The More-Than-Human Other of Levinas’s
*Totality & Infinity*

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Daniel Cook  
Duquesne University

Emmanuel Levinas’s writings militate against an ontological way of thinking that he claims dominates the history of European philosophy. In their drive towards truth and knowledge, Levinas argues that thinkers like Kant, Hegel, and Heidegger efface the alterity of the Other, the Other’s “otherness,” by appropriating alterity as a moment of self-consciousness or Being. This ontological thinking, Levinas argues, attempts to violently reduce the unthematizable excess of the Other by systematically assimilating the Other in the concepts of totalizing thought. Levinas articulates his opposition to this tradition at length in *Totality & Infinity* by insisting upon an irreducible heteronomy: an Other who remains radically outside of any relationship that I might have with them.

Levinas’s argumentation in *Totality & Infinity* assumes a distinction between morality and ethics. Morality is any “series of rules relating to social behavior and civic duty,” or any attempt to construct a valid system of rules that can guarantee desirable behavior when taken up and followed by moral agents, such as utilitarianism, consequentialism, or deontology, or any other systematic attempt to prescribe how one ought to be good.¹ Ethics is the fact that one ought to be good—an exigency that, once represented, systematized, and organized, Levinas names morality.² Levinas’s philosophical approach is, in general, phenomenological. He proceeds by way of phenomenological reduction, a “bracketing out” of second-order morality, to see how the ethical exigency to value the well-being of the Other over myself first appears in pre-reflective experience. In *Totality & Infinity*, he identifies this pre-reflective exigency as “a calling into question of the same ... [that] is brought about by the other,” and names “this calling into question ... by the presence of the Other ethics.”³ My lived experience is ethically meaningful only because of the presence of the Other. The Other is the exigency that challenges me, that *disturbs* my otherwise unquestioned freedom, and makes me feel that I ought to do good.
The overwhelming majority of contemporary commentators argues that Levinas’s Other must be a human other. They interpret Levinas’s ethics as anthropocentric, or as excluding non-human others in the first instance. It is my aim in this paper to reframe the question of who counts as an Other in light of the diachronous and discontinuous temporality that affords the ethical relationship Levinas develops as his main thesis in *Totality & Infinity*.

I will develop two consequences of this reframing. First, because it is the Other’s alterity that disrupts egoist *jouissance* and inaugurates ethical life, and this alterity is essentially and radically futural, I argue that one cannot restrict in advance or once and for all what kind of Other may disturb them. Second, I argue that explaining the Other’s ability to call my freedom into question as the consequence of their humanity, reason, dignity, suffering, or even their language amounts to a thematization of the essentially unthematizable: a violence to their alterity. I proceed in three sections. The first section reconstructs Levinas’s argument in *Totality & Infinity* that ethical life and discourse condition objectivity, the second section articulates Levinas’s description of the temporality of the Other’s alterity, and the final section concludes by intervening in the recent debate regarding the possibility of a non-anthropocentric extension of Levinas’s ethics.

**The Ethical & Discursive Origin of Objectivity**

Levinas claims that “the presentation and the development of the notions employed [in *Totality & Infinity*] owe everything to the phenomenological method,” but he distances himself from fundamental features of the respective phenomenological philosophies of Husserl and Heidegger. Husserl’s phenomenology brackets out metaphysical assumptions about objective reality to discover how objects first become meaningful in lived experience, prior to being colored by abstract assumptions. An example of such an abstract metaphorical idea is Locke’s distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Primary qualities are simple mathematical features of objects in-themselves that necessarily persist through any changes the objects to which they belong might undergo. Secondary qualities are sensations that are the effect of these primary qualities, such as “colors, sounds, tastes, etc.” They “in truth are nothing in the objects themselves, but powers to produce various sensations in us.” Locke takes primary mathematical qualities to be original and to hold objectively, whereas secondary sensual qualities are derivative and merely subjective affectations. In so doing, Locke attempts to reduce the truth of secondary qualities to their correlative primary qualities. This sort of reduction is committed when, for example, one posits that the true meaning of a B♭ m7 chord is the mathematical relationship between a set of waves oscillating at different frequencies and insists that their emotional response is merely a subjective affect.
Husserl’s phenomenology is opposed to such a reduction. He claims that understanding secondary qualities as mere subjective effects of primary objective qualities renders lived-experience derivative, which is untenable because such mathematical relations in fact originate in our lived experience. And, as Dan Zahavi explains, Husserl’s position is that to understand objective mathematical principles and objects “we have to turn toward the subjectivity that experiences [them], for it is only there that they show themselves as what they are.”

In his *Logical Investigations*, Husserl describes intentionality as a general feature of this subjectivity. Intentionality is the concrete fact that consciousness is always consciousness of something. Zahavi explains that “one does not merely live, fear, see, or judge, one loves a beloved, fears something fearful, sees an object, or judges a state of affairs.” Regardless of whether I am experiencing some actually existing object, or imagining something non-existent, my consciousness always experiences objects. Consciousness intends an object, and, in this sense, is intentional. Intentionality is “a decisive argument against a theory,” such as Locke’s, “that claims that an object must influence me causally if I am to be conscious of it.” Because even our imaginations intend objects—even the hypochondriac’s paranoid dread is always dread of a tumor absent in reality—we need not postulate that subjective experience is influenced causally by an objective state of affairs to make sense of it. If we stick closely to a faithful description of subjectivity (pre-reflective, first-personal experience), by bracketing out the assumption that there is a metaphysical distinction to be made between primary and secondary qualities, we will encounter neither a sharp distinction nor a causal/metaphysical relationship between them. Rather, in the intentional act, these qualities emerge simultaneously at the same level of reality, and neither can be localized to the perceiver (subject) or to the thing itself (objectivity), so Husserl argues that Locke’s distinction cannot be substantiated.

Levinas agrees with Husserl’s rejection of Locke’s metaphysical distinction and with his critique of the reduction of meaning to primary qualities, but criticizes Husserl for too strongly correlating *noesis*, the intentional act of perception, with *noema*, the object intended. Levinas’s position is that, by emphasizing their correlation, Husserl posits a naïve perceptual realism and effaces the “alterity” of objects, their radical inaccessibility to perception. This is why Levinas claims Husserl “too hastily discredit[s]” intellectualism. Intellectualism posits that our experience of the world is a product of the mind’s active imposition of order and meaning on otherwise meaningless sense data. For the intellectualist, our experience of the world admits of no exteriority, it is “pure interiority.” Levinas agrees with Husserl that the intellectualist position is untenable because we cannot meaningfully posit that raw sensations stimulate our sense organs prior to our mind’s imposition of meaning and order. Because pre-reflective experience
admits of no distinction between things as they appear subjectively and as they are objectively in themselves, such a distinction is unfounded. However, Levinas argues that Husserl’s rejection of intellectualism effaces the extent to which each of our singular, pre-reflective experiences of the world are particular to our various unique embodiments, because it “fail[s] to recognize the plane on which the sensible life is lived as enjoyment \(\textit{jouissance}\).”\(^{15}\) Levinas’s claim here is that my pre-reflective experience of the world is characterized as much by my \textit{enjoyment} as it is by intentionality. As Seán Hand explains, for Levinas “life is … from the beginning … full of the stuff that makes life enjoyable.”\(^{16}\)

Levinas argues that the enjoyment of material sensuality, the embodied experience of a material being who takes pleasure in things, is in fact a more primordial mode of subjectivity than Husserlian intentionality. As James Mensch explains, “in the bodily experience of eating an apple, our experience is not objectifying but affective,” because “it is one of tastes, textures, chewing, swallowing, the sense of something being within us, and of hunger being satisfied.”\(^{17}\) Because my engagement with the world is not in the first instance representational or intentional, but rather a \textit{jouissance}, a deeply personal and material kind of enjoyment, “the experience that each of us has is private, not open to the public.”\(^{18}\)

Levinas writes that “the very distinction between representational and affective content is tantamount to a recognition that enjoyment is endowed with a dynamism other than that of perception.”\(^{19}\) The dynamism of perception, the activity or movement of intentionality, is objectification, insofar as consciousness is always consciousness “of” an object. But \textit{jouissance}, precisely because we can distinguish it from perception, must involve a fundamentally different sort of activity. Material sensuality is not “the subjective counterpart of objective qualities,” Levinas explains, “but [a \textit{jouissance}] “anterior” to the crystallization of consciousness, I and non-I, into subject and object.”\(^{20}\) As Mensch has explained, “when I bite into a fresh peach, its sensuous presence in my mouth has no sides.”\(^{21}\) Enjoyment does not unfold “here” inside of my mouth, but in a medium prior to any clear distinction between my body and the world. As Levinas writes,

In [\textit{jouissance}] quality is not a quality of something. The solidity of the earth that supports me, the blue of the sky above my head, the breath of the wind, the undulation of the sea, the sparkle of the light do not cling to a substance. They come from nowhere.\(^{22}\)

The sensations “take form,” rather, “within a medium in which we take hold of them,” that “remains essential to things,” and “has its own density.”\(^{23}\) Here, Levinas names this medium “the elemental,” but elsewhere in \textit{Totality & Infinity} he will also describe it as the “\textit{il y a},” or the “there is.”\(^{24}\) The \textit{il y a} is Levinas’s description of being in general, indifferent to this or that existent being, and ontologically prior to the distinction between interiority and
exteriority. When Levinas writes that “in [jouissance] things revert [retournent: return, turn over, go back] to their elemental qualities,” he means that, in my pre-reflective enjoyment of things, sensations unfold not here in my mouth, but “there” in an element neither inside nor outside of me, prior to any distinction between subjectivity and objectivity.

Although the elemental is prior to any distinction between the interior and the exterior, Levinas explains that we nonetheless experience it first-personally. He writes that “[jouissance], as interiorization, runs up against the very strangeness of the earth.” Levinas characterizes jouissance as a process of interiorization, or as “the transmutation of the other into the same.” It returns things to an elemental status that admits of no exteriority—an interiority so pure as to not be posed against exteriority. As Richard Cohen has explained, in my pre-reflective enjoyment of things, “there is no exteriority, no otherness; interiority is made up of its own excited, exalted dependency, ... its immersion in the wealth of the world.”

Mensch makes sense of the privacy of jouissance by explaining that, for Levinas, “embodiment distinguishes us” from one another, because “the uniqueness of the ego’s ipseity is a function of the privacy of the body in its organic functioning.” The fact that “no one can eat for you, sleep for you, breathe for you, or perform any of your functions” means that “the functioning of the body is non-substitutable, irreplaceable.” When Levinas writes that “objects are not objects when they offer themselves to the hand that uses them, to the mouth and the nose, the eyes and the ears that enjoy them,” his claim is that objects appear in jouissance by conforming to my body. Precisely because it is my hearing and enjoyment of a B ♭ m chord, it is an experience that conforms in advance to my body, and not an experience of what is true for each and all. As things meaningfully appear for me, they simultaneously withdraw from intersubjective availability.

Levinas thinks Husserl is right to demand we return to the pre-theoretical appearance of things. But by effacing the extent to which things conform to each of our sensuous, material experiences of the world, Husserl’s phenomenology involves a “clarity” that “detaches the object from something other than itself.” Levinas compares intelligibility in Husserl to Descartes’s “clear and distinct idea manifested as true and as ... entirely present, without anything clandestine.” He finds in Husserl a clarity that he defines as “the disappearance of what could shock.” Because things conform in advance to the particularities of my body, my experience “advances on a terrain already familiar.” Because perception is singularly embodied, and because Husserl ignores the singularity of jouissance, there is no alterity in his understanding of perception.
Levinas’s phenomenological approach attests to and maintains alterity by radicalizing both the extent to which experience is contingent upon the particularities of our different bodies and the extent to which the intentional object is radically inaccessible to experience. For Levinas, there is no objectivity in my pre-reflective enjoyment of the world. Left to my own devices, I would be unable to distinguish between what sensations hold only for my private sensuous experience and what holds for each and for all. But if objectivity is not available to my material enjoyment of the world, then how is it possible at all?

While objectivity could not emerge in jouissance, Levinas is not claiming that objectivity remains unavailable. He argues, rather, that “the objectivity of the object and its signification comes from language.”39 I can distinguish objective meaning from subjective illusion because I can discourse with others. As Levinas writes,

The generality of the Object is correlative with the generosity of the subject going to the Other, beyond the egoist and solitary [jouissance], and hence making the community of the goods of this world break forth from the exclusive property of [jouissance].40 Discoursing with the Other invests my experience with objectivity, and “abolishes the inalienable property of [jouissance].”41 By alienating things from the interiorizing movement of jouissance, language renders things “objective” in that they become offerable to the Other. Objectivity is thus not a theoretical disinterestedness, but “is defined by gift, by the abolition of inalienable property.”42 The Other has me recognize things and the world as suitable for their needs. And it is only through this recognition that “the world possessed by me—the world open to [jouissance]—is apperceived from a point of view independent of the egoist position.”43

Objectivity is thus inextricable from the way language renders things suitable for others. And, for Levinas, discourse names this work of alienating things from the elemental status to which jouissance submits them. Levinas’s claim in Totality & Infinity, then, is that discourse is the condition of possibility for objectivity. However, as Richard Cohen has argued, “at [the] level of sensibility the subject is entirely self-satisfied, self-complacent, content, sufficient.”44 For Levinas, embodiment is as a kind of freedom, or a “determination of the other by the same.”45 My sensuous embodiment, as the interiorizing movement of jouissance, also involves the freedom to take for granted the objectivity that discourse offers. While I can offer the things of my world to the other, I am also always free to simply be satisfied with my pre-reflective and egoist enjoyment of those things. As Levinas writes, “to sense is precisely to be sincerely content with what is sensed … to maintain oneself at home with oneself.”46

From the perspective of the satisfied and self-sufficient subjectivity of jouissance, there is no objectivity, but only a spontaneous flow of sensation.
Internally, there is no reason why this kind of subject would abandon their pleasurable self-satisfaction and experience the things of their world as offerable to the others. While discourse could open the subjectivity of jouissance to objectivity in this way, why would they? In the first instance, Levinas argues, the exigency for objectivity must not be a rational one. Because it entails generosity, or a recognition of the suitability of their world for others, the subject of jouissance must first call their self-sufficient experience into question for ethical rather than rational reasons. The exigency for objectivity is therefore ethical. As Levinas writes, “a calling into question of the same—which cannot occur within the egoist spontaneity of the same—is brought about by the other. We name this calling into question of my spontaneity by the presence of the Other ethics.”

The Other calls jouissance into question, not by limiting or weakening its freedom, but by shattering it. The spontaneous subjectivity of jouissance is fractured in this way because the Other is radically irreducible to this subjectivity. While the sensuous life of jouissance involved an interiorizing movement that divests things and the world of their otherness, the alterity of the Other cannot be divested in such a way.

The appearance of the Other is categorically unlike the appearance of other things. Levinas distinguishes the speaking being, the Other, from their phenomenal manifestation, when he writes that “the speaking being guarantees his own apparition and comes to assistance of himself, attends to his own manifestation.” The Other “appears” in such a way as to render their very manifestation an apparition. Levinas articulates the complexities of the appearance of the Other in “Meaning and Sense,” where he explains that “[w]hereas a phenomenon is already ... an image, a captive manifestation of its plastic and mute form, the epiphany of a face is alive.” Levinas names this complex mode of presentation, wherein the Other appears only to rend phenomenal appearance as such, the epiphany of “the face.” When the Other appears, Levinas explains that they “[break] through [their] own plastic essence, like a being who opens the window on which [their] own image was already taking form,” in the sense that “his presence consists in divesting himself of the form which does already manifest him.” As Edith Wyschogrod has explained, “the face belongs to the world it inhabits but must in some fashion retain the alterity of a beyond, a transcendence that is inscribed as a trace that attests an indestructible alterity.”

In Totality & Infinity, this complex mode of appearance, “the face,” is what is at stake when Levinas claims that the infinity of Other, their radical irreducibility to me or to anything I could have in common with things or the world, is “stronger than murder.” Even the violence of killing, of removing that being whose “face” challenges the self-sufficiency of jouissance, removes only their appearance, and not the challenge that their alterity poses to my phenomenal world as such. This challenge, Levinas explains, “is the primordial expression, is the first word: ‘you shall not commit murder.’”
face of the Other is the flash of a shocking alterity that shatters the self-sufficiency of jouissance, rendering its arbitrary freedom a consciousness of shame. Their alterity makes me ashamed to take them for granted, or to continue to live a life of unchallenged, egoist, material satisfaction. The Other “expresses itself [and] imposes itself [upon me] by appealing to me with its destitution and its nudity—its hunger—without my being able to be deaf to that appeal.”

However, the Other does not force me to tend to their suffering. “The expression the face introduces into the world does not defy the feebleness of my powers, but my ability for power [mon pouvoir de pouvoir].” While I am not free to not respond to their destitution, I am free to respond by ignoring their destitution. I can turn away from this or that other and shirk my responsibility in particular cases. However, I am not free to not have been called into question, or to undo the ethical consciousness that introduces me to my responsibility for others.

In the first instance, the subjectivity of jouissance opens discourse with others, and begins to experience the things of its world as offerable to those others, as objectively existing things, because its experience of the world becomes ethical. As Levinas writes, “the primordial essence of ... discourse does not reside in the information they would supply concerning an interior and hidden world, but a solicitation that concerns me by its destitution and its Height.” Ethical experience, for Levinas, fundamentally involves an asymmetrical valuation of the Other above (“higher” than) me myself. Even if I could experience objects rationally as equally serving others as much as they might serve me, such a recognition would not justify offering them to the Other rather than incorporating them into an unchallenged life of jouissance. To challenge my power to divest things of their objectivity, to consider how they might serve the destitution of the Other, I must recognize that lessening the Other’s suffering matters more than my unchallenged self-satisfaction. This asymmetrical valuation is therefore the condition of possibility for the discourse through which objectivity—the suitability of my things, my body, and my world for the Other—emerges. “The face,” Levinas writes, “opens the primordial discourse whose first word is obligation, which no “interiority” permits avoiding.”

This is why Levinas claims that ethics is first philosophy or metaphysics. In the first instance, I question my satisfied and sufficient experience of the world, that, qua jouissance, disposes of any distinction between subjectivity and objectivity in advance, not for rational or epistemological ends, but for ethical ends. I desire to know how things are objectively because I want to know how they might serve the Other. Ethics is thus prior to ontology and to epistemology. To encounter things as objects—as how they are objectively for others—I must encounter them as suitable to the Other’s needs, as offerable to “the stranger, the widow, and the orphan, to
whom I am obligated.” The asymmetrical ethical relationship affords the discourse in which objectivity first emerges.

The Temporality of Ethics

In this section, I show that the asymmetrical ethical relation, which I’ve argued conditions the objectivity and discourse, is afforded by the temporal diachrony that Levinas exposes in his analysis of fecundity. On my argumentation, when Levinas argues that the Other is ontologically prior to Being, he is pointing to a diachronic temporality which pre-exists the continuous and singular temporalizations of particular existents.

In the “Fecundity” chapter, Levinas describes parenthood to reveal a discontinuous and diachronic temporal structure. Making sense of this analysis of time demands a brief recollection of some features of temporality in Heidegger’s *Being and Time*. Heidegger claims that Dasein has a fundamental structural involvement in the world and refers to this involvement as care [*Sorge*]. This structural involvement is evinced in the fact that things always appear within the horizons of Dasein’s pragmatic projects, which are always possibilities afforded by the world. As such, meaning appears neither “inside” of a subject nor “outside” in an already-determined empirical world. Meaning appears, rather, there where Dasein stretches out into the world: its ekstatic being-in-the-world. Given that meaning appears in this way, Heidegger claims temporality must be an *a priori* condition for the possibility of meaning. As he writes, “Dasein’s totality of Being as care means: ahead-of-itself-already-being-in (a world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the- world).”

For Heidegger, temporality has three modes or ekstases. Dasein is always ahead of itself stretching towards the future because it makes decisions by weighing the different anticipated futures against each other. It is always encumbered by a past because these options are afforded by the resources of its past decisions. And it meaningfully occupies a present because things appear either as relevant or irrelevant to its current concerns. Heidegger argues that because these three ekstases always appear together, they evince a more primordial and unified temporality. When Heidegger analyzes understanding, state(s)-of-mind, and falling/discourse, he finds that while they are grounded primarily in the future (anticipation), the past (having-been), and the present (making-present), respectively, each nonetheless involves the others. Temporality thus fundamentally involves all three ekstases as an intertwined and non-discrete whole, and, as such, is a singular and continuous flow: “temporality temporalizes itself ... as a future which makes present in the process of having-been.”

Levinas, too, analyzes first-personal lived experience to interrogate temporality. But because he attests to different subjectivity than Heideggerian
Dasein, the temporality he describes differs too. The subjectivity described in *Totality & Infinity* exists generationally. None of us are *causa sui*, insofar as we are each born from others, and it is meaningful to us that future generations will outlive us. Levinas teases out the temporal significance of this generational subjectivity in his description of parenthood in the “Fecundity” subsection.63

There is a sense in which the son both *is* and *is not* the father: the child as “both my own and non-mine” is “a possibility of myself but also a possibility of the other.”64 The child both reiterates and refuses the parent’s identity. They are both an extension of the parent’s unique experience of the world, insofar as they inherent a perspective on the world that to some extent conforms to their parent’s projects, hopes, and concerns, and also a being who has their own body, and is free of their parent’s interests. In their relationship with their child, the parent relates to a future both meaningfully determined by their past and radically free from it. While carrying out their own life, the parent, by offering their life to the needs of the child, lives for a time that is radically other than their own, and, in this sense, the parent lives a life beyond their own mortality. Levinas names this futurity fecundity: “[a] being capable of another fate than its own is a fecund being.”65

The fecundity of parenthood is afforded by a temporality of reiteration and interruption. Rather than singular and continuous, for Levinas, my experience of time is fundamentally disjointed and diachronous, a flowing plurality of non-synchronizable temporalizations. This diachronic and discontinuous temporality is not localizable to the experience of biological parenthood. Levinas writes that “the discontinuous time of fecundity makes possible an absolute youth and recommencement,” and claims that “this recommencement..., this triumph of the time of fecundity over the becoming of the mortal and aging being, is a pardon, the very work of time.”66 A discontinuous and diachronous temporality, involving the non-synchronizable temporalizations of different existents, underlies and affords the fecundity of parenthood.

For Levinas, in contrast to the “Heideggerian possibility which constitutes being itself,” meaning is not determined solely by the various projects at my disposal.67 I anticipate the future not only egoistically, but as offerable to and suitable to the destitution of the Other, whose alien temporalization is the object of my concern. Meaning appears not only in light of the possibilities of my future, but in “light” of a time other than my own mortality. It is not solely the anticipation of my future that matters and informs my experience, but also always the radically unanticipatable future of the Other.68 And even my own future, more than a mere projection of the possibilities at are at my disposal, is a future that is offerable to the other. In this way, the Other invests my experience of the world with a radical sort of novelty. And it is precisely the non-appropriability of the Other’s future, the irreducibility of their future to my own anticipations and projects, the non-
synchronizability of our respective unfoldings, that affords my experience of the world with objectivity.

In *Existence & Existents*, Levinas claims that his contemporaries (e.g., Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty) attest to an “existence where past, present, and future would be caught up all at once,” and, as such, the idea of the moment, of “the pure present,” must be considered an abstraction, because “the concrete present, pregnant with all its past, already leaps towards the future; it is before and after itself.” A consequence of this temporality is that “to take human existence as something having a date, placed in a present, would be to commit the gravest sin against the spirit.” The argument of his contemporaries, expressed generally, is: lived experience, because it involves freedom and change, fundamentally involves time; arguments for the existence of a “pure present” assume the reality of an abstract and discrete moment that is incapable of change; thus, the affirmation of a pure present involves a denial of time that renders experience, at best, groundless and, at worst, illusory. Levinas argues, to the contrary, that “human existence does contain an element of stability” insofar as “it consists in being the subject of its own becoming.” By attesting to a temporality that admits of no gaps or moments, his contemporaries contradict the stability that characterizes pre-reflective subjectivity. “Modern philosophy,” Levinas asserts, “has been little by little led to sacrifice for the sake of the spirituality of the subject its very subjectivity, that is, its substantiality.” Levinas agrees with his contemporaries that it is “impossible to conceive of substance as the persistence under the current of becoming of an invariable substratum,” because one could not account for how an invariable subject would relate to the changing world without situating the subject “outside of time.” But he attests to stability of the subject through his articulation of the present.

“The present,” he claims, “is the very fact that there is an existent,” an embodied subjectivity. This is an early formulation of the provisional stability and self-sufficiency of *jouissance* in *Totality & Infinity*. He writes that “the present introduces into existence the preeminence, the mastery and the very virility of the substantive.” The subjectivity that maintains egoist self-sufficiency by divesting objects of their exteriority takes place in this present. It takes up a position that “is not equivalent to the abstract position of the idealist ego, nor to the engagement in the world of Heidegger’s Dasein, which always goes beyond the *hic et nunc*,” but rather consists of “the fact of putting oneself on the ground, in that inalienable here which is a base.”

“A subject’s immobility, its steadiness,” Levinas claims, “is not the result of an invariable reference to some coordinates of ideal space, but of its stance, the event of its position, which refers only to itself and is the origin of fixity in general.” He likens subjectivity to the statues of Rodin, writing that “the event [Rodin’s] statues realize ... is much more in their relationship with the base than in their relationship with a soul, a knowing or thought, which they would have to express.” Levinas’s point is that Rodin’s statues, like our
materiality, presuppose the support of a unique and inalienable place and position, a *hic* and *nunc*. I could not be the sort of being that I am without the “present” of my embodied identity. If we suppose that my materiality, the restless atoms and energies of which my body is composed, are fundamentally disinterested with my personhood, we might posit the existence of an immaterial soul or an absolute subject to make sense of the stability of my identity. Levinas, on the contrary, claims that human materiality *itself* necessarily takes position, or involves an inalienable *hic et nunc*, and so already attests to this stability.

Just as in *Totality & Infinity* the provisional subjectivity of *jouissance* divests things of their alterity, in *Existence & Existents* the ego maintains itself, remains in its “present,” by refusing temporal exteriority. “As a self-reference in a present,” Levinas writes, “the identical subject is ... free with regard to the past and the future.” Its freedom, however, “is a weight and a responsibility,” in that it is “articulated in a positive enchainment to one’s self; the ego is irremissibly itself.” One is enchained to one’s ego. Because my embodiment is a constitutive taking-place, I cannot but unfold in the presence of my own self-identity. As Levinas writes, “the dynamism of the “I” resides in the very presence of the present.” But doesn’t the experience of self-identity, as much as it involves stasis, the present, and sameness, also involve change, time, and difference?

“The personality of a being,” Levinas writes, “is its very need for time as for a miraculous fecundity in the instant itself, by which it recommences as other.” Personality is one’s capacity to remain oneself through change, to recommence as differently the same. But given the ego’s enchainment to the present, the difference presupposed by change is not found in the ego. Rather, Levinas’s claim here is that “this alterity comes only from the other,” and that “the nothingness necessary to time, which the subject cannot produce, comes from the social relationship.” This analysis of the “present” of embodied subjectivity in *Existence & Existents* is carried forward to Levinas’s characterization of “the Same” in *Totality & Infinity*. *Jouissance* is characterized by a temporality that admits of no proper or radical future. Prior to the discursive relation, my anticipation of the future conforms to the particularities of my material embodiment. A future sufficiently alien to call the interiorizing temporality of *jouissance* into question could originate only from the radically unanticipatable future of the Other.

Ethical alterity is thus inherently futural. It involves offering things and the world, even my own body, to the future of the Other, a future irreducible to my projects, hopes, and anticipations of the future. Put differently: ethical life is a life lived for the precarious future of the Other. And the constitutive unavailability of the Other’s future, which affords my experience of the world with objectivity, is only sufficiently “alterior” because of its non-synchronizability, or its irreducibility to my own temporality. As such, it is time’s discontinuity and diachrony that affords the ethical relation.
Consequences for Anthropocentrism Debate

In this concluding section, I articulate the practical consequences of the diachronic and discontinuous temporality that underlies the ethical relationship in *Totality & Infinity*. This temporality reframes the recent scholarly debate regarding the possibility of a non-anthropocentric extension of Levinas’s ethics. I argue no such extension is necessary, because the temporality of alterity in *Totality & Infinity* implies that Levinas cannot be anthropocentric or exclusory of non-human animals in the first instance. I will first challenge the common prejudgment that Levinas inherits the anthropocentrism of Kant and Heidegger and will conclude by showing how *Totality & Infinity* offers intrinsic provisions for a more-than-human ethics.

In “The Name of a Dog, or Natural Rights,” Levinas recalls his time as a prisoner in a Nazi labor camp, explaining that while the free people who dealt with him and the other prisoners “stripped [them] of [their] human skin,” they were often visited by a dog named Bobby, for whom “there was no doubt that [they] were men.” He describes Bobby as “the last Kantian in Nazi Germany, without the brain needed to universalize maxims and drives.” John Llewelyn, in *The Middle Voice of Ecological Consciousness*, takes these remarks to place Levinas in the Kantian tradition that excludes animals from moral consideration. He takes the comment that Bobby lacks “the brain needed to universalize maxims and drives” to exclude Bobby from Kant’s kingdom of ends. And because he understands Levinas’s ethics as “analogous to the ethics of Immanuel Kant,” this exclusion is tantamount to exclusion from moral consideration in Levinas’s own ethics. In *The Animal That Therefore I Am*, Derrida, too, places Levinas alongside Kant and Heidegger in a philosophical tradition that has always excluded the animal from speech, reason, and dignity, and claims that, for Levinas, “subject of ethics, the face, remains first of all a fraternal and a human face.”

While Levinas undoubtedly engages seriously with Kant’s moral philosophy, his own ethical philosophy diverges from Kant’s fundamentally. In *The Ethics of Emmanuel Levinas*, Diane Perpich explains that whereas for Kant dignity is “a function of the capacity for reason and thus for a moral will,” for Levinas “what matters is not at all a what but a who: an absolutely incalculable other who cannot be reduced to some subset of properties,” who is “not worthy of ethical … consideration only in virtue of certain qualities or capacities.” Contrary to Llewelyn’s interpretation, Perpich takes Levinas’s comment that Bobby lacked “the brain needed to universalize maxims and drives” to mean precisely that, given how Kant would deny Bobby reason, “reason may not be what makes you ethical.”

Derrida includes Heidegger in this anthropocentric philosophical tradition by recalling his thesis in *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics* that “the stone (material object) is worldless; the animal is poor in world; man is
world-forming.” Given Levinas’s intellectual debt to Heideggerian phenomenology, we might assume that he inherits Heidegger’s distinction between the animal and the human as “poor in world” and “world-forming,” respectively. However, I follow Colleen Glenney Boggs’s suggestion that when Levinas remarks that he and the other prisoners were “no longer part of the world,” he “invokes and challenges Martin Heidegger’s argument that ‘the animal is poor in world’ whereas ‘man is world-forming’.” Boggs claims rather that “Levinas indicates that the distinction between human beings and animals is not absolute but relational, that their position in regard to the world is not ontological but situational.” Engagement in an objective world is not a structural or ontological feature of human life, but emerges only in ethical life, or sociality—a worldliness that the prisoners found themselves robbed of.

Llewelyn and Derrida’s respective texts inaugurated a common reading of Levinas’s ethical philosophy, wherein it is assumed that there is some principle, quality, or characteristic that makes a face “the face” in Levinas’s ethical sense. On this reading, Levinas’s critics argue that this principle excludes non-human animals. Even recent scholarship that challenges such anthropocentric readings of Levinas nonetheless assumes that there is some principle at stake in Levinas’s account of the “face,” but identifies this principle as one that would include non-human animals. Those who argue against the possibility of a non-anthropocentric extension take this principle to be one that cannot be attributed to animals. For Llewelyn and Derrida this exclusory principle is language. For Mensch, it is speech, so speechless beings are excluded from Levinas’s account. For Peter Atterton, it is “the ability to feel pain and organs for expressing it,” so only organisms complex enough to experience pain can disturb jouissance. And those who argue for the possibility of such an extension identify a principle that can be extended to include non-human others. Christian Diehm, for example, argues that because any being with its own existential project can call me into question, Levinas’s account can be extended to include any self-conscious form of life.

However, in The Ethics of Emmanuel Levinas, Diane Perpich finds that scholars commonly conflate ethics, or what it is about the Other that calls egoist spontaneity into question, with politics, or what sort of systematic response is the most just. On Perpich’s interpretation, it is always another human being that disturbs the enjoyment and self-sufficiency of jouissance, but they introduce the possibility of distributing justice in a way inclusive of all others, not only humans. She takes Levinas’s politics to be potentially non-anthropocentric, while maintaining that his ethics excludes non-human others.

While I agree that Levinas’s account of ethics is not interchangeable with his politics, I maintain that the diachronic and discontinuous temporality described in Totality & Infinity contests Perpich and other scholars’ claims that, in the first instance, Levinas’s ethics excludes the possibility being called into
question by a non-human Other. In arguing that only a human other can disrupt egoist spontaneity, scholars explain the Other’s shattering of *jouissance* as the effect of some positive, identifiable property, and thereby compromise the futural alterity of the Other that *Totality & Infinity* describes. Such a reading overlooks the unassimilable character of the Other’s futurity and thus the diachronic and discontinuous temporality that Levinas argues affords the ethical relationship.

It is not the Other’s humanity, reason, dignity, language, or suffering that disturbs *jouissance*. It is rather the *alterity* of the Other, their irreducible and radical excess with regard to my interiorizing, material enjoyment of the world, that disrupts the self-sufficiency of *jouissance*. Indeed, no feature that the other and I might share in common (language, the capacity for suffering, etc.) could act as the exigency by which self-sufficiency is disrupted. The potential commonality of such a feature would mean it is not radically exterior to *jouissance*. Because the interiorization of *jouissance* would be free to divest such a feature of its alterity, such a feature could not disrupt egoist spontaneity. “If the resistance to murder were not ethical but real,” if it involved not a radically futural alterity, but some present, empirical feature, Levinas claims that “we would have a perception of it, with all that reverts to the subjective in perception:” the interiorizing movement of *jouissance*.  

This is why Levinas describes the Other’s shattering of *jouissance* as an epiphany or revelation. The Other’s alterity entails a break and excess with respect to the present. While I can offer *post facto* explanations of what has shattered *jouissance*, these explanations will always necessarily do violence to the radically unthematisable excess of the Other.

There can be no atemporal criteria by which the Other ethically matters. While we can explain what criteria seem to have, historically, determined the moral standing of the beings before whom we’ve felt we must justify ourselves, if Levinas is right that a diachronic temporality structures experience, a possible and necessary consequence of this temporality is that we are exposed to possibility of radical change, to the future of the Other which fractures the “present” of egoist *jouissance*. Alterity, the face of the Other, disturbs my satisfied enjoyment of the world because it is radically asynchronous with my own finite temporality. It is a future that is more alien than my own projections and anticipations of the future, that renders my body, my things, and my world offerable to the precarity of the Other. This asynchronicity, *qua* asynchronicity, cannot be reduced to the effect of some criteria that could be determined in advance.

Because the diachronic and discontinuous temporality of *Totality & Infinity* remains open to the future in a radical way, Levinas’s ethics need not be “extended.” Rather, as I have argued, Levinas’s *Totality & Infinity* already offers intrinsic provisions for a non-anthropocentric ethics. Because Levinas’s rethinking of ethics presupposes a radical sort of futurity, it is open to an irreducible diversity of potential others. Because alterity is, on Levinas’s
account, intrinsically and radical futural, we cannot restrict in advance or once and for all what sort of Other can disturb me. We cannot posit categorical restrictions on what sorts of beings can interrupt the self-sufficiency of jouissance. Levinas’s narrative about Bobby is perhaps meant to attest to the surprise of being disrupted by the alterity of a dog.

2 “...while morality thus operates in the sociopolitical order of organizing and improving our human survival, it is ultimately founded on an ethical responsibility towards the other.” Levinas, “Ethics of the Infinite,” 80.


7 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 135.


9 “Each [perceptual] act has its own appropriate, intentional, objective reference: this is as true of complex as of simple acts. Whatever the composition of an act out of partial acts [m]ay be, if it is an act at all, it must have a single objective correlate, to which we say it is ‘directed’, in the full, primary sense of the [word].” Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations: Volume Two, trans. by J. N. Findlay and edited by Dermot Moran (New York, NY: Routledge, 2001), 114.

10 Zahavi, Husserl’s Phenomenology, 14.

11 Zahavi, Husserl’s Phenomenology, 15.

12 “There are ... not two things present in experience, we do not experience the object and beside it the intentional experience directed upon it, there are not even two things present in the sense of a part and a whole which contains it: only one thing is present, the intentional experience, whose essential descriptive character is the intention in question.” Husserl, Logical Investigations: Volume Two, 98.

13 Levinas, Totality & Infinity, 94.


15 Levinas, Totality & Infinity, 187. In his 1969 translation of Totality & Infinity, Alphonso Lingis translates jouissance as enjoyment. Throughout this article, I keep jouissance untranslated because Levinas’s usage of this term in TI seems inextricable from the context of embodied sexual pleasure. I do not take it as coincidence that Levinas publishes Totality & Infinity in 1961, not far after Lacan’s 1959-1960 seminar The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, where Lacan speaks of a jouissance beyond the pleasure principle. By keeping this in mind, we better place Levinas in the wider context of the French philosophy of gender and sexuality in the 1960s.


20 Levinas, *Totality & Infinity*, 188.


22 Levinas, *Totality & Infinity*, 141.


26 Levinas, *Totality & Infinity*, 134.

27 Levinas, *Totality & Infinity*, 142.

28 Levinas, *Totality & Infinity*, 111.


31 Mensch, *Levinas’s Existential Analytic*, 77-78.

32 Levinas, *Totality & Infinity*, 95.

33 Levinas, *Totality & Infinity*, 95.

34 Levinas, *Totality & Infinity*, 124.


37 Levinas, *Totality & Infinity*, 96.

38 Levinas, *Totality & Infinity*, 95.


40 Levinas, *Totality & Infinity*, 76.

41 Levinas, *Totality & Infinity*, 76.

42 Levinas, *Totality & Infinity*, 75.

43 Levinas, *Totality & Infinity*, 75.

Levinas, *Totality & Infinity*, 85.

Levinas, *Totality & Infinity*, 138-139.

Levinas, *Totality & Infinity*, 43.

Levinas, *Totality & Infinity*, 98.

Meaning and Sense, 53.

Meaning and Sense, 53.


Levinas, *Totality & Infinity*, 199.

Levinas, *Totality & Infinity*, 199.

Levinas, *Totality & Infinity*, 200.

Levinas, *Totality & Infinity*, 198.

Levinas, *Totality & Infinity*, 200.

Levinas, *Totality & Infinity*, 201.


“...understanding is in every case a Present which ‘is in the process of having been’;” “one’s state-of-mind temporalizes itself as a future which is ‘making present’;” and “the Present ‘leaps away’ from a future that is in the process of having been.” (Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 401).

“...we can see that in every ecstasis, temporality temporalizes itself as a whole; and this means that in the ecstatical unity with which temporality has fully temporalized itself currently, is grounded the totality of the structural whole of existence, facticity, and falling—that is the unity of the care-structure,” Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 401.

Levinas’s choice to describe generational being with the masculine fecundity of the father-son relation, excluding the possibility of a fecundity with the feminine Other, has been the subject of much criticism. While a sufficiently nuanced discussion of these criticisms demands its own study, I will briefly sketch out some key positions. The earliest can be found in the Simone de Beauvoir’s *The Second Sex*, where she claims that Levinas’s characterization of the feminine in *Time and the Other* “deliberately takes a man’s point of view, disregarding the reciprocity of subject and object. When he writes that woman is mystery, he implies that she is mystery for man. Thus his description, which is intended to be objective, is in fact an assertion to male privilege” (p.16, n.1). In “Violence and Metaphysics,” Derrida characterizes Levinas’s *Totality & Infinity* in a similar way, writing that “its philosophical subject is man” because Levinas “pushes the respect for dissymmetry so far that it seems to [him] impossible ... that it could have been written by a woman” (p.320, n.920). Luce Irigaray follows and radicalizes Derrida’s critiques in two influential
texts: “Questions to Emmanuel Levinas,” and “The Fecundity of the Caress: A Reading of Levinas, Totality and Infinity.” Lisa Guenther summarizes Irigaray’s critique in her 2006 The Gift of the Other. For Irigaray, because “only the emergence of a child transforms eros into fecundity and opens the radical alterity that ethics demands,” a “hierarchy between feminine voluptuosity and paternal fecundity threatens to reduce the beloved woman to a means to an end, a condition for the lover’s own ethical and temporal enrichment” (84-85).

More recent feminist criticism is well represented in the 2001 volume Feminist Interpretations of Emmanuel Levinas. On the more critical end is Stella Stanford’s argument that Levinas’s notion of fecundity is restricted to biological heterosexual reproduction and that “the feminine is made to give way to the masculine” (199). Tina Chanter, on the other end, suggests that “Levinas’s understanding of the feminine as a disruption of the virile categories of mastery, domination, and self-possession opens up the possibility of another way of (non)being, a different mode of existence” (252). My argument in this section follows Lisa Guenther’s own claim that “the discontinuous temporality that Levinas describes as a “paternity” cannot be coherently restricted to fathers and sons” (76).

64 Levinas, Totality & Infinity, 267.
65 Levinas, Totality & Infinity, 282.
66 Levinas, Totality & Infinity, 282.
67 Levinas, Totality & Infinity, 267.

68 Whereas in Totality & Infinity Levinas associates the Other with radical futurity, in his later texts, such as his 1975 Otherwise than Being and his 1985 “Diachrony and Representation,” he associates the Other with an immemorial past.

70 Levinas, Existence & Existents, 101.
71 Levinas, Existence & Existents, 102.
72 Levinas, Existence & Existents, 102.
73 Levinas, Existence & Existents, 102.
74 Levinas, Existence & Existents, 103.
75 Levinas, Existence & Existents, 103.
76 Levinas, Existence & Existents, 104.
77 Levinas, Existence & Existents, 69.

78 Levinas, Existence & Existents, 70. This positive point of comparison runs up against Levinas’s aesthetics in his 1948 essay “Reality and its Shadow.” In this text, Levinas characterizes art as dangerous because of its capacity to provoke ethical quietism. This positive construal in Existence & Existents resonates more with his later aesthetics—for example, his claim in a 1988 interview that the disruption of responsibility “can come from a bare arm sculpted by Rodin.” Emmanuel Levinas, “The Other, Utopia, and Justice” in Entre Nous: On Thinking-of-the-Other, trans. Michele B. Smith and Barbara Harshav (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1998), 232.

79 Levinas, Existence & Existents, 89.
80 Levinas, *Existence & Existent*, 89.


86 Levinas, “The Name of A Dog,” 150.


100 Perpich, *The Ethics of Emmanuel Levinas*, 174-75.
101 Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, 199.