The Gift of Mourning

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Here we touch on what remains no doubt the unavoidable problem of mourning, of the relation between gift and grief, between what should be non-work, the non-work of the gift, and the work of mourning.\(^1\)

Is mourning possible? Or impossible? And if impossible, in what sense impossible? What does this mean, in turn, for what we do as human beings in the face of the normal, natural experience of mourning the death of the other? How can we mourn? How \textit{should} we mourn? For some, these questions arise on account of the death of a beloved pet, a friend, a child, a spouse, and/or a parent. Perhaps they arise even on account of the death of their own faith in God, others, humanity, and/or the universe. Yet since 2020, these questions have become especially emphatic with Covid-19 spreading across the globe disrupting, transforming, and ruining many people’s lives. With little risk for hyperbole, I suspect that not a single person’s life was left untouched by the effects of Covid. Moreover, I suspect that how Covid touched each person’s life in some degree or another centered around each person experiencing the inflexible law of life: that one of two people will experience the other die.\(^2\) This world-event of a pandemic gave rise to worldwide deaths each of which touched someone somewhere, each of us, personally thereby leaving virtually everyone wondering what is happening to me, to us, to the world, etc. For some, this event led to a mourning that overcame them leading them to be added to the number of deaths during Covid though not from the virus but by their own hand. For others who survived not just the deaths of the others around them but, perhaps, also their own appeal to end their own life, the mourning left to be done and left to be undergone left them in a place teeming with possibility. This place teeming with possibility in the aftermath of the death of the other or in the throws of mourning is the site that I explore in this paper with Jacques Derrida, and a few others, as my guide.

To explore the theme of mourning after Derrida, the questions with which I began cannot help but be posed, imposed, exposed, and answered even if only in part. Derrida’s work on mourning, whether in his own eulogies
in, for example, *The Work of Mourning*, or in his many reflections and ruminations on mourning throughout his writings, is especially important today for helping us understand what we are doing and what is happening to us when we mourn. For his approach to thinking under the heading of deconstruction and especially in and through *différance* points him in each context toward the nuance, complexity, and difficulties that attend the topic, philosopher, or text under consideration. By bringing mourning under *différance* or through Derridean deconstruction is, then, especially important to begin considering some of the nuances of this complex phenomenon of mourning. At a time when the West, with its focus turning more and more toward mental health awareness, is getting better at allowing and giving people the time to mourn, we continue to need some assistance on this front as shown, for example, by the new definition of “prolonged grief disorder”\(^3\) in psychology’s DSM 5. While helpful for diagnosis in a clinical setting, this definition seems to revitalize the idea in Sigmund Freud regarding the *pathology* of melancholy or to the more recent, yet related, trite remark months or years after someone dies: Just get over it already. Derrida’s work on mourning can help move this openness to mourning, even when “prolonged,” even further.

Within Derrida’s works and the scholarship on it, this question of mourning has been explored in terms of the relationship of mourning and melancholia or introjection and incorporation regarding the remembrance and forgetting that attends mourning.\(^4\) I am challenging this conversation by relating mourning to what follows the Derridean logic of the gift. Derrida has broached this relationship among mourning and the gift, in both *Given Time: I* and *The Gift of Death*, yet he does little to explain or explore this relationship. He provides many insights on what this relationship of the two may entail, and I aim to trace some of these insights in an effort to grapple with the possibilities that open themselves to us through mourning someone who has died. With this, the gift that occurs, according to Derrida, *sans voir*, *sans savoir*, and *sans avoir* disrupts any economy of exchange by interrupting it in a transformative, eventual instant. Such a gift is given unexpectedly, in secret, and im-possibly as it conditions its own possibility. I argue that mourning is not necessarily a moment in which we can give such a gift, but mourning opens us to the possibility, namely the im-possibility, of a gift. More precisely, when we mourn, we can open ourselves to the type of giving that lays at the root of Derrida’s ethico-political hopes under the heading of an other friendship and democracy to-come that have profound implications for our being-with one another in the world. Mourning opens to such an im-possible gift because mourning exercises an ethos ready for an event. Mourning welcomes the gift in being ready not to be ready for its surprise, that is, mourning is ready for the coming of something that for all intents and purposes seems impossible. In this, mourning becomes a chance for the gift.
To explore these themes and thesis, I take as my guides not only Derrida but also Aristotle, Cicero, and Søren Kierkegaard. Each of these figures turns carefully toward the phenomenon of surviving the death of the other in order to describe what friendship and love ought to look like in general. According to these figures, the love and friendship at the edge or border of life and death give relief to the love and friendship that should be practiced and cultivated with the living. To follow this trajectory of thinking, what is at stake with the gift according to Derrida must be clarified so that the phenomenology of mourning offered by a look at friendship to the dead can be seen as making possible the coming of an impossible gift. Understanding this role that mourning can play culminates in a responsibility to mourn with ethical, political, and ontological implications.

Derrida on the Gift

As Derrida explores the theme of the gift throughout his writings, he tends to relate it to another of his important themes—the event. Both themes develop and enrich one another to the extent that Derrida’s understanding of the gift becomes a paradigm for his understanding of the event as an eruption of contingency into everyday life that is unexpected and world transforming. He even tells us, “There is not an event more eventful than a gift that breaks up the exchange, the course of history, the circle of economy.” The gift “should be an event” because in breaking up the circle of economy, the gift “has to arrive as a surprise.” The gift is the gift event. Accordingly, the gift operates as a paradigm for understanding his account of an event because the gift operates following a logic of the sans. A gift occurs for Derrida sans voir, sans savoir, and sans avoir. In disrupting an economy of exchange by interrupting it in a transformative instant, a gift is given unexpectedly or without being able to see it on the horizon (sans voir), is given in secret outside the realm of calculative rationality (sans savoir), and is given without any person possessing what is given (sans avoir). Through this logic of the sans, a gift is given unexpectedly, in secret, and im-possibly as it conditions its own possibility. In order to understand how the gift for Derrida is this paradigm of the event, we must understand its conditions for possibility as well as impossibility.

These conditions are the economy of exchange that occurs with everyday gift giving. When one person has the intention of giving something to another person who receives it, gift giving is made possible. In other words, “A gives B to C.” These are “the conditions for the possibility of the gift” because “for there to be gift, gift event, some ‘one’ has to give some ‘thing’ to someone other, without which ‘giving’ would be meaningless.” The gift involves a giver, a givee, and the given. Without these three, we could not speak about giving or the gift at all. Therefore, a gift (don) for Derrida occurs
as a *dissymmetrical* or asymmetrical event of giving insofar as A gives, C receives, and B is the gift.

However, as experience teaches, everyday gift giving is *not* dissymmetrical. What normally occurs in everyday gift giving is a circular cycle of giving, receiving, and returning. And this return constitutes the circular economy that nullifies the gift on Derrida’s understanding. In such a reciprocal economy, the giver puts the givee in a place of debt on account of the given. So the givee is obligated to give something in return. A “Thank you very much,” perhaps, which effectively completes the circle of exchange. Of course, a further thank you gift from the givee might be given, which would complete the circle while possibly effecting another circle of exchange. Economy always “implies the idea of exchange, or circulation, of return.”

And this return nullifies the gift by ridding of its dissymmetry. The economy causes the initial giver to become an *expectant* givee insofar as he or she expects something in return. Similarly, the initial givee becomes an *indebted* giver insofar as he or she is expected to give something back as a sign of appreciation for what has been given. Such an economy gives rise to a calculated generosity in which the gift (*don*) becomes a present (*cadeaux* or *présent*). The giving of presents is, in turn, a kind of profitable giving. Person A gives presents in order to receive something in return; Person B receives presents with an indebtedness to reciprocate. In this way, these three conditions of the possibility of the gift—the giver, the given, and the givee—“designate simultaneously the conditions of the impossibility of the gift.”

Thus, if the gift is to remain possible, the very conditions of its possibility become the conditions that ultimately constitute the economy that the gift event disrupts. The gift *as an event* must surprise us, exceed any horizon of expectation, resist the confines of static, conceptual construction, and exhibit singularity. The gift, then, cannot enter the economy of exchange between giver, givee, and the given because this economy reduces any surprise to an expectation that arrives on a determined, expected, and economic horizon.

Nevertheless, Derrida maintains that the gift and the economy that it makes possible, which in turn makes the gift impossible, must always remain in concert together. We cannot fall into the trap of metaphysical thinking that would pursue the *pure* gift as a transcendental signified apart from economy. The gift needs the economy as much as the economy needs the gift. Accordingly, Derrida has no qualms, per se, with economy. After all, he says, “[G]ive economy its chance.” We must still “give consciously and conscientiously.” Yet even while we give economy this chance to do what it does, we must also know how the gift disrupts it because for the event to be possible, for the gift to be possible as the unexpected disruption of the economy, this economy must be there to be interrupted and transformed. The gift *as an event* must surprise and exceed any horizon of expectation including the rational, profitable calculation within the economy. The gift disrupts this
economy according to an excessive generosity and temporality of the instant. So rather than the calculated, profitable generosity of the economy, the gift operates according to an “excessive generosity,” that is, a giving that gives not for profit but without return. In such excessive generosity, the gift then becomes a “dissemination without return.” The gift as gift is given without any need for something given back. The gift, then, “must not circulate, it must not be exchanged …. If the figure of the circle is essential to economics, the gift must remain aneconomic.”

And this aneconomy of the gift follows a peculiar kind of temporality. In the circular economy of presents, the temporality at play is itself the present. This economy deals with presents that present presence. A present is always presented in the present. Derrida’s image for this is “time as [a] circle.” Though a present is present, a gift operates according to the aneconomic temporality of the to-come. This is the unexpected, surprising in-breaking or irruption of a future into the present that breaks and enters based upon its own conditions of possibility and not those of the economy at play. Understood as an event, a gift operates in a temporality that fractures or keeps out of joint any such notion of a present now. This would mean that the event breaks into and out of the presence of the economy of exchange. For this reason, Derrida says that the gift happens “at the instant.” And as Parmenides in Plato’s Parmenides maintains, an instant is a “queer thing … lurk[ing] between motion and rest—being in no time at all.” This instant is an interruption of the temporally present economy of exchange. As such an interruption, “this instant of breaking and entering [effraction] (of the temporal circle) must no longer be part of time.” This instant is “paradoxical” because it breaks into and out of time all the while retaining a relation with time. As Geoffrey Bennington says, “The gift is never (a) present …; it is given in a past which has never been present and will be received in a future which will never be present either.” The gift is never lived-through, in other words, because the event remains irreducible to any past, present, or future modality. As such, the event cannot be brought into the present of presence. And yet the instant at which a gift happens both opens and transforms time for something new to happen. As such an opening, it exceeds time all the while relating to time. This instant that breaks into the temporality of the economy of exchange is what happens when a gift event that is to-come arrives. Temporality fractures at the instant of the arrival of a gift.

In order for the gift instantly to do this, the gift must operate in secret as im-possible. The giving and receiving of the gift must operate outside the order of knowledge and being known. Consequently, Derrida insists that the gift is possible there where the giver does not give with any intentions of giving and the givee does not receive with any recognition that she has received. The gift must, thus, occur sans savoir and sans avoir. He writes, “At the limit, the gift as gift ought not appear as gift: either to the givee or to the giver. It cannot be gift as gift except by not being present as gift.” The gift
operates in the order of secrecy insofar as the parties involved cannot know that a gift has been given. If this gift enters the order of knowing, then it enters the circle of exchange and can no longer interrupt and transform this circle. This secret operation of the gift that removes it from the realm of consciousness allows for the gift to surprise, to break in at the instant, and to interrupt the economy of exchange according to its own conditions of possibility and not those of the economy. In other words, the gift event can arrive but its arrival must appear im-possible written with a hyphen to show that this does not mean “that there is no gift.” The impossibility of the gift with no hyphen would mean no gift is possible or that a gift is an impossible possibility that will never occur. However, the im-possibility of the gift with a hyphen means that the coming and interrup-tion of a gift event would resist the current conditions of possibility all the while bringing its own conditions of possibility.

For an event to occur, in other words, the event must seem impossible to the current conditions of possibility. The occurrence of an event is something that is only possible to think until the event itself occurs because through its occurrence, an event makes the impossible possible and actual. What once was only possible in thought is now possible in experience after the event because the event’s own unexpected breaking into the status quo makes itself possible. An event is its own possibilization because an event transforms the current conditions of possibility through its own conditions of possibility that before the event seemed impossible. A gift event is only phenomenologically impossible until it breaks into phenomenality transforming phenomenality itself through its rupture. In order for the gift to surprise, break in at the instant, and operate secretly, the gift must, then, “keep its phenomenality” because phenomenalization of the gift would annul the gift by making it a present that enters the economy of exchange. To paraphrase the epigraph of Given Time: 1, phenomenality takes all our gifts making them presents; we give the rest of our gifts to the instant, to whom we would like to give all of them.

Therefore, we give economy a chance by keeping the economy of exchange open, trembling, a little uncertain, or a little off-center. We must keep the circle loose in order “to create an opening for the tout autre,” for the coming of the wholly other, of the event, of the gift event, that is, “of an alterity that cannot be anticipated.” Giving economy a chance by knowing how such an economy works and how the gift disrupts it is precisely what will have helped keep the circle open to the to-come of the event. What is needed, then, to prepare for the gift is an openness to its eventuality, that is, to its to-come and its in-breaking at any instant. An ethos of welcome toward this coming of the gift event is needed. Such an ethos would welcome the gift by being ready not to be ready for its surprise. And mourning may just help to develop such an ethos of welcome insofar as mourning opens the mourner to the call of responsibility to the other whether dead or living.
Mourning’s Welcome in Loving the Dead

Derrida’s *Politics of Friendship* begins to unpack how mourning can be this kind of ethos insofar as Derrida suggests that mourning can prepare for a new kind of politics that he names here, and elsewhere, a democracy to-come. His development of this democracy occurs in and along his engagement with the readings in the history of philosophy of the epigraph—first attributed to Aristotle by Diogenes Laertius in his *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*—“O my friends, there is no friend.”

Derrida explores the meanings of this epigraph by deconstructing the history of meanings of this phrase in the works of, to name a few, Diogenes, Augustine, Cicero, Montaigne, Friedrich Nietzsche, Maurice Blanchot, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Luc Nancy, Carl Schmidt, and, naturally, Aristotle himself. Through this Wirkungsgeschichte, he sees a development of a politics that is ruled by and formed around an economy of exchange. However, in the shadows and cracks of this history he finds glimmers of and hopes for a development of a politics, a democracy to-come, ruled by the gift under the guise of friendship and what he ultimately names “lovence” (aimance)—a becoming love of friendship and a becoming friendship of love. This is another friendship or, perhaps more aptly put, an other friendship because it remains other to the canonical tradition of friendship under the hegemony of reciprocity, the fraternal, and brotherhood. Thus, he deconstructs the history of the politics of friendship gathered around this Aristotelian epigraph in order to open this history to an unexpected, eventful, and surprising reconfiguration of the friend and politics. In the end, Derrida seeks lovence as a possible friendship that is “without hearth” or home and that breaks free from the confines of the familiar, reciprocity, and the brother. This other friendship would be “aneconomical” because it would not be grounded upon an economy of exchanging presents in the present. Rather, this friendship would operate according to the logic of the gift insofar as it would be grounded upon a giving without reciprocity. Derrida writes, “This logic calls friendship back to non-reciprocity, to dissymmetry or to disproportion, to the impossibility of a return to offered or received hospitality; in short, it calls friendship back to the irreducible precedence of the other.”

In addition to being aneconomical, the lovence operative in a democracy to-come would be unexpected and transformative in its arrival insofar as it would recondition the conditions of possibility for friendship and politics themselves. Adhering to the logic of the gift, the arrival of lovence and a democracy to-come will have been the arrival of an event. And mourning can help prepare for this arrival.

His deconstruction of this politics of friendship comes face to face with the relationship between gift and mourning by suggesting that the practice of friendship to the dead is, perhaps, what can open us to this aneconomical friendship of lovence and its democracy to-come. He writes, “It is indeed through the possibility of loving the deceased that the decision in favor of a certain lovence comes into being.” Derrida argues that friendship to the dead...
via mourning is dissymmetrical because regardless of how much is done for the dead, the dead cannot reciprocate. Nor do the mourners and survivors of the dead have any expectation for the dead to reciprocate. After all, the dead give no recognition of what is given them in our mourning. Consequently, friendship to the dead via mourning is one in which someone loves the dead for nothing, that is for nothing in return.

Derrida sees this development especially in the works of Aristotle and Cicero. By looking at their works on friendship to the dead, along with a supplement from Derrida’s long-time interlocutor, Kierkegaard, we see in these figures that mourning opens the mourner to the coming of the gift event of lovence. Mourning may not be the gift itself, but the gift of mourning can help us keep ourselves and our economies of exchange open to the coming of what we cannot see coming. In this regard, the accounts of mourning from these philosophers show that mourning opens us to the gift as *sans voir*, *sans savoir*, and *sans avoir* because mourning participates in an unexpectedness, a lack of knowing, and a lack of having or possessing. Together these philosophers develop a logic in which mourning is a limit situation that allows us to see how friendship and love is to be practiced with the living. With this, friendship to the dead becomes emblematic of the affirmation of life and responsibility to the other that Derridean deconstruction points toward.

We can begin to see how mourning those who have died opens us to a gift event in Aristotle’s *Eudemian Ethics*, a text that Derrida draws on extensively in *Politics of Friendship*. Two moments in Aristotle’s *Eudemian Ethics* are important in this regard. In the first moment, during the seventh book, Aristotle is continuing his exploration of the friendships of excellence, utility, and pleasure by breaking each of them into two types “one kind based on equality, the other on superiority.” The first type concerns a relationship of equality and reciprocity between friends. In such a friendship, says Aristotle, the parties “are friends.” This would be the kind of friendship that the gift event would disrupt because the focus is on the equality and reciprocity of those involved. Aristotle discusses this type only briefly before focusing extensively on the second type concerning a relationship of inequality or non-reciprocity. While he insists that this second type remains a type of friendship, the parties involved are not considered friends. So this friendship lies on the fringes of the concept of friendship itself, which is partly why Derrida takes interest in it and why this iteration of friendship lies close to the gift. In this non-reciprocal friendship, “the superior ought to claim either not to return the love or not to return it in the same measure” to the one with whom she is in a friendship. This kind of friendship resists the tit-for-tat type of thinking that dominates the reciprocal friendship by not even requiring that love be returned. Though Aristotle immediately mentions the friendship between a human and a god as an instance of this non-reciprocal friendship, friendship to the dead can be included here as well, which Aristotle seems to imply in the second important moment of his text. In this
regard, friendship to the dead would be a friendship in which the circle of exchange is no longer the currency. Consequently, friendship to the dead would keep us open to an aneconomy in which reciprocity, the giving and receiving of debts, and repayment are no longer the focus. Such friendship would keep those in relationship open to what operates *sans voir* and *sans savoir*. The second moment in Aristotle’s text develops this idea directly.

He ends Book 7.4 with a direct praise of friendship to the dead-on account of the focus on such a friendship of inequality on the act of loving rather than the passivity of being loved. He writes, “We praise those who persist in their love towards the dead; for they know but are not known.” He praises friendship to the dead through mourning because such friendship is motivated by the act of loving itself and not the receiving of love. In this focus on the actualizing of love, that is the *energeia* of love, rather than the potentiality and passivity of being loved, the love given to the dead is superior to the love received by the dead precisely because the one who loves is not known by the dead. The dead cannot reciprocate by knowing and loving in return the one who loves, yet the one who loves continues in her love without this reciprocity. Once again, mourning keeps those who mourn open to the aneconomy of the gift because it keeps those in relationship open to the giving of something without any intention of receiving back and receiving without any recognition. Such friendship keeps us open to what operates *sans savoir* and *sans avoir*. Mourning develops an ethos of welcome to something aneconomical.

Cicero continues the development of this theme in his *De Amicitia*. In remembering what Laelius once had to say about friendship, Cicero praises those who mourn the dead because friendship to the dead represents the true origin of friendship, namely in a love that does not calculate. Cicero ponders the origin of friendship by asking whether friendship is born from a desire for reciprocity or from “another cause, older, more beautiful, and emanating more directly from Nature herself.” If friendship arises from reciprocity, then “friendship is felt on account of weakness and want so that by the giving and receiving of favors one may get from another and in turn repay what he is unable to procure of himself.” In this regard, friendship would be engendered, run, and ruled by circles of economy dealing with presents and the present. If this were the case, then any openness to the coming of the gift remains annulled indefinitely. Cicero disapproves of friendship based on reciprocity, even though it is a common view of friendship, because such friendship “limits friendship to an equal interchange of services and feelings” by basing the friendship on a “petty accounting” that keeps “an exact balance of credits and debits.”

In contrast, the “older” origin of friendship is to be found in love “for it is love [*amor*], from which the word friendship [*amicitia*] is derived.” This origin of friendship in love resists any focus on “calculation of how much profit the friendship is likely to afford.” Thus, true friendship, or as he names
it earlier “that pure and faultless kind,” begins without calculation, reciprocity, or give and take. This aneconomic origin of friendship in love means that friendship springs not “from the hope of gain … not for the purpose of demanding repayment;” instead, true friendship’s “entire profit is in the love itself.” True friendship, as Aristotle said, is in the énergie of love. This true friendship “is richer and more abundant than that [ruled by the counting of credits and debits]” because true friendship is not concerned with making sure it “pay[s] out more than it has received.” Such friendship is akin, says Cicero, to his understanding of the love of self. The love of self is non-reciprocal because “everyone loves himself, not with a view of acquiring some profit for himself from his self-love, but because he is dear to himself on his own account.” A true friend can only be found if “this same feeling were transferred to friendship … for he [the friend] is, as it were, another self.” Therefore, when Cicero writes, “Wherefore friends, though absent, are at hand … and—harder saying still—though dead, are yet alive; so great is the esteem on the part of their friends …. These things make the death of the departed seem fortunate and the life of the survivors worthy of praise,” we see that he praises friendship to the dead out of love for the dead because in this friendship the focus is on true friendship grounded in a love that loves excessively, which is to say without economy, reciprocity, and calculation. Such friendship is sans voir, sans savoir, and sans avoir. And as such, this friendship to the dead through mourning keeps us open to a gift that would disrupt any economy of exchange.

Kierkegaard builds upon these accounts of mourning in Aristotle and Cicero by bringing into relief in his Works of Love that loving the dead through mourning is instructive for how we are to live life daily with the living. Mourning opens us to responsibility for the other whether dead or living. As Kierkegaard concludes his chapter from Works of Love on loving the dead, “The work of love in recollecting one who is dead is thus a work of the most unselfish, the freest, and the most faithful love …. [R]collect the one who is dead and just in this way learn to love the living unselfishly, freely, and faithfully.” His explanation of mourning as an act of the most unselfish, free, and faithful love shows that this relation to the dead opens us to the gift because this friendship driven by love (i.e. lovence) operates sans voir, sans savoir, and sans avoir.

The most direct connection between mourning and the gift occurs through Kierkegaard’s description of mourning as an act of unselfish love because here mourning is described in aneconomic terms. He writes, “When one wants to make sure that love is completely unselfish, one can of course remove every possibility of repayment. But this is exactly what is removed in the relationship to one who is dead.” Loving the dead through remembering them is the most unselfish love because the dead, as Aristotle and Cicero have also noted, can in no way provide any repayment. No thank you from the dead, no return love, nothing can be given back from the dead to the one who
mourns. While love of the living can be “reciprocal love,” following an economy of exchange, the love to the dead is non-reciprocal and, as a result, gift-like. Love of the dead operates without the knowledge of and without the expectation, the horizon, of anything in return. Mourning is an unselfish love that operates sans voir and sans savoir. And for Kierkegaard, as for Derrida, if love is to be love, it must operate according to this excessive logic where we love for nothing, that is for no thing in return. For the hope and prospect of repayment in our love of one another “make one unable to see with complete clarity what is love.” But in loving the dead, we open ourselves to this excessive love. Mourning opens to the disruption of an economy of exchange by the in-breaking of an excessive gift event.

Moreover, the love of the dead operates sans avoir for Kierkegaard because of the freedom and faithfulness operative in this love. Through this love’s freedom and faithfulness, mourning operates without any conditions that hold this love to an accounting of credits and debits. This is no love by extortion. Whereas the living other can compel us to love him, her, or it, Kierkegaard insists that the dead cannot compel us so. He writes:

[I]n connection with other human love there usually is something compelling, daily sight and habit if nothing else, and therefore one cannot definitely see whether it is love that freely holds its object firm or [if] it is the object that in some way compellingly lends a hand. But in relation to the dead, everything becomes clear. Here there is nothing, nothing compelling at all.

For the dead are no longer present for us to hold in our expectant grasp of repayment. Quite literally, then, nothing itself compels us to mourn the dead. When we love the dead, we do it of our own accord. We do it freely. We do it for no thing at all. Furthermore, the dead themselves cannot compel us to be faithful or steadfast in our mourning of them. In fact, as experience shows and Kierkegaard describes, loving and mourning become more difficult as time passes because the dead are no longer present to “beckon” and “bind us” to them. Kierkegaard writes, “When two who are living hold together in love, the one holds on to the other and the alliance holds on to both of them. But no alliance is possible with one who is dead.”

Kierkegaard insists that mourning is an important work of love because only when we love the dead are we then practicing, that is working, at love in its fullest, excessive, gift-like expression. Loving the dead guides us in “rightly understanding life: that it is our duty to love the people that we do not see but also those we do see.” Moreover, by loving those who we do not see, those no longer present, or the dead, we open ourselves to loving the living with an aneconomical, excessive, and gift-like love. Then we are opening ourselves for the coming of what we could not see coming, of we know not what, of what we cannot control. Then, we are opening ourselves to the gift to break-in and
transform the conditions of possibility around us. This journey from Aristotle to Kierkegaard on the relation of mourning and friendship helps to show why Derrida concludes his *Politics of Friendship* by saying that “the great canonical meditations on friendship ... belong to the experience of mourning.”\(^{62}\) And, moreover, that this experience of mourning “reveals and effaces at the same time this ‘truth’ of friendship,”\(^{63}\) namely that mourning welcomes the coming of the *other* friendship, of lovence, and its democracy to-come that follows the lineaments of the gift.

**Responsibility and Mourning**

Consequently, mourning carries a certain “weight.” As Elizabeth Rosner has noted in her memoir on being the daughter of a survivor of the Holocaust, this idea of mourning carrying *weight* is “an appropriately physical as well as metaphorical term” because it carries a “palpable sensation of burden and heaviness” that is missed by the abstract notions of obligation.\(^{64}\) Just as, existentially speaking, our own being and notion of self carries a weight to which we are responsible for responding and attending, so too does the death of the other and mourning require our response and our attention as part and parcel of “the incalculable coming of the other.”\(^{65}\) The weight of this responsibility suggests that it is not only important but also costly. We carry this weight as we, drawing on Derrida’s reflections on the poetry of Paul Celan, *carry (tragen)* with us the others who have died.\(^{66}\) Carrying this weighty responsibility helps prepare for a gift event by preparing us and our worlds, phenomenologically speaking, for the in-breaking and transformation of a gift. This is not to say that mourning will lead to such a gift event because mourning can, as stated, end up being too much for a survivor to the point that mourning spells their end. Mourning may end in suicide, addiction, or psychological madness. However, assuming that a person survives and continues living with her mourning, in what Derrida describes as the *différance* of mourning and melancholy, that is in the worklessness of mourning, mourning harbors the possibility or the impetus for bettering our lives with one another in at least two distinctive ways.

First, mourning the other in daily life allows us to be *faithful* in an ethico-political sense to the in-breaking of a gift event.\(^{67}\) The “fidelity to death” or “faith ... to whom and to what happens to be dead”\(^{68}\) that mourning practices helps to cultivate, in turn, a faithfulness to the coming of what we cannot see coming in the name of the event. We become better stewards, in other words, of allowing for the gift to disrupt the various economies of exchange around us insofar as mourning makes us and our worlds hospitable to the coming of what we could not see coming by opening ourselves to the surprise of such an event. The unexpectedness of the death of the other and concomitant mourning prepares us “to be ready to not be ready,”\(^{69}\) which is precisely the *ethos* or attunement that must be taken when welcoming an event. Such an
attunement to the event through mourning can help the survivor see that the
goal of mourning is not to move past the past because it is never truly passed
insofar as the past death of the other continues to haunt the present from out
of the ways it transforms the future. Rather, the goal of mourning becomes
allowing the past to transform the present and the future by “reconfiguring
relational habits so that they continue to mark the truncated relation [with the
dead], but in a way that opens up new possibilities for engagement.”
But this opening and possibility, or the new possibilities after the death of the
other, can only become actual by taking up the responsibility to carry the
other and the world in the aftermath of death. For only through “carrying the
other and his world … can [there] possibly be another one and unique
world.”

And beyond just this personal, existential re-imagining of new ways to
live in response to the death of the other, mourning can also have a broader
ethico-political impact. Derrida even maintains that no politics can exist
“without an organization of the time and space of mourning … without an
open hospitality to the guest as ghost.” And he frames the entirety of his
thinking of politics and the democracy to-come around the themes of justice
and the death of the other. For his exploration of the themes of the ghost,
spectrality, inheritance, and “others who are not present” is done precisely
“in the name of justice. Of justice where it is not yet, not yet there, where it is
no longer.” Such an explicit thinking of politics in and through mourning is
currently happening under the name of agonistic or rebellious mourning.
Athena Athanasiou presents the mourning of “the urban feminist and
antinationalist movement Women in Black of Belgrade (Žene u Crnom or
ŽuC)” as “agonistic mourning” in the way that their mourning challenges the
ethical and political power structures in Belgrade. This movement formed in
response to the nationalist military violence in the mid-1990s after the
dissolution of Yugoslavia. The group performs nonviolent, public
demonstrations while dressed in all black in order to practice solidarity with
victims of war violence, especially the violence done to women refugees
during wartimes, and the families who have lost loved ones in these contexts.
Athanasiou’s anthropological work makes a connection among the political
protest and dissidence of the mourning practiced by those in ŽuC with the
idea of preparing for and being faithful to a gift. Athanasiou maintains that
the mourning of this organization restructures the temporality for the political
body by allowing for the death of the oppressed to haunt the present of the
“nation’s body and psyche.” In this way, the mourning of this group opens
the political world of Belgrade to a “historicality” revolving around “an
incalculable moment, or a ‘flash,’ of a new and intensified awareness, which
might take the form of a crack, even a revolutionary occasion, into the order
of homogeneous, chronological time.” Much like the gift itself in Derrida’s
discussion, the mourning of ŽuC opens the body politic to the in-breaking of
an event by calling into question and challenging the economies of exchange
in the political life of the nation. Through giving economy a chance by
challenging its own national attempts to forget the death of those who had been oppressed and marginalized while living, this agonistic mourning prepares the world for the coming of something new that can disrupt the economy itself. In this way, mourning can transform the loss of the other “into a performative power that leaves traces in the body of politics,” thereby opening the political space itself to be transformed by a gift event.

Cindy Milstein develops this same performative power of mourning through her idea of “rebellious mourning.” She writes:

Our grief … can open up cracks in the wall of the system. It can also pry open spaces of contestation and reconstruction, intervulnerability and strength, empathy and solidarity. It can discomfort the stories told from above that would have us believe we aren’t human or deserving of life-affirming lives—or for that matter, life-affirming deaths.

Mourning can be a way to fight for truth and justice in the worlds in which we find ourselves because it can be a way of “reassert[ing] life and its beauty” by allowing us to “struggle to undo the deadening and deadly structures intent on destroying us.” For instance, Benji Hart, an artist and activist in the Chicago area, maintains, along Milstein’s view, that mourning “shows that I have not given in, not accepted the current, violent reality as inevitable, nor forfeited belief in my own right to life.” Mourning, for Hart, can be used in order to begin to repair the social injustices around racial, sexual, and economic lines in our various communities. The poet Claudia Rankine echoes this sentiment when she describes the national mourning of political movements, like Black Lives Matter, as “a mode of intervention and interruption” of the public space that allows us to develop a feeling for the Levinasian other who looks differently, believes differently, and votes differently. In this way, mourning the dead other we cannot see can help us to see and understand better the other who we can see in our communities. Rankine writes, “Grief, then, for the deceased others might align some of us, for the first time with the living.” Much like the mourning of Žižek, mourning the oppressed and marginalized who are not only often overlooked while living but even more so in their death, can help society as a whole, and perhaps even an entire nation, not only to remember the marginalized but to better treat the other in their midst.

Public art aimed at mourning the oppressed is often used for precisely this reason. As the artists Melanie Cervantes and Jesus Barraza write:

We hope that the visual works that we create … interrupt the violence of forgetting that silences and negates our history. The pieces we create can be visual aids for political education and discussion; they can be used as public declarations of grief, and are both figurative and literal signs of a larger public memory project that resists dominant narratives that seek to criminalize and villainize the victims of police and state violence.
Such “solidarity art” is meant to be “a tool to continue shaping culture specifically in the way we imagine what justice means in our society” and as “a way to take up public space and stand in solidarity” with the victims and the survivors of the victims. In this way, survival, the living on after (survivre) the death of the other, or the carrying of the death of the other becomes more than simply an individual act of mourning. Mourning is fertile for being faithful to the coming of an event intent on transforming the worlds around us by breaking into and disrupting the economies of exchange in our worlds. Mourning the oppressed and marginalized who are not only overlooked while living but even more so in their death can challenge national, political attempts to forget their death. By not allowing the dead to be forgotten, mourning can begin to transform and interrupt the economy of national memory by not allowing the past to simply be passed. Mourning allows the past to haunt the present, thereby allowing the present to be open to the event to-come. In being with the dead through mourning, we become open to the surprise of the living by demanding that our worlds be more just and less forgetful of those who have died and who continue to shape who we are individually and collectively.

Accordingly, second, mourning reminds us of the integral connection between life and death. The relation of life and death has been an important theme in the history of philosophy as far back as Heraclitus’ ruminations on phusis through his experience of the bow. As he writes, “The name of the bow is life (bios), but its work is death.” However, whereas this tradition typically focuses on the death of the self in its discussion of the connection of life and death, we find with mourning the important relation among life and the death of the other. In this regard, mourning the other helps us to develop a better understanding of who we are ontologically as human beings by beginning and ending with our being-with the dead. Hans Ruin maintains that humans have a “basic socio-ontological predicament” insofar as we “live not only with the living but also with the dead.” This predicament is ontological because this “being with the dead … determines human existence down to its basic condition and sense of self.” Yet this predicament is sociological and political because “we belong to a polis not only of the living but also of the dead.” Learning to live means to inhabit the shared space with both the living and the dead and to do so in “a responsible way” because life is always a matter of “life after, as inheritance, ancestry, legacy, and fate.” So to Plato’s announcement in the Phaedo that philosophy is “practice for dying and death” (64a), Ruin adds, “[Philosophy] is also the art of learning how to live with the dead and to share the earth with those who have been.” Life is always survival in this regard because life is a matter of living on after those we have lost. Derrida never ceases to remind us of this with his notion of life as survivore. We begin to learn what living means, says Derrida, through “the other and by death” because life is only ever lived with the other and in the aftermath of death and loss. Thus, learning comes “from the other at the edge of life.” Mourning is more than simply an individual act done out of
respect for the dead or cultural necessity. Rather, our relation to the dead via mourning shapes who we are individually and collectively. Mourning, then, is originary because it is part of the warp and woof of life.⁹⁴

Consequently, how we mourn the other or carry the dead other with us in life is no trivial concern. Mourning carries weight. Carrying the other in our mourning is a weighty responsibility. And realizing this integral relation between life and death allows us the possibility to become better at practicing mourning itself. We can improve on carrying the other by recognizing how integral such mourning is to life itself. We can be better by understanding the weight of this responsibility. And in becoming better at mourning the other, we can become better at preparing our worlds for the coming of what we could not see coming. In developing an ethos of welcome to the in-breaking of a gift event, an ethics of mourning is cut precisely to fit the event. Mourning opens us to the politics of friendship under the name of lovence and its accompanying democracy to-come whose logic is the gift. By preparing us for the breaking in of a new politics of friendship that transforms and re-possibilizes the world, mourning develops an ethos of welcome to the gift. The gift of mourning is to keep us open to the gift.⁹⁵


² I am paraphrasing Derrida when he writes, “A fatal and inflexible law: one of two friends will always see the other die” (*Sovereignties in Question: The Poetics of Paul Celan* trans. Thomas Dutoit, Outi Pasanen, et. al. (New York: Fordham, 2005), 139).


6 Ibid 92.

7 In developing this logic of the sans, I follow Derrida’s statement about the call of Come to an event, “But will I have been able to say to you, come, without knowing, without having, without seeing [sans savoir, sans avoir, sans voir], in advance what ‘come’ means to say [veut dire]” (Jacques Derrida, Parages transl. John P. Leavey et. al. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010)), 15).

8 GT 11.

9 GT 12 and 11.

10 GT 6.

11 GT 12.

12 GT 30.

13 GT 63.

14 GT 82.

15 GT 100.

16 GT 7.

17 GT 9.

18 Ibid.

19 Plato, Parmenides 156e in Plato: Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997). An important itinerary for the event’s temporality runs from Plato’s understanding of “the sudden” in Parmenides, to Aristotle’s notion of movement in his Physics, to Kierkegaard’s understanding of repetition and the decision of faith, up through the work of Heidegger, Derrida, Nancy, and the recent French philosopher Claude Romano.

20 GT 9 translation modified.

21 Ibid.


23 GT 14 translation modified.


25 For example, Derrida writes, “It may be, then, that the order is other—it may well be—and that only the coming of the event allows, after the event [après coup], perhaps, what it will previously have made possible to be thought .... [It] would be only the event of revelation that would open—like a breaking-in, making it possible after the event—the field of the possible in which it appeared to spring forth, and for that matter actually did so” (Jacques Derrida, The Politics of Friendship, trans. George Collins (Brooklyn, NY: Verso, 1997), 18. Citations appear hereafter as PF followed by the page number.
The epigraph of *Given Time* reads, “The King takes all my time; I give the rest to Saint-Cyr, to whom I would like to give all” (GT 1).


This approach overcomes the criticism that friendship to or love of the dead is understood as the only true form of friendship and love, which would entail that friendship or love is not toward the living. M. Jamie Ferreira defends Kierkegaard against such a critique along these same lines (*Love’s Grateful Striving: A Commentary on Kierkegaard’s Works of Love* (New York: Oxford, 2001), 209-227).


Ibid, viii.27.
52 Ibid, vii.23. The first half of this passage serves as the epigraph to the entirety of Derrida’s *Politics of Friendship*. This epigraph remains in the background for the majority of Derrida’s text except for the moments where Derrida provides something specific about the *other* friendship for which he hopes.


54 WL 349 emphasis mine.

55 Ibid.

56 WL 351.

57 Ibid.

58 WL 354.

59 Ibid.

60 WL 355 emphasis mine.

61 WL 358.

62 PF 290.

63 PF 295.

64 Elisabeth Rosner, *Survivor Café: The Legacy of Trauma and the Labyrinth of Memory* (Berkeley, CA: Counterpoint, 2017), 153. Rosner draws on the work of Sabine Bode who helped to pioneer the idea that past trauma is carried from first generation survivors into the second and even third generations of these survivors themselves. This carrying of past trauma is now being connected with epigenetics to argue that trauma is passed down not merely societally and in the family unit but genetically through the epigenome.

65 François Raffoul, *Thinking the Event* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2020), 295. I am drawing explicitly from his careful distinction between traditional responsibility and responsibility understood “as responsiveness” (294). However, Raffoul does not make the connection here between this coming of the other and the death of the other.


67 In using ideas of being faithful to or stewards of the event, I am drawing on the work of Alain Badiou regarding the event especially as this is developed in Alain Badiou, *Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism* trans. Ray Brassier (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003).


75 Ibid, 181.

76 Ibid.

77 Ibid, 72.


79 Ibid, 4.

80 Ibid, 21.

81 Ibid, 38.

82 Ibid.


85 Ibid, 218 and 224. The artists speaking in these passages are Oree Originol and Zola.


87 Ruin, *Being With the Dead*, 3.

88 Ibid, 3.

89 Ibid, 7.

90 Ibid, 201.

91 Ibid, 14.
92 SM xvii.

93 Ibid.

94 cf. Michael Naas, “When it comes to mourning” in Jacques Derrida: Key Concepts ed. Claire Colebrook (New York: Routledge, 2015), 117 where he maintains that mourning is originary for Derrida because “a mourning for the other is the unchanging form of our lives.”

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