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In her recent essay "The Body of Adel," called a "conversation," but actually a one-sided address to the Algerian contemporary artist Adel Abdessemed, Julia Kristeva begins by remarking that the image, emerging from its traditional role as an imprint or receptacle of the sacred, has become, through the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the eventual secularization of the Enlightenment, a kind of social space, one not completely severed from its sacred origin. Today, she writes, artists, those "extravagant manipulators of the visible," are able better than religion to evoke the exhilarations, fears, and daydreams of contemporary humans in "splinters of divinity hearkening back to the source."¹

In writing this Kristeva says she is reminded of her reading of Hannah Arendt in the third volume of her "Feminine Genius" trilogy, in particular her discussion of Arendt's use of Kant's aesthetic conception of the *sensus communis* to conceptualize a possible political philosophy. In particular, she recalls Arendt's dream of a political space analogous to a crowd emerging from a concert. Each audience member has incorporated the work in their own singular fashion, and yet, they come together to communicate about it. Kristeva calls this an "effervescence of thought" in which the singular ideas come together but do not melt into a homogenizing totality.²

Taste, as Arendt and Kristeva read it, has something ineluctably singular and bodily about it, to a greater extent than any other of the senses. Kant himself talks about taste not only in terms of the appreciation of the beauty of nature or of art, but also of a delicious dinner. Kristeva reads Kantian taste in contradistinction to Hegel, for whom digestion signified the overcoming of singularity. The singular in aesthetic judgment remains distinct, even as it enters into dialogue with other singularities.

Kristeva's "The Body of Adel" is a piece about one artist, but also about the body, and specifically the animal body, individuated to a greater extent than in any other of her works. As artist and as beast, in addition to energetic pulsion and fluctuating drive, "the body of Adel" is a fascinating, alluring, but equally othered body; one might even say it is the counterpart to the abject body in *Powers of Horror*. In its sometimes uncomfortable proximity to the nonhuman animal, his is a body inflected by racial stereotypes. This piece on Adel Abdessemed might recall a chapter in another of Kristeva's works, where she engages with the concept of the non-western foreign. That we are "strangers to ourselves," refers not just to the unconscious mind within each human, but also to the foreigner, specifically the exotic other from the East that she discusses with reference to orientalist tales by Voltaire and Montesquieu. She writes to Adel: "I recognize in you the uprootedness (*arrachement*) of the foreigner," ... "I travel myself."³

Kristeva's *Teresa My Love*, also one of her more recent published writings, appears to concern a very different subject matter, namely, the life and thought of a 16th century Spanish mystic, written in the form of a novel. Yet the theme of another kind of foreigner, equally exotic but this time threatening, pops up unexpectedly and disappears several times during the course of the novel. At the very beginning of the story, the 21st century narrator, psychoanalyst Sylvia Leclerque, is present at a meeting where different representatives are guiding a lawmaker through a discussion of France's constitutional secularism. Abruptly, a young woman in a headscarf, whom Kristeva describes as an IT engineer, speaks out, explaining that "she and her God were one and that the veil was the immovable sign of this 'union,' which she wished to publicize in order to definitively 'fix it' in herself and in the eyes of others." This statement interrupts and yet reflects Leclerque's musings about her growing preoccupation with St. Teresa, who, albeit in a contrasting manner, also evinced a kind of ecstatic union with God. Whereas Teresa's unity with the divine is apparently malleable and amorous, the Muslim woman is juxtaposed to her in Leclerque's mind as desirous of a *fixed*, determinate, and rigid union. This picture of Teresa resists the old image of the mystic that Simone de Beauvoir perpetuates, as a woman who turns to worship of God when her human love is disappointed, and as a form of narcissism that seeks above all a sovereign gaze fixed attentively on her alone.⁴ While Kristeva's depiction of Teresa is intellectual and nuanced, when she turns to describing nonwhite, Muslim women, racial stereotypes predominate. When a man present compares the headscarved woman to St. Teresa, Leclerque exclaims "but it is completely different!" She adds, to herself, without provocation, regarding the woman in the headscarf, "and should we deny her this 'identity,' she was quite prepared to sacrifice herself—like those female suicide bombers on the other side of the world, and soon, perhaps in our own suburbs."⁵ Here the image of the foreigner seems to reflect instead the paranoia of the bourgeois French subject. Leclerque writes that what interests her in St. Teresa is specifically how her way of

thinking contrasts with those for whom the fragmentation of globalization has led to destructive fanaticism.

Beauvoir judged mysticism to be one of the ways in which women justify remaining in immanence,⁶ but Kristeva appears to disagree. In this paper I ask what difference Kristeva discerns between these two women, a distinction that apparently makes Teresa's immanence simultaneously a transcendence, but transforms a Muslim woman in a headscarf immediately into an imagined suicide bomber. Relatedly, how does Adel the Middle Eastern artist, in Kristeva's mind, remain just this side of the animal even as he is able to sublimate? Despite the problematic aspects of this comparison, we can learn something from them about Kristeva's ideas on mysticism and on art. Both mysticism and art are products of the death drive, but whereas the suicide bomber and the animal directly and purely pursue death (again, on Kristeva's view) Teresa and Adel remain on its outer edge and merely play with mortality.

I will begin by looking at "Adel's Body," followed by *Teresa, My Love*, in order to draw out these themes. In "Adel's Body" Kristeva discusses the artist's work using language that, while it recalls the description of the semiotic realm that is the theme of much of her early work, takes on a decidedly less psychic and more carnal dimension. Here she repeatedly returns not only to semiotic drives and energies, but also to specific body parts. She writes, "I feel (*palper*) the body of the work with my eye, as I could feel with my ear or tongue." The work of Adel opens itself up to a "carnal interpenetration" to which all contemporary art aspires. This reaction is "the reciprocal reverse, in terms of reception, of the artistic act in terms of creation." Adel is, in her words, the very incarnation of the "universal vocabulary of contemporary art," continually forming and reforming meaning, embodying the perpetual mobility of the foreigner.⁷

The essay is dominated by animal images, partly because the artworks Kristeva is discussing feature animals, but also because she depicts Adel himself as an animal, provisionally formed as a flow of primal energy. She writes that artists like Adel "succeed in lending meaning and form to their semiotic body." The semiotic body is characterized by heterogeneity, "neither pure energy nor pure meaning," but rather "infused with a meaning that escapes the Ego and its language, yet echoes their logic."⁸ While everyone has a semiotic body,⁹ repressed or expressed as the person or work may have it, artists like Adel have an "unnameable energetic thrust that sways hither and thither" and "fastens on an element, an object, a person, an ambient situation, that calls to it and on which its vibrations chime or overflow."¹⁰ He is a "shout (*cri*)" whose works invite us to shout with him.¹¹ His works present an "animal figurability of the self at the dawn of the self," a "complicity with animals."¹²

In one work, a mock *Pieta*, she writes that Abdessemed instantiates the baroque body in the self-portrait photograph in which he appears to be held up horizontally by his mother in the form of an almost cross.¹³ Maria Margaroni argues that for Kristeva the baroque body blurs the distinction between illusion and truth, appearance and reality, without confusing them; this feature renders the nature of sublimation and of art, by definition, baroque.¹⁴ Adel's is a specific kind of rehabilitation of the baroque body, one engendered by globalization, that is, at once Western and other, French and Arab. His body is "ecstatic, schizophrenic, savage, civilized" and "driven by the eccentric force of refugees." It is a purely "semiotic body," a "body without organs," the first term referring to her own early work identifying unconscious rhythms that inform symbolic language, and the second phrase, taken from Deleuze, referring to a body without any inherent organization, one which continually dismantles the organism, causing asignifying particles or pure intensities or energies to circulate.¹⁵ The purely semiotic body would not be translatable into propositional language. Yet unlike the true schizophrenic, whose semiotic body remains mute, and who confounds words with things and loses their sense of reality, some traumatized individuals are able to give signification and form to their semiotic body, shaping a provisional crystallization in language, an ephemeral adoption of the codes of the community that surround them. They seek not to communicate, but to express another intensity, an inchoate, singular desire, into terms that might be received by others, even while not capable of being transformed into a universal code. Such is the artwork of Abdessemed, which Kristeva describes as composed of intensities and fragments that nonetheless signify. She notes that what struck her first and foremost about him is his energy.¹⁶

Kristeva contrasts this language of intensities not only to symbolic language in which we search for recognition in socially communicable terms, but also to another, more destructive form of communication. She considers Adel's work "*Habibi*" ("dear one", "loved one", in Arabic), a scaled-up replica of his own skeleton, seventeen meters long, hung horizontally from its spine. She then asks, with curiosity and no apparent connection, "would fundamentalist Islamists use this to send their kamikazes to blow their bones into the paradise of virgins?" She interprets "*Habibi*" as a term of endearment addressed toward death that neither trivializes nor idealizes it. In answer to her own question she writes, "On the contrary, the serene mortality traced by Adel's skeletons doesn't banalize death."¹⁷ To banalize death would be to understand the death drive literally as a drive to bring about the cessation of life, to kill or destroy. The only reason to contrast Adel Abdessemed's art—which, like that of other artists, including Van Gogh and Picasso among many others, makes use of skeletons—to the "art" of fundamentalist suicide bombers, is that Abdessemed comes from Algeria, a country that France colonized and to which its citizens bear an ambivalent attitude: there are

"good" Arabs and dangerous ones, but both remain ineluctably non-white and non-European.

Although clearly there is some Eurocentric or anti-Arab bias present here, I don't want simply to point this out. Kristeva argued in an earlier piece that religious fundamentalism, in particular Islamic religious fundamentalism, is nihilistic and adolescent in the sense that an eternal adolescent continues to believe in the ideal One, even after identifying with the symbolic phallic Other who is the object of the mother's desire outside of her bond to the child. If this initial investment "*khred*," which, as Kristeva explains, is the root of both *credo*, "I believe" and "credit" in an economic sense, has a weak link to the future subject who responds to it, the subject may turn to idealization rather than investment in an intersubjective bond.¹⁸ Furthermore, since recognition of and identification with this imaginary one in whom the mother has "invested" the symbolic identity of the child, eventually transforms the stammering of the child into linguistic signs, the subject's relation to language, rationality, and ethics may be compromised.

Without recognition from or investment in this other, who stands for all others, the "I" cannot fully come into being. The Third is a guarantor for the child of transition to a more stable, independent, and flexible, intersubjective identity. Kristeva describes the moment of successful investment as, fulfilling a "prereligious need to believe," or a belief in the "God Logos." The subject can only eventually become speaking and intersubjective if a "beloved authority" first acknowledges and receives their capacity for meaning, however inchoate it may initially be.¹⁹ Without a genuine response to the prereligious need to believe, the subject risks becoming susceptible to ideology. Thus sacred space is correlated with a meaningful psychic space, and in turn to a political space. Without a strong intersubjective, ethical other or set of others with whom to identify, the child turns instead to a single authority. This fixed, determinate object of adherence takes the place of multiple energies of individual expression. The turn toward a fixed Great Other that cannot by definition disappoint characterizes adolescence, which can result, at its most extreme, in an unbinding of the death drive and complete separation from familial bonds. Kristeva calls this a "triumph of evil," caused by the "ruthlessness of global migration" and its resulting disconnection among people. It results ultimately in "blind destructivity and finally auto-destruction."²⁰

Kristeva implies that Adel and his work exist just at the border of this possibility. His "Habibi" hovers in proximity to, but not among, the abjection of death. Kristeva writes in *Powers of Horror*: "The corpse, seen without God and outside of science, is the utmost of abjection. It is death infecting life." What causes abjection, however, has not so much to do with unhealthiness or lack of sanitation, as it has to do with lack of separation. She writes that the object "is something rejected from which one does not part, from which one does not protect oneself as from an object." Because it is not separate from us

it "ends up engulfing us." It "disturbs identity, system, order." It does not respect borders or rules.²¹ This language, out of context, could almost describe the French attitude toward its north African immigrants. Yet literature that plays with but does not display the abject is ground-breaking, just like the art of Adel. Its very vicinity to abjection is what makes it revolutionary.

Thus Adel's creativity is also an expression of the death drive. In *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, Freud begins his discussion of the death drive with attention to the curious symptom of the compulsion to repeat, in which a traumatic event is relived over and over again, overriding the pleasure principle. Although the death drive may most often manifest itself in ways that are directed inward by the subject upon itself, it is also evidenced by outward displays of aggression. Freud posits that the death drive manifests the organism's urge to restore as much as possible an earlier state of things, one characterized by an utter lack of stimulation.²² Outbursts of aggressive energy can be seen as aspects of the death drive which, "under the influence of other narcissistic libido, have been forced away from the ego" and thus emerge only in relation to an object.²³ In the case of sublimation, the death drive is exposed through a transformation of eros. According to Kristeva's theory, the thinking process itself is founded by sublimation, as *significance* (the relation between representation, language, and thought) structures all of the other psychic processes.²⁴

There is a close relationship, then, between the structure of thought and the aggressive animal-like outbursts Kristeva returns to in contrasting them (but still keeping them close) to both Adel and Teresa. The initial sublimation that opens up the possibility of thought must be thought of in terms of an initial investment, the "belief in the God Logos." In *Teresa, My Love*, Kristeva writes: "If, before and after becoming the *I* of cogitation, *I* is a fantasizing subject, and if *I* fantasize the ideal and/or dead Father, this means that I am owed at once to a desire and its frustration, a beginning and a sublimation together." The "owe" here, again a financial metaphor, is the credit that has been extended to me, one that necessitates an acknowledgement of lack, the substitution of logos for the full satisfaction of desire. For Kristeva, this anguish in acknowledging the impossibility of fulfillment of desire is Christianity's "own special truth." Without the fantasy of the Father who promises that "all will be sorted out in the fullness of time," a fantasy that is both of the ideal Father (god the father) and the dead Father (Christ), "you will...be deprived of the imaginary itself.... You are left to tick over in the realm of calculating, operational thinking. You become superhuman, you start somatizing, or you sign up as a suicide bomber."²⁵

How is it that a suicide bomber is "deprived of the imaginary"? Kristeva seems to be alluding here to the prohibition on images of the divine in Islam. In contrast to this absence of images, the sacred, she writes in *The Severed Head*, "turns out to reside not in sacrifice after all, or in some aesthetic or religious

tradition, but in that specifically human, unique, and bitter experience that is *the capacity for representation*.²⁶ Although she does not link this capacity to any particular religious tradition, at the same time, she does remark that in Christianity, Jesus says "there is but one desire that counts, the desire for the name, for the representation of meaning,"²⁷ for "representation-verbalization-sublimation."²⁸ Teresa "introduces the sensible into the intellectual in order to weave a *third space*, that of those 'intellectual visions' whose task it is to rename and rewrite the felt experience of an invisible overcoming and dispossession."²⁹ This "sensible intellectual" is what distinguishes Adel and Teresa from the suicide bomber, in Kristeva's view. This "third way" is distinguished from the intellect by comparing thought to the "imaginative faculty." It is thus a kind of reflection in and through the image. By contrast, and even more troubling, she compares Hell to a place with "no images."³⁰

Where Kristeva makes a mistake is in overlooking the fact that it is not just Christianity, but also Islam, that recounts this "betrothal of imagination and understanding."³¹ The Islamic theologian Al-Farabi, too, linked prophecy to the imagination, so that it is not an absolutely iconoclastic religion. Moreover, Kristeva herself, in *Crisis of the (European) Subject* connected a modified form of iconoclasm with the possibility of unfreezing the symbolically congealed nature of Christianity.³²

Kristeva is correct in her analysis of the vulnerability of "adolescent" believers to the call of ideology, as far as it goes. North African and Arab immigrants have not been recognized as full members of the social contract in France. And religion may be a place to turn in order to feel a sense of recognition and power. But to argue that religion is merely a "private matter," as Kristeva, through her alter ego Sylvia Leclercque, declares at the beginning of *Teresa, My Love*,³³ is to overlook its role as a substitute when a *sensus communis* is missing. As I have argued elsewhere, following Kristeva but pointing out her omission of the political aspect of the "suburban troubles" in France, without recognition and full place in the public sphere it is impossible to get beyond "adolescence."³⁴

The description of religion as private is also curious given Kristeva's own efforts to "privately" address the lack of a loving Third to which the adolescent might turn. Rather than a public solution that would address laws and institutions that affect youth prone to radicalization, Kristeva has recently been involved in an intercultural and interdisciplinary team effort, in conjunction with caregivers from the *Hôpital Cochin*, which addresses the suffering of individuals attracted to radicalization through psychoanalysis, play, and exposure to literature, philosophy, and Western culture. Kristeva calls it "lacework": delicate, painstaking, slow, finely attuned to the individual.³⁵

In *Teresa, My Love*, Kristeva writes a fictional story about a woman obsessed with another kind of religious practice, namely, Saint Teresa. Silvia

Leclerque, Kristeva's alter ego, compares Teresa's mysticism to a vessel that "by contrast with the average suicide bomber," is a size that is "commensurate with what [God] wishes to pour into it," loving and not calling her to die or "blow [herself] up."³⁶ To be spiritual in this balanced sense is to open oneself up to the divine not as something that overwhelms, but as something that fills just the vessel that oneself is. To do so is to "love" and not to immolate oneself. Again, the reference is to the death drive which, when properly commensurate with the erotic or life drive, transforms desire into the *jouissance* of the divine father located at the "junction between flesh and word."³⁷ When death overwhelms love, the result is self-destructive and destructive of others. Teresa, by contrast, is "made for dying of desire."³⁸ Kristeva writes, quoting Francisco de Borja, that Teresa is "seized by a strong desire to live a bodily life while at the same time longing to be delivered of the prison of the body in order to be united with God."³⁹ This oscillation at the edge of a binary opposition renders Teresa capable of *jouissance*, accessed through "representation-verbalization-sublimation" between the world and the beyond.⁴⁰

Likewise, Christianity, Teresa's religion, exists in the anguish at the border between the fantasy of the ideal father and that of the dead father. In Freud's *Totem and Taboo*, the destruction of the primal horde of brothers who band together in order to kill their father is the condition for the formation of a society in the name of the law.⁴¹ For Kristeva, what is created in Teresa's case is not a firm symbolic register but a realm of possible representation, one that does not even need to be definitively pictorial in nature, the "sensible intellectual" that is at the origin of meaning.

Kristeva also writes that Christianity was "ingenious" for appropriating the fantasy, described in Freud, of a child being beaten. Jesus is a human, like us, who is beaten to death by the father, but then comes back to life.⁴² Both boys and girls have this unconscious fantasy; for girls, it arises from seeing boys get corporal punishment, which they internalize as the inversion of the forbidden love for the father into the punishment of the envied rival, the boy. For boys, the unconscious fantasy is of being beaten by the mother, and is to trigger the anxiety that pushes them away from incestuous love toward identification with the father. In either case, acts of representation—speech and image—become a transcendence of sadomasochism toward expression and appeasement.⁴³ Each of us is, Kristeva writes:

the result of a prolonged 'work of the negative': birth, weaning, separations, frustrations, bereavements. By staging this rupture at the heart of the absolute subject that is Christ...Christianity brings back into consciousness the dramas inherent in our becoming, thus endowing it with an immense, *unconscious*, cathartic power.⁴⁴

Both Teresa and the "Islamists" are driven by their faith, what Leclerque calls their "'hair in the soup'...that makes a person ill with love, ill unto death" in different manners.⁴⁵ Whereas Teresa's faith leads to an unprecedented sensuality, to "imaginative visions" that are "inscribed in the very interior part of the soul,"⁴⁶ however, the suicide bombers believe that "He (the Almighty, the One and Only, the True, the Beyond) has mutated into pure spectacle, and twist their alleged faith into murderous nihilism."⁴⁷ On this interpretation Islamic fundamentalism is the other side of global capitalism. Such an analysis has promise. Yet Kristeva does not go the further step to advocate a new kind of community or political vision in which people unmoored from any loving Third could see themselves reflected. Instead, she writes that such:

dangerous maniacs of the virtual Absolute" are not really that scary. Indeed, "their fundamentalist rage would be defused if they just read [Cervantes] instead of burning flags, embassies, and Danish cartoons. And he could detoxify the rest. I know, there's a long way to go—fanatics are no good at reading, or laughing, and the inner halls of my nuanced Teresa would be way about their heads. What would it take? Nobody knows, not even me. Missionaries? Believers? Educators? Committed people opening up spaces for reading and writing? People daring to analyze the 'fundament,' to renew it? Maybe some of that will happen eventually.⁴⁸

Kristeva's reference is to Don Quixote, as she imagines some righteous thinkers of the West tilting at the endless, unfindable "windmills" of "chimeras, TV soap operas for avid women and their partners. Or God's madmen, the suicide bombers."⁴⁹ She allows that "we'd do better to change the wind than sit in judgment on the windmills."⁵⁰ The death of the Father represented by kenosis and the death of Christ has, Kristeva writes, "thrown open the possibility of another psychic upheaval" than the one represented by sadomasochistic fantasies. This is the abolition of paternal (national) authority itself, which has happened in many non-European countries, "with all the attendant risks of mental, social, not to say biological disorders, some of which are already to be glimpsed amid the globalized desolation of the world."⁵¹ This desolation also manifests itself in the "suburban troubles" of France to which Kristeva frequently alludes.

These passages also make reference to the work in which Kristeva has been engaging at the *Hôpital Cochin*, working individually with youth perceived to be vulnerable to the appeal of fundamentalist Islamic rhetoric. Admirable as such efforts are, they ignore the fact that the basis of much radical Islam is in fact intellectual, even drawing on Western philosophy, including Marxism, critical theory, and the analytic philosophy of science, and "fanatics" are not necessarily "no good at reading."⁵² Educating Islamic thinkers by exposing them to Cervantes, Proust, and St. Teresa might bear fruit

in the case of some individuals, but it is not a systemic, structural solution. Even if we invent countless specific, individual versions of "loving intelligence" to replace God,⁵³ this effort can only be successful in a society where all mutually recognize each other.

In the final chapter of *The Severed Head*, Kristeva discusses the death mask as an image of the "paralyzed limit" of "the threat or promise of the invisible."⁵⁴ The sensible intellectual hovers at the edge of the visible/invisible divide. She compares the artist to those of us who, immersed in the "spectacle" that is the contemporary realm of the reproducible image, exist within an economy of the visible fully figured for us in advance. Some artists at the inception of modern art, by contrast, "allow themselves to believe only *in their own way* of figuring the economy of bodies and of being." This belief allows them to "abandon the spectacle, infiltrate the borders of appearances, and find there a *kind of face* that has not yet found its *face*, that never will, but that never stops seeking a thousand and one ways of seeing." Such an act makes Adel and Teresa "sensual seekers of the visible incarnation."⁵⁵

Contrasted to this fantasy of seeking another face is a vision of the human with no head at all, Bataille's *Acéphale*, who "escaped his head like a prisoner escapes prison," becoming "a being who does not know prohibition."⁵⁶ And at the other side of this ruleless headlessness lies what Kristeva calls the "sacrificed, decapitated, immured woman." The other phrase she uses for this woman is "chador."⁵⁷ Without belaboring the point too much, it is important to recognize that Kristeva's main point is not to bash Islam; nevertheless, her repeated juxtaposition of the "proper" contours of sacred space—which is most often linked with incarnation and the "capacity for representation" that she associates with Christianity—with suicide bombers and women in chadors, those uncomfortable non-white bodies infiltrating rational, French society, is notable and uncomfortable.

The most glaring omission in this part of Kristeva's analysis of the failure of the need to believe, then, is the surprising lack of connection of her critique of terrorism to the absence of a *sensus communis* or political space for action. Although she relates Adel's ability to sublimate to the idea of the image as a secularization of the sacred, she fails to observe, as I think Arendt would have, that the capacity for making a sacred space, in order to become fully actualized, must necessarily be correlated to a political space. Although Kristeva repeatedly criticizes the global society of the spectacle in which we all exist, she does not account for the differing responses to this unmooring from a meaningful "sacred space" in a political manner, but only as a personal choice. Adel, as an artist fully integrated into French and international artistic circles, does not find himself without an intersubjective mirror in which to be reflected back to himself as a part of a polis. The others to whom Kristeva compares him, namely suicide bombers or Islamic fundamentalists, but also the vast majority of noncriminal, nonfanatic, rootless victims of colonization and globalization, lack this mirror.

An interlocutor in the novel says to Sylvia, "sacred space is fast turning into a desert, isn't it!" Sylvia responds: "What space?... Teresa tears us all away from our spaces, from space itself, to deposit us in time."⁵⁸ The inner sense that Teresa fosters is psychic, not political space. Yet just like Adel she *has* another, outer space ready, be it that of the convent, the family, or the city, one which supports and respects her psychic space. What is involved in the image as a sacred space? Recall again the image of the audience coming out of a concert. Each has incorporated the work in her own singular fashion, and yet, they come together and communicate about it.⁵⁹ But what if your language is not heard or comprehended? Surely psychic space is crucial, but to be meaningful it must be integrated with political space.

¹ Julia Kristeva, "Adel's Body (Conversation),"

http://www.kristeva.fr/2017/AA_text_JK_english.pdf, 64.

² Ibid.

³ Kristeva, "Adel's Body," 65.

⁴ Simone de Beauvoir, *The Second Sex*, trans. H.M. Parshley (New York: Vintage Books, 1950), 674.

⁵ Julia Kristeva, *Teresa, My Love*, trans. Lorna Scott Fox (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), 8.

⁶ Simone de Beauvoir, *The Second Sex*, trans. Constance Borde and Sheila Malovany-Cevallier (New York: Vintage Books, 2011), 709-717.

⁷ Kristeva, *Adel's Body*, 65.

⁸ Kristeva, *Adel's Body*, 70.

⁹ See Julia Kristeva, *Revolution in Poetic Language* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984).

¹⁰ Kristeva, "Adel's Body," 71.

¹¹ Kristeva, "Adel's Body," 72.

¹² Kristeva, "Adel's Body," 87.

¹³ Kristeva, "Adel's Body," 76.

¹⁴ Maria Margaroni, "Julia Kristeva's Voyage in the Thérésian Continent: The Malady of Love and the Enigma of an Incarnated, Shareable, Smiling Imaginary," *Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy*, VOL XXI, No. 1 (2013): 83-104.

- ¹⁵ Gilles Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, trans. Constantin Boundas (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 7.
- ¹⁶ Kristeva, "Adel's Body," 65.
- ¹⁷ Kristeva, "Adel's Body," 21.
- ¹⁸ Julia Kristeva, "New Forms of Revolt," Address to the Kristeva Circle annual meeting, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee, May 2014. See also Elaine Miller, "Investing in a Third: Colonization, Religious Fundamentalism, and Adolescence in Julia Kristeva's *New Forms of Revolt*," *Journal of French and Francophone Studies* Vol XXII, No 2 (2014): 35-45.
- ¹⁹ Julia Kristeva, *This Incredible Need to Believe*, trans. Beverly Bie Brahic (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 9.
- ²⁰ Kristeva, "New Forms of Revolt," 22-23.
- ²¹ Julia Kristeva, *Powers of Horror*, trans. Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), 4.
- ²² Sigmund Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, trans. James Strachey (New York: W.W. Norton, 1990), 43.
- ²³ Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, 65.
- ²⁴ Julia Kristeva, *The Sense and Non-Sense of Revolt: The Powers and Limits of Psychoanalysis*, trans. Jeanine Herman (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 56.
- ²⁵ Kristeva, *Teresa, My Love*, 176-77.
- ²⁶ Julia Kristeva, *The Severed Head: Capital Visions*, trans. Jody Gladding (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), 130.
- ²⁷ Kristeva, *Teresa, My Love*, 178.
- ²⁸ Kristeva, *Teresa, My Love*, 179.
- ²⁹ Kristeva, *Teresa, My Love*, 211.
- ³⁰ Kristeva, *Teresa, My Love*, 263.
- ³¹ Kristeva, *Teresa, My Love*, 214.
- ³² Julia Kristeva, *Crisis of the (European) Subject* (New York: Other Press, 2000).
- ³³ Kristeva *Teresa, My Love*, 8.
- ³⁴ Elaine Miller, "Investing in a Third."
- ³⁵ Julia Kristeva, "N'ayons pas peur du besoin de croire," *Madame Figaro* (December 2017). <http://www.kristeva.fr/madame-figaro-22-12-2017.html>
- ³⁶ Kristeva, *Teresa, My Love*, 254.
- ³⁷ Kristeva, *Teresa, My Love*, 179, 255.
- ³⁸ Kristeva, *Teresa, My Love*, 254.
- ³⁹ Kristeva, *Teresa, My Love*, 255.

- ⁴⁰ Kristeva, *Teresa, My Love*, 179.
- ⁴¹ Kristeva, *Teresa, My Love*, 173.
- ⁴² Kristeva, *Teresa, My Love*, 388.
- ⁴³ Kristeva, *Teresa, My Love*, 400.
- ⁴⁴ Kristeva, *Teresa, My Love*, 403-404.
- ⁴⁵ Kristeva, *Teresa, My Love*, 192.
- ⁴⁶ Kristeva, *Teresa, My Love*, 209.
- ⁴⁷ Kristeva, *Teresa, My Love*, 186.
- ⁴⁸ Kristeva, *Teresa, My Love*, 386.
- ⁴⁹ Kristeva, *Teresa, My Love*, 192, 385.
- ⁵⁰ Kristeva, *Teresa, My Love*, 192.
- ⁵¹ Kristeva, *Teresa, My Love*, 406.
- ⁵² See Chris Harman, "The Prophet and the Proletariat, *International Socialism Journal* 2:64 (1994). Accessed online at <https://www.marxists.org/archive/harman/1994/xx/islam.htm>. See also Elaine P. Miller and Ferit Güven, "Paul Feyerabend in a Free Society" (translated title), *Birikim Journal of Society and Culture* 37 (1992): 43-47.
- ⁵³ Ibid.
- ⁵⁴ Kristeva, *The Severed Head*, 121.
- ⁵⁵ Kristeva, *The Severed Head*, 127.
- ⁵⁶ Kristeva, *The Severed Head*, 128.
- ⁵⁷ Kristeva, *The Severed Head*, 123.
- ⁵⁸ Kristeva, *The Severed Head*, 200.
- ⁵⁹ Julia Kristeva, *Hannah Arendt*, trans. Ross Guberman (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 1.