenological structure.

Why and how does pain oppose consciousness? One may assume that its opposing character derives from its quantity, so that at certain thresholds, the sensation exceeds our capability of receiving it. Although Levinas thinks there is a “too much” inscribed in pain, he does not think its opposition stems from quantity but rather the quality of the sensation. It is its very quality that makes it impossible to integrate – it is qualitatively too much, an excess of what consciousness can bear. Such determination, however, leads to the paradox that pain is first determined as sensual content given to consciousness, then to manifest itself as in-spite-of-consciousness. It is as if
Levinas’ understanding of pain is both affirming Henry’s immanence and at the same time rejecting it. Moreover, Levinas suggests that such a paradox is not indicative of a philosophical flaw, but rather that it should be preserved as pain’s phenomenal character. Sensation opens the meaningful assemblage of data that pain is grafted onto – only to oppose it. In a short passage, we can see how Levinas moves continuously between the two horns of the paradox, saying that pain,

in the guise of experienced content, the way in which, within a consciousness, the unbearable is precisely not born, the manner of this not-being-borne; which, paradoxically, is itself a sensation or a datum…
Contradiction qua sensation: the ache of pain – woe.61

Henry’s analysis of suffering seems to miss the specific way in which pain arrives as unwelcome or even as an adverse intrusion. While Levinas holds that sensations belong to our conscious and thus immanent life, pain still comes with a sense of exteriority, in the sense of “what is disturbing and foreign to itself. And in this sense transcendence!”62 The specific sense of transcendence as disturbing and foreign relates to pain’s quality of being non-integratable as a qualitative excess that has a non-worldly and pre-social sense of exteriority to it. Transcendence of evil, Levinas says, is “the excess of evil, the excess of all exteriority,” that is, the pre-social “wholly other,” as an exteriority in contradistinction to the ethical Other.63 Suffering pain can therefore not, according to Levinas, be captured adequately by immanence, but implies transcendence in the sense of an excessive and opposing exteriority. Indeed, it is in the very intrusion of the exterior other into our interior life that Levinas locates the original experience of suffering.64 To respect the phenomenality of pain, suffering, and ultimately, of evil, no meaning can be assigned to it, and certainly no overall explanation of it in terms of theodicy. The non-integratable character of its fundamental datum resists all theoretical synthetization and integration.

Conclusion: Exteriority and heterogeneity

Behind Levinas’ and Henry’s different accounts of pain and pleasure, we have detected a common presupposition, namely their critique of phenomenology’s misrepresentation of the affective life due to its attachment to intentionality. This presupposition, however, has not prevented Henry and Levinas from developing divergent answers to the two problems posed in the introduction, which we will treat in turn. The first problem concerned whether enjoyment and suffering unfold as purely immanent, or whether an external reference is constitutive. No doubt, Henry affirms the former alternative holding that enjoyment, as well as suffering, can only find their sufficient conditions in the unfolding of pure immanence. But as Levinas rightly points out, even if enjoyment is self-enjoyment, it retains a relation to the outside as the contents it “lives from…” Pleasure does not isolate me in my interiority,
but orients itself to that which it finds pleasant, and this reference to a pleasant exteriority is contained in the very phenomenality of pleasure itself. If we turn to suffering with the same problem in mind, both Henry and Levinas agree that its milieu of appearance is immanence and that an important aspect of what makes us suffer is the experience that there is no way out. For Henry, this is so because there is no horizon – spatial or temporal – that outlines an alternative; pure suffering allows for no distance. But since it seems that the self is just as at home with itself in suffering as in enjoyment – both unfolding in the absolute immanence – it is hard to see why the suffering should feel imprisoned or urge to flee it in the first place. Nevertheless, the exigency to flee seems to be precisely what marks the particular dynamism of suffering, which the earlier writings of Levinas capture with precision. It is precisely because he outlines a horizon of exteriority that Levinas captures the impossible urge to escape pain, which in turn mirrors the feeling of being imprisoned in pain with no way out.

What Levinas’ later writings add to this is an analysis of the tensions from the opposite angle: pain’s arrival from the exterior and its violent penetration into our interior. At this point, we believe Levinas provides the most important critical correction to Henry’s account. While it is not surprising that Henry leaves no room for the exterior in his analyses, his reduction is, as he says, radical – we may add, too radical. It is guided by what Rudolf Bernet terms “hyper-transcendentalism,” where we are – beyond the strictures of Husserl’s reductions – completely purified from any compromise with the world and its contingencies. But this also means that Henry is prevented from taking into account the foreignness of pain, both in Levinas’ sense of excessive exteriority and its “non-integratable” quality. Jean-Francois Lavigne is to the point when he criticizes Henry for neglecting the tensions that are inherent to the experience of pain. Suffering, Lavigne argues, is “not only that which is affected by an ‘impression,’ but more properly as aggressed by a hostile enemy, or an adverse unbearable quality.” While we believe that suffering unfolds in the interiority of the self, Henry simply misses what makes suffering aversive, negative, in short, felt as an unwelcome intruder. In the homogenous sphere of absolute immanence, there cannot be anything disturbing. In fact, Henry’s description of pain could more accurately be taken as an account of mood or Stimmung – an affectivity that envelopes the self but with no concrete sense of invasion. Due to the irreducible adversity of pain, Levinas in one place notes that “pain does not just somehow innocently happen to ‘color’ consciousness with affectivity.” Whether this is alluding to Henry or not is not clear, but it nonetheless appears a very appropriate critique of Henry’s confusion about moods and pain.

Where does this leave us concerning our second problem concerning the nature of the relation between pleasure and pain? Are they utterly heterogeneous or do they betray a common structure? Henry seems to be attempting to defend two irreconcilable claims: both the irreducibly distinct
tonalities or phenomenological content, and one fundamental identity of suffering and joy as modalities of one essence. Because Henry, according to our reading, gives priority to their identity, suffering and pleasure become tonalities that share the same underlying essence, and thus they both share a homogenous structure. The problem with such homogeneity is that it leads to the result that suffering and enjoyment can pass into one another, disregarding any external circumstances. Henry writes that such passages belong to the essence of life: “And this is because pure suffering is the concrete phenomenological mode according to which the coming of life into itself accomplishes itself, ... something which in the final reckoning is never anything other than joie de vivre, the limitless happiness of existing.”69 Hence, the very same affectivity can appear both as suffering and happiness. Admittedly, there are examples of people able to transmute pain and suffering into joy, such as Julian of Norwich and other mystics. But we take them as exceptional precisely because the exception confirms the rule. Only if we presuppose the distinct sense we have of suffering and joy can their crossing strike us as exceptional. Moreover, blurring the basic distinction between suffering and joy comes with considerable risk: it threatens to throw us into a state of vertigo where we lose our basic bearings of affective and moral life. In short, we believe it is necessary to hold on to the irreducible heterogeneity of pleasure and pain, joy and suffering, indicated in Wittgenstein’s saying: “The world of the happy man is a different one from that of the unhappy man.”70

In insisting on the distinction between suffering and enjoyment, we must also let go of a binary model because it fails to do justice to their respective givenness. Binary models, such as in classical utilitarianism, must already presume that pain and pleasure are opposing poles of one underlying continuum. But as Paul Ricoeur has pointed out, the phenomenology of pain and pleasure does not give itself as such opposing poles as they cannot be unified by one homogenous phenomenological structure.71 We take Levinas’ works as a whole to support this position. Admittedly, a heterogenous model of pain and pleasure is not explicitly developed by Levinas himself, but it remains, nonetheless, operative in his writings. To suffer pain is to be nailed to it in such a way that there is no distance where a dialectic with enjoyment could take place. The inescapability of pain closes the door to suffering as a mere modification of enjoyment. In general, we find that Levinas’ delineation of the heterogenous phenomenologies of pain and pleasure is rooted in the distinct ways in which they relate to the exterior. While both enjoyment and suffering entail an exterior reference for Levinas, the way in which they orient us to this exteriority could not be more radically different. Enjoyment “lives from” a world it finds agreeable and is thus at home in the world. Enjoyment seeks to remain where it finds itself accomplished. The invasiveness of pain, however, is not something merely disagreeable. It does not only fail to please me, but invades me despite myself, refusing any horizon of integration. Moreover, whereas pleasure accomplishes a complacent homeliness in its
surroundings, pain cuts us off from any belonging and imprisons us in that which contradicts our very life. These different structures, we think, suffice to indicate that the relation between pain and pleasure is not only a matter of different tonalities, but of essential differences in structures and givenness that prohibit any conflation of the two. Thus, in response to our second problem, we think phenomenology must dispose of any binary determination of suffering and joy in order to reflect their heterogenous phenomenality.

For Henry and Levinas, suffering and enjoyment are not added to our otherwise theoretical grasp, but are located at the most original level of our constitution. We must therefore expect them to have some moral impact, too. But they also stir wonder. For Henry, the suffering of the passivity of life is at the same time joy, and this joy fills us with wonder. Also alluding to the metaphysical wonder—this time Leibniz’s “why is being and not nothing?”—Levinas quotes Phillip Nemo’s reformulation with approval: “Why is there evil rather than good?” Unlike Henry’s invocation of wonder that feeds on the source of suffering and joy alike, Levinas’ sense of wonder concerns the uncompromised difference between evil and goodness. To Levinas, this duality not only de-neutralizes ontology, but establishes the difference at the heart of human concerns that no principle should try to bridge.

But will a Levinasian position imply that suffering and joy, like goodness and evil, are statically fixed? Henry is surely right that suffering and joy do change during the flow of life—and also, on exceptional occasions, that even suffering can be related to goodness. Levinas is not blind to this movement, but it is important to recognize that changes do not stem from the transition inherent to the movement internal to the essence of affectivity. It does not occur on the plane of ontology at all, but from a new vector of externality—the ethical relation. Taking concrete pain as his example, Levinas emphasizes that it is “for nothing.” It intrudes into consciousness, absorbs it, and isolates the sufferer from all communities. And yet, precisely at this point, there is an opening toward the other, “the possibility of a half opening, and, more precisely, the half opening that a moan, a cry, a groan or a sigh slips though—the original call for aid, for curative help, help from the other me whose alterity, whose exteriority promise salvation.” This half opening from the suffering other exposes itself to me as my responsibility to comfort or help. Levinas does not suggest any mutation of the suffering, but that the non-sense can be reoriented to ethical meaning—to goodness beyond being.


3 Cf. Nozick’s comment when introducing his famous experience machine: “What else can matter to us, other than how our lives feel from the inside?” - Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1974), 43.


7 Henry, Incarnation, 36.

8 Ibid., 50.


10 Ibid.

11 Levinas adds that this is the case for “enjoyment - or suffering,” ibid. In other words, he believes the same holds for suffering, but since enjoyment is more primordial for him, this is what he focuses on.


13 Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being, or Beyond Essence, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1998), 73.

14 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 188.


16 Ibid., 115

17 Henry, Incarnation, 74

18 Lupo, “The Affective Subject,” n.6,102


21 Henry, “Phenomenology of Life,” 103.


23 Ibid., 232, 283.


26 Henry, “Phenomenology of Life,” 105-06; *Incarnation*, 261.


28 Ibid., 657.

29 Ibid., 662.

30 Ibid., 665.

31 Henry, *I am the truth*, 201.


35 Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, 114

36 Levinas, *Existence and Existentia*, 37

37 Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, 112

38 Levinas, *Otherwise than Being*, 72.


40 Ibid., 138.

41 This is, incidentally, part of Levinas’ critique of Husserl and Heidegger: whereas the latter two regard our *Lebenswelt* or being-in-the-world as a form of transcendence, Levinas determines our relation to the world as a form of immanence, and reserves the term “transcendence” for the relation with the Other


46 Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, 164.
While our discussion of Levinas' analysis of enjoyment draws primarily on *Totality and Infinity*, where Levinas explicates this phenomenon most extensively, our discussion of Levinas' analysis of pain is drawn from other works. This is because we find that the definition of suffering that is found in *Totality and Infinity*, namely that it is “a failing of happiness”, is a) unsatisfactory and b) at odds with how he describes suffering elsewhere. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, 115.


Levinas, *On Escape*, 52.


Ibid.

Levinas, *On Escape*, 68.

Ibid., 55.


Levinas, *Otherwise than Being*, 64.


Levinas, “Transcendence and Evil,” 180

Ibid.


Bernet, “Christianity and Philosophy,” 337.


We have Heidegger’s analysis of moods in mind, of course without Heidegger’s notion of world. *Being and Time*, trans. J. Stambaugh (Albany: SUNY, 2010), 130-36.


Henry, “Phenomenology of life,” 106

Ricoeur points to structural differences, as pleasure stems from a happy encounter, pain what is foreign to life; activity precedes pleasure, and activity (reaction) succeeds from pain. Ricoeur, *Freedom and Nature*, 106.


Levinas, “Transcendence and Evil,” 182.