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Ricoeur’s Narrative Identity Reconsidered in the Light of Enactivism

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In this paper, I argue for a revaluation of Paul Ricoeur’s notion of narrative identity in light of what has been coined “the body-social problem” in enactivism. It is my contention that while phenomenological perspectives upon the body and the self are considered as relevant in enactivism, the self’s hermeneutical, discursive facets so far have remained underdeveloped. For instance, the discursive self is understood as a less essential facet of the self, its reflexive side, that gives expression to an experiential self.

Miriam Kyselo in her description of the body-social problem starts from the contention that the philosophy of cognitive science so far has not been sufficiently capable to address the social dimension of the embodied human self. In the meantime, this problem has been taken up in enactivism and new accounts of the relation between bodies, selves, others and language have been developed. In this paper, I will focus upon the debate that Kyselo embarked on, because it will allow me to consider a tension in enactivism between biological individuation and the self as a social relational being. My claim is that Ricoeur’s notion of narrative identity can first of all contribute to this body-social problem because it does not merely imply considering the self as singular due to its self-narrative, but because Ricoeur understands the self as individuated on the basis of its embodiment. I will demonstrate that this is the case by relating Ricoeur’s notion of narrative identity in his later works, to his early philosophical anthropology. Secondly, even though Ricoeur does not explicitly consider the social situatedness of the self, his conception of the narrative self furthers the debate in enactivism because it helps to understand how an individual on the one hand takes over social norms, thereby becoming a social self, while on the other hand remaining relatively independent of, and not (always) complying with social norms.
For Ricoeur the narrative self conditions the ethical self. It is especially the idea that the self needs to grasp who it is in a narrative in order to distinguish itself from prevailing social norms, that is relevant for the debate about the relation between the body and the social in enactivism. In this debate, Miriam Kyselo is criticized by Michelle Maiese for being in tension with the enactivist framework because of downplaying the role of the living body. Maiese holds that Kyselo does not pay sufficient attention to individuation – that according to Maiese for enactivists takes place upon the basis of embodiment. However, with the help of Ricoeur, I will argue that individuation takes place not only on the basis of embodiment, but also in language, and that the latter is critical in order to be able to take a distance from the social norms that condition individuals.

In the next section, I start with “the body-social problem” and Kyselo’s solution to it. Next, I discuss Maiese’s critique and alternative “life-shaping” thesis. Because both do not solve the body-social problem, I will turn to Joe Higgins’ critical discussion of Kyselo, in which he argues for the ontological entwinement of body and sociality within human existence. Higgins discusses gender as an example of biosocial existence. I endorse his conception of gendered biosocial existence, but think that the relationship body-norms needs to be further developed and will suggest Judith Butler’s notion of “materialization” as an alternative for Higgins’ “tattooing” of norms on the body. Then I discuss Ricoeur’s conception of narrative identity against the background of his philosophical anthropology. I will first show that Ricoeur’s notion of narrative identity is not in contrast with the enactivist framework, because he considers a human being’s embodiment as the basis for a person’s individuation, that is, for its separation from its environment, similar to enactivists. Individuation for him does not take place merely on the basis of embodiment, however, as is the prevailing idea in enactivism, but also on the basis of language: narrative identity implies self-gathering and self-constitution in language. It is especially the latter that makes that a person is not only capable of referring to itself in a language that it shares with others, but also of relating to social norms. In order to conceive of embodied social facets of the self such as gender, is my conclusion, the two forms of individuation, embodied and discursive, as well as their interrelation will need to be considered.

Enactivist ‘Solutions’ to the Body-Social Problem

“The body-social problem,” as it is coined by Miriam Kyselo, indicates the tension in the philosophy of cognitive science between recognizing that human brains are embodied and the self’s sociality. Granting that nowadays in this field cognition is considered as embodied and interactive, the social in the philosophy of cognitive science is an “external, independently given
world into which these newly embodied, yet essentially isolated selves parachute," Kyselo claims.\textsuperscript{11} For her, instead, the human self’s sociality implies intersubjectivity and the relationality of the self: “humans live not only in a world of others that affect them and that they relate to, but […] \textit{qua} being interactors in a social world, they also co-constitute each other’s self.”\textsuperscript{12} She aims at offering a solution to bridge this body-social problem, as well as the dichotomy between a pluralist conception of the self and an essentialist one.\textsuperscript{13}

Kyselo’s paper starts with drawing the outlines of contemporary developments in the philosophy of cognitive science. Because it provides a background for my paper as well, I will start from there. First of all, the cognitive sciences do not limit their observations to the brain anymore and no longer make a clear cut separation between the individual cognitive system and its objectively and independently given environment, but consider the dynamic interplay of individual bodily and environmental processes, with the brain as a mediator of that interplay.\textsuperscript{14} This perspective on embodied cognition has consequences for the notion of the self, because it now includes phenomenological observations from a first- and second-person perspective, and is considered as a subjective and experiential bodily self.\textsuperscript{15} In the second place, cognitive sciences increasingly acknowledge that cognition involves the social, is intersubjective and concerned with understanding others. In various studies the social dimension of cognition is addressed: from psychological investigations of child development (on neo-natal imitation, for instance) to philosophical accounts of mirror neurons, and from acknowledgments of social cognition to narrative approaches of the self.\textsuperscript{16} The philosophy of cognitive science faces problems in conceiving the coherence of these embodied and social claims, Kyselo contends. In a Gallagherian plural conception of the self, embodied cognition and its social dimension may perhaps be taken together as different patterns of the self,\textsuperscript{17} but for Kyselo this is unsatisfactory, because according to her interdisciplinary research is in need of a coherent unity of the self.

The body-social problem she describes comes down to conceiving of the body as, on the one hand, grounding the identity of the cognitive system and individuating it as living entity (and informing the cognitive system about its goals, for instance by means of emotions) and, on the other hand, as the means and reason for the cognitive systems’ interactions with the world.\textsuperscript{18} The problem Kyselo notices is that social relations are considered under two aspects: group identity (individuals join in creating the autonomy of the interaction process) and individual identity (the role of social interactions for the individual). Group and individual are both considered as autonomous and this leads to the dilemma that both cannot be the case at once: when the individual adapts to external norms it in fact is heteronomous, and not governed by its own laws of self-organization.\textsuperscript{19}
Kyselo finds an enactivist solution to the tension between the role of bodily and social processes in cognitive individuation in Hans Jonas’ biological notion of “needful freedom,” according to which an individual identity reflects the world from which it emerges, as well as emancipating itself from the world through these same processes. She explains that this means to “define the human self organizationally as a whole in terms of social interactions and exchanges with the environment” while also considering it as an independent being that forms its identity “as that particular social individual standing out against the social relations of which it is made.” The self in this account is not given or something the individual has, but an achievement, open to change and something between individuals. In order to conceive of this conception of the self, Kyselo needs to take a step from the realm of the bodily and organic in Jonas’ notion of freedom to the social realm in which individuals are bound to social rules and individuate. The notion of “social needful freedom” she accordingly develops entails thinking the individual “as arising from a sea of social relational, not merely bodily processes.” The individual’s self is constituted in and remains open to structural change generated in interaction with others (Kyselo calls this: “participation”), and it is capable of distinguishing itself from some of these relations (“distinction”).

In a recent paper, Michelle Maiese criticizes Kyselo for conceiving the self as – in Kyselo’s own words - “not a bodily, but socially enacted identity.” Maiese reads Kyselo as concluding that the self is “constitutively social,” and that “the body’s role is to mediate that social existence,” and claims that Kyselo downplays the role of the living body. For this reason, according to Maiese, the latter’s position is in tension with the enactivist framework that entails an account of the body as an autonomous organization. In order to make sense of the human capacity to navigate between social interactions and the agency to defy social norms and expectations, a notion of biological individuation is necessary, is Maiese’s claim. Her alternative to the body-social problem in enactivism is what she calls “the life-shaping thesis.” I will argue that instead of surpassing the body-social problem that Kyselo signals, Maiese reinforces it by claiming that in Kyselo’s account the social is emphasized over the bodily sphere. I will question her solution (and also Kyselo’s), but first will specify Maiese’s “life-shaping thesis,” because it demonstrates a central asset of enactivism, namely that the self’s individuation is based upon its embodiment.

The issue of concern is how individuation can take shape when the individual is considered as a social being. In the enactivist framework, individuals are considered as autonomous organizations (systems) that have agency. In order to have agency, an individual must be capable of defining its own identity as an individual and thus of distinguishing itself from its environment (individuality); it must be the source of activity and self-
constructing instead of one of the partners in the coupling with its environment (interactional asymmetry): and finally the individual must adaptively regulate its coupling with the environment according to norms (normativity). The latter implies that an agent does not completely adapt to existing norms but that it regulates its interactions in relation to the goals it has itself and the norms in its environment. In enactivism, it is the biological autonomy of the living body that conditions agency. Biological autonomy in this framework is not considered as distinct from psychological or cultural forms of life, but is taken as the presupposition of biological self-maintenance as well as of psychological and cultural life. In order to conceive of psychological and cultural life, and not merely of biological autonomous systems, apart from agency also an account of phenomenologically differentiated subjectivity is relevant: individuals do not only conceive of their bodies as distinct from other bodies and things, but also experience their subjectivity as separate from and connected with others. In the enactivist framework, subjectivity is considered in terms of a rudimentary sense of self, or as Maiese writes “inner presence,” that is separate from as well as dependent upon its surroundings.

Maiese’s claim is that selves are first and foremost biologically constituted, rather than socially. She argues that the identity of living systems as well as the identity of selves is grounded upon a distinction between the components that constitute the living system and the ones that form its environment. In other words, the living system and the self are differentiated from the social world. It is upon the basis of biological autonomy that the self individuates, but while being fully embodied, the various dimensions of “mindedness” – such as “desires, feelings, emotions, sense perceptions, memories, thoughts, intentional actions” – are all partially determined or shaped by the social world. This is what she calls her “life-shaping thesis”: it entails a conception of autonomous agency that is based upon the self’s embodiment. As Maiese writes, instead of considering the self as socially constructed or individuated, the life shaping thesis holds that the self is “causally dependent on, and shaped by, the social world, and should be individuated in terms of the form or autonomous organization of the living body.”

Maiese is careful to show that she does not equate the self with the body, and suggests to consider the self in terms of a neo-Aristotelian anima or also form of life, that animates a neurobiologically complex living organism. The self, in her account, “internalizes” social influences and norms. She works out her life-shaping thesis with the notion of habit, that shows how social relations and norms become bodily habits that shape the self’s form or structure. Social norms in this way become sedimented in the body, “by way of socio-culturally habit formation.” The living bodies of human animals hence are socially embedded and partially determined by the surrounding social world, is Maiese’s conclusion. Her answer to the body-social problem
is thus, in her own words, that human selves should be understood in terms of “the autonomous organization of the living body and [...] as a socially embedded form of life.” Social norms “exert a powerful causal influence” but the human subject also retains her autonomy, and some power to resist norms, because of being embodied.

In the two solutions to the body-social problem discussed so far, an imbalance between the two branches of the problem remains: Kyselo’s solution is positioned more on the side of the social to the detriment of bodily processes (she claims – and Maiese cites this phrase multiple times – that “[t]he self in its most minimal sense, thus escapes the body”), whereas Maiese’s alternative life-shaping thesis takes the stance of the individuating body and considers the social as “causally” influencing the embodied self. By considering the social as “internalized” by the human self, and the self as “partially determined” by social norms, Maiese leaves an important facet of the body-social problem intact. She considers the body and social as two separate ontological realms that perhaps relate to each other but are not intertwined. The problem with Kyselo’s account is that it does not sufficiently consider the individual’s embodiment, and mainly focuses upon the individual’s distinction of and participation in social relations.

A better solution to the body-social problem is given by Joe Higgins, who in a commentary on Kyselo’s paper argues for the ontological entwinement of bodily and social processes, and considers humans as biosocial selves. His paper is affirmingly mentioned by Maiese, but in the end the latter falls back into the body-social opposition, because the social dimension is understood by her as merely affecting the body - as her notion of bodily habits exemplifies. The social therefore is not considered as the realm in which the self is situated to start with (Kyselo’s starting point), but merely from the perspective of the self’s embodiment. My suggestion is close to Higgins account of biosocial selves. In the next section, I therefore first will detail his “biosocial experiential space,” which implies an alternative solution to the body-social problem. In the section thereafter, I will demonstrate to which extent Ricoeur’s notion of narrative identity can be seen to relate to this and which contributions it offers to understanding individuation. Gender is an important example of the influence of social norms upon everyday existence in Higgins’ paper, as it will be in mine.

**Gender as Materialization**

For Higgins “body” and “social” should not be treated as distinct aspects of selfhood that are entwined to a certain extent, nor as the opposed poles of a spectrum, but he considers the two as related within “the experiential space in which humans dwell.” Instead of starting from a distinction between two
spheres, the body and the social, he claims that the two amount to “a single ontological feature” of human selfhood. Drawing upon classical sources that inform enactivism, he contends that human experience entails a physiological and a relational domain and that it is structurally coupled to its environment. While for Maturana language is the mechanism by which the human experiential world obtains its complex character, and through which humans enter into a “unique relational domain of conceptual rationality,” Higgins claims that the inherent social normativity of our bodies subserves also the ability to use language. On the basis of empirical data, he argues that the capacities for social interactions are already present in human newborns who are not yet capable of speaking. These infants develop self-awareness, that is typically taken as a basic bodily self-awareness. This does not imply that bodily (self-)understanding emerges within a social world – an argument that would leave the body-social distinction intact - but instead that (self-)understanding is social to start with. Higgins’ claim is also that selfhood is not “achieved’ on the back of a nascent bodily identity, but is present with the earliest indicators of individuation.” He thereby succeeds in surpassing the body-social distinction. For him, bodily activity is permeated by social ways of being and social norms feed back into the individual’s potential bodily actions, that in turn generate and modulate further norms. The body and social in Higgins account are no longer opposed, nor in tension. Instead, in human existence, in his words, the two are “conjointly foundational to the manifestation of one another.” Higgins also surpasses the idea of the body as a vehicle of the social self that as Maiese claims is “causally determined by social interactions.” Instead, the body “generates, discloses and modulates social norms” in a direct way.

The bodily acquisition and expression of social gender norms is a telling example of this process. Before continuing with Ricoeur, in this section, I elaborate on gender as a form of embodied social normativity. Higgins understands women as “tattooed” with the social normativity of gendered modalities. He considers gender as a consequence of socially generated norms that mark human – and as he writes, especially female – bodies. Bodily subjectivity hence is normatively permeated and (re-)enacted in daily activities. Individual agents in this process enact these norms and play an active role, Higgins contends, in generating and modulating the social norms that they are themselves modulated by. He draws on the famous essay, “Throwing Like a Girl” of Iris Marion Young, who describes differences between masculine and feminine bodily comportment. Throwing a ball like a girl does not mean bringing your whole body into the motion like boys do (reaching back, twisting, moving backwards, stepping and leaning forward), but tending relatively immobile except for your arm. Combining the analysis of women’s situation by De Beauvoir with Merleau-Ponty’s investigation of bodily comportment, Young explains this difference as a way of using the body that has its source in women’s particular situation as conditioned by their sexist oppression in a patriarchal society.
Higgins uses the notion of “tattooing” in order to understanding how bodies are marked with gender norms. Considering the body as “marked” with social norms or these norms as “attached” to bodies, however, implies regarding the body as merely a surface or material object upon which existing social norms are inscribed. Higgins might be correct in considering embodiment and sociality as belonging to the same ontological sphere, but his way of relating the body and the social sphere is in need of further theorizing. By using notions such as “tattooing” he seems to fall back behind the claim in his paper that the body is not a vehicle of the social self. Judith Butler, whose gender notion in the field of gender studies nowadays is broadly accepted, offers a viable alternative, with the notion of “materialization.” What does this entail for the relation between the body and norms?

In *Gender Trouble* (1990) and *Bodies That Matter* (1993) Butler’s starting point is the sex/gender opposition in feminist theory, that is, the opposition between nature and culture. This distinction is perhaps not completely similar to the body-social distinction in enactivism, but related enough to be of use for my purposes. The problem in feminist theory is to circumvent the trap of thinking in terms of unconstructed matter on the one side (sex) and social constructions on the other (gender). Butler argues against a constructivism that considers the social as an agent “which acts upon a nature, which is itself presupposed as a passive surface, outside the social and yet its necessary counterpart.” This argument does not apply to Higgins, because his claim is that the body and social are intertwined from the start. Yet Butler’s argument does specify how gender norms are related to bodies and therewith gives an alternative for “tattooing.” She explains how social norms condition the emergence of gendered subjects. “Conditioning” applies not only to the subject’s sense of self but also to its body. Gendering is an activity, but not one of a human being that willfully appropriates existing gender norms, but gender is a matrix “through which willing first becomes possible.” Butler’s aim is not to rip the human self of all agency, but to give an account of the social process of gendering that includes some subjects and endows them with “social existence” (namely heterosexual male or female subjects) and excludes others (non-binary persons). In this respect Butler also uses the Althusserian notion of “interpellation,” for instance in claiming: “Consider the medical interpellation which […] shifts an infant from an ‘it’ to as ‘she’ or a ‘he,’ and in that naming, the girl is ‘girled,’ brought into the domain of language and kinship through the interpellation of gender.” The process of interpellation naturalizes gender, she claims, and is reiterated throughout time to reinforce this naturalized effect. “This naming is at once the setting of a boundary, and also the repeated inculcation of a norm.” Gender therefore is not, or rather not only, natural to start with, but it is naturalized in the process of citing and repeating social norms. This is not to deny the biological aspects of gender (genes, gonads and genitals), but the point is that bodies are socially
constructed because the world we live in and are born into is a social normative one to start with. We conceive of our own bodies and the ones of others in terms of the social norms we are raised with.

Instead of speaking about gender norms in terms of construction, Butler suggests the notion of “materialization,” meaning “a process […] that stabilizes over time to produce the effect of boundary, fixity, and surface we call matter.” Gendered bodies materialize, that is, we conceive of the bodies of others and of ourselves through the frame of gender. In a society in which gender is perceived as binary, it is the frame of heterosexual masculinity or femininity that materializes. “Materialization” surpasses the body-social distinction, because it implies no longer conceiving of bodies as matter that is signified by social norms but understanding the signifying process as producing specific kinds of bodies (masculine and feminine ones). We have seen that for Higgins bodily subjectivity is normatively permeated and (re-)enacted in daily activities and that individual agents enact gender norms and play an active role in generating and modulating the social norms that they are themselves modulated by. Butler’s notion of materialization explains how bodies are from birth onwards (and even before birth) endowed with gender significations. In this process, the body is not a blank neutral surface to which a signification is attached, but on the basis of its characteristics the body is naturalized as gendered in a binary way.

What does this social normative frame for understanding bodies imply for the enactivist body-social problem under discussion in this paper? We saw that Kyselo’s solution is positioned more on the side of the social to the detriment of bodily processes, while Maiese’s life-shaping thesis considers the social as causally influencing the embodied self. For Maiese selves are first and foremost biologically constituted, rather than socially, and individuation takes place on an embodied basis. She refers to and further develops the notion of habit in order to account for the social influences and norms that play a role in selfhood. In the case of social gender norms, this notion of bodily habits may account for gendered behavioral aspects such as moving, gesturing, walking, throwing, and it may even be extended to dressing up and to talking (pitch, styles of speaking). Maiese’s life-shaping thesis thus enables to explain how within a given social order individuals take over and reenact social gender norms by means of their bodily behavior. How they are capable of differentiating themselves from these norms is difficult to understand from her perspective however – as happens today by people who identify as non-binary, but also by everyone who objects to act in a typical binary gender-conform style. In contrast, Kyselo’s Jonasian notion of “social needful freedom” entails thinking the individual “as arising from a sea of social relational (…) processes.” The self for her is not given or something the individual has, but is an achievement, open to change and something between individuals. Her notion of social needful freedom accounts for the social existence of individuals (that is, their complying to binary social gender
norms), but also for their capacity to deviate from these norms and to negotiate them (in the case of people who identify as non-binary).

Higgins in his commentary upon Kyselo criticizes her on two grounds: in considering the individuation of the self, she does not give primacy to bodily processes over social ones,66 and secondly, Kyselo considers the body as the self’s means and mediator.67 Therefore, as Higgins concludes, Kyselo is successful in “overcoming the image of the human self as an embodied being that is parachuted into a social world,” but this success comes at the cost of depicting “the human self as a socially enacted being that is parachuted into a mediating body.”68 In considering the body as mediator of the self, Kyselo’s solution does not bring us any further than Maiese’s did. In order to actually get any further with the body-social problem, the body will need to be considered as more than a mere mediator of and for social processes. Higgins’ notion of biosocial existence suggests, as we have seen before, that the body “generates, discloses and modulates social norms” in a direct way.69 Even though he unfortunately uses the notion of “tattooing” individuals with social normative gendered modalities,70 which seems to indicate that the body is a surface upon which norms are inscribed, he still considers the embodied self as enacting social normative processes.

In order to further the body-social problem we therefore will need to understand how the embodied self can be subject to social normative categorization processes (in which it is understood as gendered, the process Butler calls “materialization”), how it reenacts these norms (by throwing, walking, talking “like a girl,” or “boy” or in a non-binary way) and how it can take a distance from these social norms. In the next section, I will argue for a revaluation of Paul Ricoeur’s conception of narrative identity for this purpose. I will show that his conception is close enough to enactivism to be of use for it, because Ricoeur’s notion of the narrative self includes the idea that individuation takes place on a bodily basis. In order to develop this argument, Ricoeur’s notion of narrative identity will need to be considered against the background of his early philosophical anthropology.71 Apart from individuation on the basis of a person’s embodiment, narrative identity includes the idea of the constitution of the self in language. These two forms of self-constitution and separation of one’s environment, embodied and discursive, need to be taken together in order to be able to account for what Higgins calls “biosocial existence.”

A Revaluation of Ricoeur’s Conception of the Narrative Self

Narrative identity is often taken as an aspect or facet of the self, that is distinct from its embodiment.72 Philosophers such as Gallagher and Zahavi differentiate between a “minimal self” or “phenomenal mineness” and the
narrative self. It is beyond the purpose of this paper to detail this debate, but I do want to argue that in Ricoeur’s conception of the narrative self its embodied is included. It is precisely this embodied narrative self that ontologically combines embodiment and the self’s discursivity, that is close to Higgins’ notion of “biosocial existence.” My arguments find their ground in the first place in Ricoeur’s *Oneself as Another* (1992), the book in which he mainly develops the conception of narrative identity. He there considers the lived body as one of the main ontological features of the self. Secondly, in his early phenomenological work *Fallible Man*, Ricoeur develops a philosophical anthropology in which he considers human beings as mixtures of embodiment and language. Granting that his early phenomenology and later hermeneutics of the self may be taken as continuous, I argue that in Ricoeur’s philosophical anthropology we find a notion of the human being that is sufficiently close to enactivism, because individuation takes place on the basis of a person’s embodiment. Because Ricoeur considers human beings as embodied as well as discursive, individuation for him takes place in these two realms. I argue that we do need to consider both in order to understand how individuals not only become social beings, complying with social norms, but also become capable of taking a distance from these norms. In this section, I start with a short outline of Ricoeur’s notion of narrative identity, and then will develop the argument that Ricoeur’s philosophical anthropology is in line with the enactivist framework. In the following section, I specify what Ricoeur’s embodied notion of the narrative self offers in terms of the body-social problem.

Ricoeur in his later works, after his so-called hermeneutic turn, develops the notion of narrative identity. Narrative identity includes that the self is constituted by its life-story. A person, understood as a character in a story, for him shares the condition of dynamic identity that is peculiar to the story recounted. The narrative constructs the identity of the character. The character draws her singularity “from the unity of a life considered as a temporal totality which is itself singular and distinguished from all others.” It is in a narrative about (parts of) one’s life that a person expresses who she is.

In contrast to other notions of the narrative self, such as MacIntyre’s (1981), Ricoeur maintains that the author of one’s life-story does not completely overlap with a person’s personal identity: we are the co-authors of our life-stories sooner than their authors. Also, there is no narrative closure in life-stories, because they do not have a clear beginning or end. Related to this problem is the difficulty that we can weave more than one plot and may recount several stories of our life. Our life-stories furthermore are caught up in the histories of others: in the ones of our parents, of our partner, friends and colleagues. They are “entangled in histories.” For these reasons, speaking of “the narrative unity of life” is problematic. Even while demonstrating the limits of the notion of narrative unity, Ricoeur does not
throw it completely overboard, however. Instead, he suggests to understand “the narrative unity of a life” in terms of an unstable mixture of “fabulation and actual experience.”

We need fiction in order to organize life retrospectively, and we need to take the narrative as provisional and be prepared to revise the plot of our lives.

This open notion of narrative identity, that includes the stories of others as well as one’s self reflections, that is endlessly recountable and that only closes when no one talks about a person anymore, makes that individuals are capable of grasping their identity as an individual. The narrative self is discursive, which includes that common signs and significations are used that this self shares with others, to express its identity and to understand itself. The self gathers and constitutes itself by means of the narrative and therewith differentiates itself from others. In the earlier section we have seen that in enactivism, the self is predominantly considered as individuating, as separating itself from its environment, on the basis of its embodiment and not in a discursive way. In order to show the relevance of Ricoeur’s conception of narrative identity for the debate about the body and social in enactivism, we therefore will need to consider its embodiment.

The body for Ricoeur is vital as the phenomenological “I can” of the self and as the fundamental passivity that opens it ontologically to otherness. The body is not merely a mediator, as it was for Kyselo, but it forms an important part of the ontological foundation of the self. More specifically, the lived body for Ricoeur makes the self and otherness intertwined on an ontological level. He speaks of a fundamental passivity in this respect. Passivity however is not opposed to activity, but indicates the ontological otherness of the self. The otherness of other people is the next ontological level: the interrelation between self and others. It is this intertwineement of body and self on an ontological level, that makes that Ricoeur’s philosophy of the self is close to Higgins’ biosocial self.

When we consider the philosophical anthropology in Ricoeur’s early book *Fallible Man*, the relevance of his perspective for enactivism shows itself even more. Ricoeur claims there that human beings are born into a world of language that precedes and envelops them. It is in this discursive world that the self realizes its self-identity. Ricoeur considers the human self as a mixture, torn between finitude, which is related to being embodied, and infinity, which is related to the self’s linguistic capacities. Embodiment does not imply being finite simply because we die or because of being born in the body that we are thrown into, but is related to the body’s perspectival nature.

Ricoeur in a phenomenological analysis considers embodiment in the first place as being open to the world and others. The body appears as the zero origin, the center of orientation from which the self perceives things and other people: “from the moment ‘I am brought into the world’ I perceive this
world as a series of changes and re-establishments starting from this place which I did not choose and which I cannot find in my memory.” 92 Embodiment also reveals my finitude, however, which appears to me in the form of the perspectival limitation of perception. 93 The free mobility of the body, that makes it possible to change one’s position towards objects, leads to the awareness of the body’s perspectival nature.

Infinitude is related to the process of signifying. The intention to signify implies transgression, for Ricoeur. 94 In kinesthetic experience the one-sidedness of a perspective on a thing is acknowledged, as we saw. Language supports the transcending of our perspectivity by naming things. In speaking, we communicate about things in their absence and in terms of their non-perceived sides. We convert our “here” into an “any-place-whatever.” 95 Using language thus implies making a shift from perspectivism to universality. We invert the point of view on the thing into “the universal of all points of view.” 96

Embodiment thus includes openness to the world, but it also makes us realize that our perspective on things is limited. Linguistic capacities lead humans to take a leap from comprehending their perspectival nature to a universal point of view. At this stage, self-consciousness has not entered the scene yet, because that entails as well what Ricoeur calls “affective closing.” 97 Affect is projective for him: things appear interesting to me out of affect. I grasp the lovable, attractive, hateful upon the things I find lovable, attractive, hateful. 98 In this process again, the body is not merely a mediator that lets the world in, but it is immediately for itself. In affective closing, I sense the mineness of my perspective upon things, as well as its being different from the perspective of others. “Feeling expresses my belonging to this landscape that, in turn, is the sign and cipher of my inwardness,” 99 Ricoeur explains. In affect we are reaching out to the outside world, as intentional beings, while at the same time becoming aware of how we relate to this world, and thereby becoming self-aware. We sense the body’s inexpressible presence to itself as well as the primal difference between myself and others. At the level of perception, in realizing the perspectival nature of one’s body, a sense of self is existent, but not yet reflexive. At the level of affect this self still is not yet conceptual, but experiential, and comes to itself by becoming aware of the distinction between itself and others.

In Ricoeur’s philosophical anthropology in Fallible Man, we hence find a notion of an embodied self immersed in the world, open to the things and others, that grasps that its perspective differs from the perspective of others. In kinesthetic experience, it realizes its perspectivity. Next, its affectivity colors its perception of things, and leads it to realize the singularity (and therefore finitude) of its own perspective. In Ricoeur’s later work, the conception of the narrative self is a discursive one that gathers and constitutes itself in its narrative. This narrative self is embodied: its embodiment forms its ontological foundation that does not enclose it in itself, but opens it to other(nes). The self-gathering in a narrative might be understood as a third
level of self-awareness (kinesthetic, affective, narrative), that adds on to the earlier levels.

Because Ricoeur’s narrative self includes a person’s embodiment, his philosophy of the self is close enough to enactivism to be of relevance for it. It adds on to enactivism as well, because it considers becoming a self on the basis of language, as discursive beings, as well. Narrative identity is the conception that addresses this.

**Autonomy: The Self and the Norm**

In order to understand the self’s relationship to the social sphere, it is not merely its embodiment, but also its embeddedness in language that needs to be understood. The discussion of gender earlier in this paper has shown that gender is not only the effect of genes, gonads and genitals, but consists of normative frames articulated in language that “materialize” bodies as well, to which we relate in order to gain social existence. Even though Ricoeur perhaps does not consider the social situatedness of individuals in an explicit sense,⁴⁰⁰ his theory of narrative identity provides an important step forward because he does understand human beings as mixtures of embodiment and language, who individuate as embodied beings but constitute themselves in narratives as well.

My aim in this paper was to show the relevance of Ricoeur’s notion of narrative identity for the body-social problem in enactivism. This problem entails that in order to have agency, an individual must be capable of defining its own identity as an individual and thus distinguishing itself from its environment; it must be the source of activity and self-constructing, and it must adaptively regulate its coupling with the environment according to norms, as we have seen in discussing the debate between Kyselo and Maiese. I have affirmed the notion of biosocial existence that Higgins suggests as an alternative for the positions of Kyselo and Maiese. Biosocial existence entails that embodiment and sociality do not fall apart in two ontological spheres, that then need to be related, but are conceived of as belonging to one ontology. I argued that Paul Ricoeur’s philosophy of narrative identity articulates such an ontology in which embodiment and the self are intertwined. In order to show the contribution of this embodied narrative self to the body-social problem, one further step needs to be taken, however.

In the section on gender it was argued that the embodied self can be subject to social normative categorization processes which make that it understands itself and others as gendered, that it reenacts these norms (with its body, by bodily behavior), and that agency includes that this self also needs to be capable of taking a distance from these social norms. For Ricoeur, agency is precisely what characterizes a moral subject. The moral self for him is
differentiated from the narrative self, but the latter is a condition for the former. He distinguishes four capabilities of the moral subject: speaking, acting, narrating, and imputability. Imputability includes “the capacity of a subject to designate itself, himself, or herself as the actual author of its, his, or her acts.” This capacity consists in recognizing in norms a legitimate claim to govern behavior (which implies reenacting norms), but also to be able to act as the norm’s counterpart. In other words, in order to become a moral subject, the self will need to not merely submit itself to social norms, but also be capable of either affirming or denying them, that is, it needs the capacity to distance itself from social norms. Ricoeur describes the moral self as follows: “Morality presupposes nothing more than a subject capable of positing the norms that posit it as a subject.” This sentence succinctly brings together the different aspects that need to be taken into account in order to answer the body-social problem in enactivism: the embodied self is constituted as a subject by social norms, but needs to be capable of distancing itself from these norms in order to become a moral subject that takes these norms as guiding principles for its behavior or that is capable of taking a distance from these norms. “Autonomy” here gains a more encompassing understanding. It is not merely related to embodiment anymore, nor to sociality, instead it is achieved when the self is capable of understanding itself as a singular embodied and discursive, that is, narrative subject within its social environment.

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3 Kyselo, “The body social,” 2.


5 Ricoeur distinguishes the notion of “narrative identity” (*l’identité narrative*) from “the self” (*le soi*) (I will refer to the translation by Kathleen Blamey, *Oneself as Another* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992): 16-18 and 140-168). The self for Ricoeur includes the ethical relationship to others (self-esteem and self-respect) as well as narrative identity. In the enactivist debate, the notion of the self is used in order to refer to different aspects of first person experience (self-experience, self-reference, etc.). I will use the notion of “self” in the latter way, and therefore will speak of the narrative self also where Ricoeur would refer to it as narrative identity.

6 In the Introduction to *Feminist Explorations of Paul Ricoeur’s Philosophy* (Lanham: Lexington, 2016): 1, Fernanda Henriques and I argue that gender is not considered by Ricoeur. Also other factors that situate a person socially are not explicitly accounted for in his philosophy. This does not mean that his hermeneutical philosophy does not offer a rich potential for thinking through questions pertaining to social situatedness, we argue in that volume.


10 Ricoeur’s Kantian argument aims at a subject that finds in norms a “legitimate claim to govern behavior,” as he writes in “From the Moral to the Ethical to Ethics,” in *Reflections on the Just*, trans. David Pellauer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 47. It is critical for an ethical attitude that subject and norms do not coincide and that the subject is capable of affirming or rejecting a norm. I use this argument in another way, namely to show that discursive, narrative individuation is important for the possibility to deviate from norms.

11 Kyselo, “The body social,” 2.

12 Kyselo, “The body social,” 2.

13 Kyselo aims at a conception of selfhood that acknowledges the plural notions of the self of Gallagher’s pattern theory, in which the self is “minimal embodied, minimal experiential, affective, intersubjective, psychological/cognitive, narrative, extended, and situated” (Kyselo, “The body social,” 1), while at the same time avoiding the lack of integration that she criticizes Gallagher’s theory for. She claims that enactivist cognitive science offers a middle way between the alternatives of pluralism without integration and essentialism. The concept of “autonomy” is critical in this respect.


16 Kyselo, “The body social,” 2.

17 Gallagher’s pattern theory of the self (which includes that the self is constituted by the features or aspects mentioned in note 13) does not include that the self consists of a sum of these aspects, instead each pattern in itself forms a self. See Shaun Gallagher, “A Pattern Theory of Self,” *Frontiers in Human Neuroscience*, 7(443) (2013): 1-7.


20 Kyselo, “The body social,” 8.

21 Kyselo, “The body social,” 8, italics in original.

Kyselo, “The body social,” 9. This results in the following definition of autonomy: “Individual autonomy is a self-other generated network of precariously organized interpersonal processes whose systemic identity emerges as a result of a continuous engagement in social interactions and relations that can be qualified as moving in two opposed directions, toward emancipation from others (distinction) and toward openness to them (participation).” (Kyselo, “The body social,” 10)


Kyselo “The body social,” 12.


Higgins, “Biosocial selfhood,” 446.


51 Higgins, “Biosocial selfhood,” 450. Merleau-Ponty’s notion of “expression” may be of help to explain the relationship between the body and the social that Higgins aims at articulating. The notion of expression is explained in the context of speech by Merleau-Ponty in Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Donald A. Landes (New York: Routledge, 2012), 187-190. Expression implies not a translation of a meaning into another medium (for instance of an idea in the mind to an idea articulated in language), but it means bringing a signification to life. In the case of ideas this can be done by words: they carry the meaning, and meaning descends through them. “[T]he expressive operation actualizes or accomplishes the signification and is not merely a matter of translating it,” Merleau-Ponty writes (Phenomenology of Perception, 188). In the same way, the body expresses social norms and in this process repeats and instantiates them as well.


53 Higgins, “Biosocial selfhood,” 451. Higgins seems to consider mainly women as gendered, instead of both sexes. My account of gender instead applies to both men, women and also takes into account human beings that do not consider themselves as belonging to one of the two binary categories.


57 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the subversion of identity (New York: Routledge, 1990), 6-7; Butler, Bodies That Matter, 4-7.

58 Butler, Bodies That Matter, 4.
59 Butler, Bodies That Matter, 7.
61 Butler, Bodies That Matter, 7. As Butler notes elsewhere: “Language sustains the body not by bringing it into being or feeding it in a literal way; rather it is by being interpellated within the terms of language that a certain social existence of the body first becomes possible.” Judith Butler, Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative (New York: Routledge), 5.
62 Butler, Bodies That Matter, 8.
63 Butler, Bodies That Matter, 9.
68 Higgins, “Biosocial selfhood,” 446.
72 For the debate about narrative identity, see for instance Dan Hutto (Ed.), Narrative and Understanding Persons; Dan Zahavi, Subjectivity and Selfhood, 106-114; Gallagher, “Self and Narrative”; also issue 15 (1) of Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (2016).
73 Shaun Gallagher differentiates the narrative self from a minimal self, that is synchronic and embodied, and closely tied to the fact that experience involves a first-person perspective (Gallagher, “Self and Narrative,” 406). The narrative self has a diachronic character and means that the self gains a new level of self-understanding by narrating its life (“Self and Narrative,” 407). Gallagher claims that from a hermeneutical point of view the minimal and narrative self may be conceptually distinguished, but not existentially. This implies that “[t]he minimal self must be regarded as the self who narrates,” but that at the same time “the narrative self is by definition much more than the minimal self.” (“Self and Narrative,” 408) As he writes: “in narrative practice, there is an integration, but not strict identity, of minimal self (as engaged in the act of narrating) and narrative (narrated) self.” (“Self and Narrative,” 409) Dan Zahavi understands the narrative self as a higher order self,
a conceptually mediated form of self-consciousness, that includes someone’s ideas, values, and goals (“Self and Other,” 186). According to Zahavi this self is not sufficient for understanding self-identity, however. It presupposes a phenomenal self-consciousness or “pre-reflective self-intimacy” (“Self and Other,” 186) or also “a first person perspective” (“Self and Other,” 59), a non-conceptual “mine-ness” that accompanies bodily sensations, emotional states and cognitive contents (“Self and Other,” 181). While Gallagher claims that the minimal and narrative self are existentially related, Zahavi argues that a non-conceptual phenomenal self-consciousness underlies the narrative self, and is expressed in one’s self narrative. I think that Zahavi’s account of the narrative self is too limited, because it does not consider the intertwinement of narrative and body.


75 Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, 319-329.

76 I do not deny that there are also differences: see for instance Pol Vandevelde, “From Fallibility to Fragility: How the Theory of Narrative Transformed the Notion of Character of Fallible Man” in A Companion to Ricoeur’s ‘Fallible Man,’ ed. Scott Davidson (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2019), 145-162.


79 Narrative identity for Ricoeur includes two dialectics: idem and ipse, and self and other (Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, 2-3). Narrative identity first of all mediates between the two poles of self-sameness (idem) and selfhood (ipse). The idem-pole can be understood in terms of a person’s character and includes the overlap between character and self-sameness. The ipse-pole is connected by Ricoeur to the minimal self-constancy that keeping a promise entails. Keeping a promise includes the denial of change: it implies the will to “hold firm,” even if I were to change my opinion or inclination (Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, 124). One’s narrative identity hence includes stability, self-constancy as well as mutability, change. The second dialectic of self and other relates narrative to ethical identity. Self-identity for Ricoeur consists in being capable of telling a narrative about one’s life and in taking an ethical stance in claiming “Here I stand!” In ethical identity, the subject precedes the action and can be held accountable for its actions, while narrative identity is about self-gathering, or self-constitution, accounted for by the organization of the events. See

80 Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, 147.

81 Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, 147.


83 Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, 160.

84 Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, 161.

85 Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, 162.

86 Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, 111-112, 323.

87 Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, 318, 319-329.

88 The other two aspects of the ontology of the self are the other and conscience (Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, 318-356).

89 Ricoeur, *Fallible Man*, 27.

90 Ricoeur distinguishes his philosophical anthropology from the ones popular in the sixties, such as Sartre’s: he does not consider finitude the central characteristic of human reality and transcendence the transcendence of finitude, but understands existence as being both, perspective and discourse, demand for totality and limited nature (*Fallible Man*, 3).

91 Ricoeur, *Fallible Man*, 19.

92 Ricoeur, *Fallible Man*, 23.

93 Ricoeur, *Fallible Man*, 20.


97 Ricoeur, *Fallible Man*, 55.

98 Ricoeur, *Fallible Man*, 51.

99 Ricoeur, *Fallible Man*, 89.

100 Halsema & Henriques, *Feminist Explorations*, 1.

101 Ricoeur, *Reflections on the Just*, 47.

102 Ricoeur, *Reflections on the Just*, 47.