Paul Ricoeur’s fastidiousness about separating his philosophical reflection from his religious reflection is well-known. Even in his religious writing, he was reluctant to engage in systematic theology, preferring biblical commentary and philosophy of religion. Despite this distanciation from systematic theology, his work has impacted it and has striking implications for it. Ricoeur’s hermeneutical philosophy is based on the root metaphor of interpreting texts, in the end indicating that human beings themselves are hermeneutical beings. Even as he drew on others such as Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer in his development of ontological hermeneutics, his own rich phenomenological account of the dynamics of interpretation became a “critical hermeneutics” as a basis for a broad philosophy that covers epistemology, anthropology, and to some extent metaphysics. As it attempts to avoid the false dilemma of objectivism and relativism so characteristic of modernity, as Richard Bernstein has pointed out, his philosophy represents one of the more significant types of postmodern philosophy. As theology has itself floundered in the wake of modernity, a philosophy like Ricoeur’s in which hermeneutics is so central, as it is in theology, shows great promise as a resource for reframing or reconfiguring theology as it seeks to relocate its moorings.

In an earlier book, Theology after Ricoeur: New Directions in Postmodern Theology, I sought to provide a basis for this claim. In that book, I attempted to show how, despite Ricoeur’s notoriously meandering pathway through an astonishing variety of areas in philosophy without clear signals for how to tie things together, his later work, particularly Oneself as Another, enabled one to discern an
impressively comprehensive and coherent philosophy. I also argued that his hermeneutical philosophy, while not always recognized as postmodern as such, represents one of the more viable attempts to do philosophy after modernity. In fact, Ricoeur’s work participated in undermining the modernist paradigm even as it has pointed beyond it. In a variety of ways, Ricoeur’s work has affinities with theological issues, to name a few, sin, evil, the nature of the self, epistemology, and figurative language. His idea of a hermeneutical arc particularly provides a model for rethinking the nature of systematic theology in the light of the postmodern paradigm change. This essay focuses some of those ideas in light of Ricoeur’s further work and recent developments in theology.

Just as philosophy has been dramatically reshaped in the aftermath of the “wounded cogito”, so has theology.6 Theology itself was deeply affected by the assumptions of modernity, manifesting its own type of foundationalism and craving for certainty.7 In many ways, such tendencies had a deforming effect upon theology. In other words, modernity provided, as it were, cramped confines for theology. As Hans Frei early indicated, obsession with verifiable facts resulted in the “eclipse of the biblical narrative” across the board, across the liberal to the conservative theological spectrum—just in different ways.8 The resulting “shattered spectrum” of theology in the postwar years of the twentieth century has left theology trying to find its footing.9

Even though Ricoeur was reticent about his own theological influences in philosophy, it is clear at this point that Ricoeur’s philosophy is at least “friendly” to Christian theology; in his own words, it provides an “approximation” to theological reflection.10 Moreover, his own late remarks reveal some change of mind about the clear demarcation that he sought, which in many ways was more of a remnant of modernity in his thought and is inconsistent with his more postmodern critique of unfettered and unsituated reason. This separation was likely related to his context in France where he had to fight to overcome a tendency to see his Christian commitments as undermining his reputation as a philosopher. As he puts it, however, in a later interview, “I no longer find such conceptual asceticism tenable.”11

I will first therefore delineate how Ricoeur’s hermeneutical arc provides a model for estimating systematic theology neither too highly nor too lowly; how Ricoeur’s development of the ideas of testimony and attestation become a basis for theological thinking; and then how Ricoeur’s work on narrative and metaphor allows one to conceive of theology in a more natural way in its relationship to its sources.
Ricoeur’s Hermeneutical Arc and Systematic Theology

Ricoeur’s hermeneutical arc, which he emphasized in the seventies, began with a first or naïve understanding, moved to critical explanation, and yielded a post-critical naiveté or appropriation. In actuality, the arc might be better envisaged as a hermeneutical spiral because the second understanding can lead to further explanation and yet further appropriation.

Each of the three terms is laden with philosophical and theological import. First, beginning with naiveté already questions Enlightenment foundationalism, which argues in Cartesian style for beginning only with tightly secured foundations, whether they be indubitable beliefs as in rationalism or incorrigible sense data as in empiricism. Theology attempted to find its own style of foundations in unquestionable religious experience as in liberalism or in inerrant Scripture as in fundamentalism. Ricoeur, conversely, reveals his postmodern move by pointing out that we always begin reflection too late:

In contrast to philosophies concerned with starting points, a meditation on symbols starts from the fullness of language and of meaning already there; it begins from within language which has already taken place and in which everything in a certain sense has already been said; it wants to be thought, not presuppositionless, but in and with all its presuppositions. Its first problem is not how to get started but, from the midst of speech, to recollect itself.

His philosophy is thus a reflective, postmodern philosophy that sees both experience and Scripture as already interpreted. To draw on perhaps the other most significant hermeneutical philosopher who heralds the end of modernity, Hans Georg-Gadamer, it is as if we are in a game, and we are not so much in control of playing the game but are being played. Ricoeur’s hermeneutical arc thus fits the Augustinian approach of faith seeking understanding but sharpens it in several ways.

Ricoeur felt that the move to explanation could not be avoided in the contemporary age, although this avoidance has been attempted by fundamentalists. Apart from them, however, the greater problem as Ricoeur has noted, even for theologians, has been to become stuck in the “desert of criticism” and not to find a way beyond it. In modern theology, for both conservatives and liberals, there has been a tendency
to make systematic theology the acme of the reflective task. Although theology has drawn on religious experience and Scripture, it has sometimes seen those as pointing to a system that exhaustively represents them. In linguistic terms, it is the religious parallel to the philosopher who assumes a substitutionist understanding of metaphor, where the metaphor is translated into literal language without remainder. Ricoeur’s own seminal work on metaphor rejected the substitutionist approach and proposed an interactionist approach that recognized the irreducible character of creative or “living” metaphor.\(^{17}\) As he put it in his early work, *The Symbolism of Evil*, “the symbol gives rise to thought,” but he made it clear that thought does not exhaust the symbol.\(^{18}\) In fact, it was in this work that he emphasized the third point of his hermeneutical arc as a “post-critical naiveté” that returns to a holistic “understanding” going beyond “explanation,” yet aided and abetted by “explanation.”\(^ {19}\) In terms of Ricoeur’s hermeneutical arc, systematic theology fits into the explanatory dimension. In this postmodern sense, systematic reflection is a crucial aspect of theology, but it is neither the beginning nor the end—despite the pretension to be both at times.

With the hermeneutical arc as a heuristic framework for “placing” systematic theology, it points to a postmodern approach that recognizes the poverty of the foundationalist metaphor and values the rich sources of experiences and texts. It also similarly rejects the drive for obsessive clarity and certainty that would see in a univocal systematic explanation an exhaustive account of those experiences and texts, rather than appreciating their “ontological vehemence” as a fecund source of recurring inspiration and insight.\(^ {20}\) The value of systematic theology in a postmodern context then is not as an end to the process but as a stage along the way to a richer, post-critical naiveté, an appropriation that is nevertheless deepened by the pathway through critical, systematic reflection. Systematic theology has thus a significant place but a supportive and not domineering one.

**Attestation and Systematic Theology**

One can further enhance the understanding of the third moment in the hermeneutical arc by drawing on the way Ricoeur richly developed the notion of testimony and attestation in his later work. Ricoeur identified existential and religious affirmation with a “hermeneutics of testimony” in the seventies.\(^ {21}\) This pointed to the way in which testimony can be critically appraised in a kind of trial of
faith but whose existential singularity cannot ultimately be replaced. In *Oneself as Another*, published in the nineties, which is as close to a *magnum opus* as Ricoeur ever wrote, Ricoeur emphasized that existential understanding of the self is a kind of “attestation,” and like Aristotle’s practical wisdom, or *phronesis*, it cannot be replaced by a set of ethical rules. Rather, it is a holistic insight and affirmation that “can claim to hold itself at an equal distance from the *cogito* exalted by Descartes and from the *cogito* that Nietzsche proclaimed forfeit.”

This kind of “phronetic thinking” that transcends explicit verification or proof, yet is not a fideistic rejection of critique, is a helpful way to understand the nature of faith affirmations. It points to the way that faith cannot be rationally explicated in a Cartesian sense but is also not wholly exempt from critique and understanding. To use the title of a later book of interviews with Ricoeur, it can be at best a constructive connection between “critique and conviction.”

Despite Ricoeur’s own earlier attempts sharply to distinguish philosophy and theology, his own work undermines such a sharp demarcation. One might assume from some of his writings that his epistemological reflections relate to philosophy but not to faith and theology. It is clear, however, that his reflection on testimony, which pertains to manifestations of the Absolute in history as well as to interpretation and a hermeneutics of the self, are similar. They are all situated between empirical verification and fideism. Theology’s roots in existential sources and critical explication of them are not wholly different from philosophy’s drawing on symbols that give rise to thought that never wholly transcends such sources. Against a kind of relativism, Ricoeur insists that “the absolute declares itself here and now.”

Otherwise, “a hermeneutics without testimony is condemned to an infinite regress in a perspectivism with neither beginning nor end.” At the same time, any manifestation of reality must be interpreted, which leads to the “conflict of interpretations,” the name of one of Ricoeur’s most significant collection of writings. This makes such claims a matter of a “wager,” not a wager that is a leap in the dark but one that has passed through the fires of criticism. In his *Lectures on Ideology and Utopia*, Ricoeur concedes that this might sound like fideism, but he denies the appellation. Still, he says, “We wager on a certain set of values and then try to be consistent with them; verification is therefore a question of our whole life. No one can escape this.” Such attestation that is applicable to major reality claims in both philosophy and theology reconfigures the age-old debate between faith and reason, showing
that theological reason cannot operate without the symbols given by faith, and faith cannot be validated without rational testing—pointing us back, once again, to the interplay in the hermeneutical arc between understanding and explanation. In this sense, the rationality of philosophy and theology appear remarkably similar—not separate poles as they often have been seen.30

The Figurative and Systematic Theology

Ricoeur, of course, did groundbreaking work in the areas of symbol, metaphor, and narrative.31 These might be grouped under his later terminology of figuration or mimesis. While Ricoeur led the way in fresh appreciation of the cognitive significance of the figurative over against a tendency to depreciate it in modern philosophy, he also tended to see philosophy as striving to minimize its presence in philosophy per se. Theology also has striven to overcome the figurative in order to be systematic. With Ricoeur’s help, we can see, however, how the figurative is deeply enmeshed even in systematic thinking, allowing for a genuinely narrative theology or metaphorical theology.32

First, Ricoeur’s work on metaphor underscores the irreducible and creative power of metaphor. For him, it funds prosaic thought more than the other way around, which is the more traditional assumption. In other words, the dominant traditional view was that the metaphorical is parasitic upon the univocal. In order for metaphors to be understood, they had to be translated or explained in literal language. In theological language, the idea is that the figurative in Scripture and tradition needed to be explained or exegeted in prosaic language. Ricoeur conversely argues that the semantic shock in the metaphor leads to a semantic innovation that is not fully translatable into literal language.33 Metaphors may be the inspiration for philosophical or theological thought, but their surplus of meaning cannot be fully dispersed into literal language.

Second, what Ricoeur’s conception of metaphor does not develop is the way that even conceptual thought is interlaced with metaphor. Metaphor not only funds conceptuality, it can structure it. This has perhaps been most strikingly illustrated in the philosophy of science where scientific paradigms are often deeply configured by basic metaphorical models.34 Ricoeur himself suggests the notion of “root metaphors” that structure understanding in a more basic way.35 What is more widely seen is the way that more conceptual thought such as
philosophy and systematic theology, even more than science, are
interlaced with root metaphors. One of Ricoeur’s former students,
Mark Johnson, along with George Lakoff, has elaborated this idea to
indicate how everyday language itself is shot through with metaphor
and is hardly comprehensible without it.\(^{36}\)

This means, thirdly, that one cannot so neatly separate the
first moment of understanding in the hermeneutical arc as figurative
from explanation as univocal, nor should one attempt to do so. The
upshot for theology is that one can notice how deeply systematic
theology’s conceptuality itself is shaped by root metaphors. An obvious
example is the way in which various atonement theories are shaped by
basic metaphors such as ransom, offended honor, legal retribution,
and estranged relationships. Ricoeur himself masterfully spelled out
the basis of sin and fault in his earlier phenomenological study, \emph{The
Symbolism of Evil}, in basic experiences of stain and defilement.\(^{37}\)
Understanding the dynamics of metaphor is crucial then to grasping
the nature even of historical theology, not to mention further
development of constructive theology.

In \emph{The Symbolism of Evil}, Ricoeur actually locates these other
symbols in the master story (which one might consider also as a
metaphor or symbol) of Adam and Eve in Genesis 3.\(^{38}\) Despite his
own theological reticence and his placement of the book in the area of
phenomenology or philosophy of religion, even this early explication
of that story was an erudite example of theological reflection. As
Ricoeur emphasizes, the actual rupture of sin or fault cannot be captured
by essential or pure phenomenological description. His conclusion that
one must unavoidably have recourse to figurative language to capture
such mysterious, inexplicable experiences led him to one of his grand
detours through figurative language: symbol (\emph{The Symbolism of Evil, Freud
and Philosophy}), metaphor (\emph{The Rule of Metaphor}), and narrative (\emph{Time and
Narrative}, 3 vols.; \emph{Oneself as Another}). Nevertheless, he does not leave
the experience wholly inexpressible, as a kind of \emph{via negativa}, but he
portrays in a helpful way the dynamics involved through an artful
combination of story and symbol (as in Adam and Eve in the Garden)
with logical if not systematic explanation. Systematic theology can hardly
do better!

This mixed discourse is akin to Ricoeur’s recourse to the term
“diagnostic” that he used in his first major work, \emph{Freedom and Nature},
for the mixed discourse between a phenomenology of human
experience and a more scientific or physiological account.\(^{39}\) Conceptual
reflection shaped by mimetic language in this way is closer to the reality of theological language. Systematic theology is therefore not so systematic that it leaves behind its figurative roots. Not only is it indebted to testimonial resources in experiences of the sacred and of sacred scripture, even in its explication it draws on the enlivening, and configuring, power of “living metaphor” and narrative. Even then, it points beyond itself to a post-critical appropriation that may well be an enriched return to original symbols, metaphors, and narratives that generated it at the outset.

Ricoeur’s philosophy has contributed much to religious reflection, whether it be his work on symbolic language or his extended reflections on anthropology. What I have suggested is that his hermeneutical philosophy has a close kinship to the nature of theological reflection. Drawing on the root metaphor of a phenomenology of interpretation, as elaborated in his hermeneutical arc, he offers several benefits to systematic theology, which has floundered along with philosophy in the midst of the fall of the modern paradigm. Ricoeur offers a genuinely postmodern way to approach theology by leaving behind the craving for foundation and certainty. His hermeneutical arc suggests that theology can be positioned as an explanatory resource for religious reflection that both calls for it and chastens it. His elaboration of figurative language attunes theologians to the way “symbol gives rise to thought” in theology and continues to shape it. Finally, his account of “phronetic thinking” provides a way to understand how theology can attest to and even clarify sacred mystery without eliminating it.

In between tendencies to conceive of theology, on the one hand, as the precise and complete exposition of Christian belief and, on the other hand, to despair over theology’s incapacity to name God at all, Ricoeur’s consistent attempt to find a middle way in philosophy between Descartes and Nietzsche offers an Ariadne’s thread for theology as well. As he describes the mysterious intersection between philosophy and theology, prose and poetry, “Beyond the desert of criticism, we wish to be called again. But what the symbol gives rise to is thinking.”

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Notes

1 Recently he has referred to this differentiation as “controlled schizophrenia!” André LaCocque and Paul Ricoeur, Thinking Biblically: Exegetical and Hermeneutical Studies, translated by David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 2.
Frei, *Eclipse*.


18 Ricoeur, *Symbolism of Evil*, 347-57. The actual aphorism is derived from Immanuel Kant.


25 One of Ricoeur’s weaknesses is a tendency to consider scientific verification as quite different from validation in hermeneutics, not seeming to appreciate the hermeneutical turn itself in philosophy of science. This demarcation, I argue, is actually inconsistent with the general drift of Ricoeur’s overall epistemology. For more discussion of this issue, see Stiver, *Theology After Ricoeur*, 225-28.

26 Ricoeur, “Hermeneutics of Testimony,” 144.

27 Ricoeur, “Hermeneutics of Testimony,” 144.

28 Ricoeur, *Conflict*.


30 In terms of the language of a wager between verification and fideism, it is interesting to see how Ricoeur uses such language in a straightforwardly philosophical investigation in Paul Ricoeur, *The Course of Recognition*, translated by David Pellauer (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), xi: “Have I won the wager upon which this book is based, that there can be a philosophical discourse about recognition that is, in fact, that of recognition? By taking as my title the “course” of recognition, and not the “theory” of this discourse, I mean to acknowledge the persistence of the initial perplexity that motivated this inquiry, something that the conviction of having constructed a rule-governed polysemy halfway between homonymy and univocity does not fully remove.”

31 In addition to the works on symbol and metaphor already mentioned, see on narrative, Paul Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, vol. 1, translated by Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).


35 Ricoeur, *Interpretation Theory*, 64.


