Deleuze, Concepts, and Ideas about Film as Philosophy
A Critical and Speculative Re-Examination

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Örebro University (Sweden)

Contemporary film-philosophy – the fastest growing field in film studies – centers on the idea that film/cinema is capable of expressing original philosophy. This idea, however, has a curiously under-examined relation to a key inspiration for the field: Gilles Deleuze. How does the notion of film as philosophy connect with Deleuze’s writings on the relation between cinema and philosophy? In an editorial titled “What is Film-Philosophy?” David Sorfa, editor-in-chief of Film-Philosophy Journal, makes two claims, one that clarifies the field’s central idea and one that points to how it relates to Deleuze:

1. [...] Film-Philosophy supports the strong argument that cinema can do philosophy in a way that is unique to the medium. Therefore, film is not only capable of presenting extended thought experiments or illustrating philosophical concepts, but [can be] philosophy itself.

2. With his Cinema books, Deleuze was “among the first to explicitly claim that films can do or be philosophy.”

While Sorfa adds no reference for the second claim, it can be recognized as a fairly common assumption in the field he overviews. Is this a valid assumption? Does Deleuze in or around the Cinema books claim that films can do or be philosophy? That is not the case, as will be detailed below. Rather, he underlines differences between cinematic thinking and philosophy: While often engaged with the same problems, and while they may even share some formal characteristics in thinking those problems, (and while someone like Resnais is said to create a rare marriage [nuce] between cinema and philosophy), they are differentiated through Deleuze’s famous definition of philosophy as the art of creating concepts – a definition that is explicit at least as early as around Cinema 1. For Deleuze, cinematic figures of thought (however much they can suggest or give rise to concepts) are themselves
always preconceptual. A valid claim that films “can do or be philosophy” using Deleuze as support, would therefore have to engage with this differentiation between philosophy as the art of creating concepts and cinematic thinking as preconceptual. It would also have to engage with the more speculative question of whether it is possible to create a notion from within Deleuze’s thought as a whole that allows for the possibility of articulating original philosophical concepts – as Deleuze defines them (as a particular kind of multiplicity) – in and through film, and what this would mean for our understanding of the concrete form of concepts. Such engagement would not merely be a correction of shaky assumptions but could also deepen and advance the discussion of film as philosophy. While Deleuze is a key figure in much film-philosophy – a field centered around the idea of film as philosophy – substantial such engagement is largely absent, with a recent book by D.N. Rodowick (2015) as a semi-exception.

This article examines this issue, critically and speculatively, with the aim to re-problematize the notion of film as philosophy and initiate further discussion. Part 1 reexamines how current ideas about film as philosophy relate to Deleuze’s own ideas about the relationship between cinema/art and philosophy (spanning an interview statement about Godard in 1968 up to What is Philosophy? in 1991). It also looks into Deleuze’s concept of concepts (how he defines their internal logic and – although this is done in Part 2 – by which formal means he implies that they can be articulated). Part 2 takes on the more speculative task of trying to create from strands in Deleuze’s thought a notion of film as a possible formal means for philosophical concept creation. If the first part looks to clarify Deleuze’s positions on film and philosophy (often somewhat muddled in current film-philosophical writings), the aim of the second part resonates with the Deleuzian/Nietzschean concern with the formal renewal of philosophy, that is, with the development of vital new forms for philosophical expression. In this article’s examination of the idea of film as a means for such formal renewal, Deleuze’s (and Nietzsche’s) implicit restriction to the written word (however inspired by also the visual arts) will be exceeded and partly re-imagined.

PART 1

How Deleuze Distinguishes Between Cinematic/Artistic Thinking and Philosophy

Deleuze in and around the cinema books conceives of cinematic thinking and philosophical thinking as formally different, even if they can share some characteristics and often inform each other as engaged with the same or similar problems, and the main formal difference has to do with concepts. In What is Philosophy? Deleuze describes concept creation as the exclusive right of philosophy, that which secures a function for philosophy, and in Cinema 1...
filmmakers are said to “think with movement-images and time-images instead of concepts.”⁶ And as he says even more strongly in a 1987 talk at Femis (the French national film school): “those of you who do cinema […] do not invent concepts – that is not your concern – but blocks of movement/duration.”⁷

Since “Cinema’s concepts are not given in cinema,” as Deleuze writes at the end of Cinema 2, “cinema’s theory must therefore be produced by philosophy “as conceptual practice.”⁸ While the concepts thereby produced “are cinema’s concepts, not theories about cinema,”⁹ this means only that they must be created by philosophy in accordance with the specificity of cinema’s structures and logics of expression, instead of applying ready-made concepts from other areas.¹⁰ While the concepts should directly resonate with the signs and images and thought-structures of the films, they are still produced by philosophy. A concept of a cinematic thought structure is thereby not merely a putting into words of that cinematic thought structure, it is the result of an extraction of that structure onto a philosophical plane on which it is recomposed according to the logic of that philosophical plane while staying true to the specificity of what is conceptualized (more on this conceptual procedure below). In this sense, the concept introduces something new.

Certainly, in the preface to the English edition of Cinema 1, Deleuze famously writes that “it is not sufficient to compare the great directors of the cinema with painters, architects or even musicians. They must also be compared with thinkers.”¹¹ As the word thinkers is here clearly a short hand for philosophical thinkers, a main premise of the book is introduced: great filmmakers work on a level of advanced thought comparable to philosophers; there is no intellectual hierarchy between them. The latter is clearer in a similar statement Deleuze made in an interview conducted by Serge Daney in 1983: “The great cinematic authors are thinkers just as much as painters, musicians, novelists and philosophers (philosophy has no special privilege).”¹² He is thereby not saying that the work of thinking and the thought products of filmmakers are the same as that to which it is compared – whether compared with the work of painters, architects, musicians, novelists, or philosophers. For Deleuze, rather, cinema and philosophy are comparable thinking modes with key formal differences having most significantly to do with concept creation. While the (controversial but influential) definitions in What is Philosophy? revolving around concept creation are done in relation to science and a generalization called art, nothing said about concepts in or around the cinema books, as we saw above, contradicts the later definitions – in brief, filmmakers do not create concepts. We can therefore claim that cinematic thinking, no longer discussed explicitly in What is Philosophy?, is in this sense subsumed into the category of art: a particular set of modes of thought that do not involve concept creation.¹³ So let us look a bit closer at the distinctions made in this book between philosophy and art.
Famously, a philosophical practice is here argued to contain three basic elements. The laying out of (pre-philosophical, “problematic”) planes of immanence on which concepts are created and on which they can make sense, along with the invention of conceptual personae that help dramatize and narrow down the problems enough for there to concept creation. A similar separation is found in art, in which there is a plane of composition and the creation of percepts/affects and aesthetic figures. While Deleuze acknowledges how philosophy and art can “intersect and intertwine” in specific cases they do so “without synthesis or identification.” And although an element from one can be brought into the other, that element is then re-reconstituted for the milieu into which it is brought. For instance, an artistic sensation on a plane of composition can become the sensation of a concept, which transforms the artistic sensation into a philosophical component. Three other kinds of intersections between art and philosophy are discussed, in which the distinction is still in the end fully maintained:

1.) Art, science, and philosophy tend to become indiscernible at the point in which they intersect with the chaos with which they all grapple. But this does not speak against Deleuze’s many declarations of their distinct properties beyond that intersection.

2.) Trickier is the “intrinsic type of interference” that occurs when concepts and conceptual personae like Nietzsche’s Zarathustra are placed on a plane that is “difficult to qualify.” But difficult to qualify does not mean cannot be qualified. And Deleuze qualifies Nietzsche’s plane as a philosophical plane.

3.) Trickiest is the type of literary writers that Deleuze calls “half philosophers” who make exchanges between the respective elements of art and philosophy in a particular and systemic way: they do not re-constitute elements to fit the mode of thought they are taken into, but rather take some elements from philosophy and some from art and create hybrids. However, even here the sharp differences are preserved between the elements that are mixed – they make hybrids of art and philosophy but “do not produce a synthesis” of the two.

While some ambiguities may remain regarding the half philosophers, Deleuze is particularly strict regarding one element: concepts. The half philosophers either place conceptual personae on planes of composition or aesthetic figures on planes of immanence. But their hybrids are never described to form or express concepts. As Deleuze writes: “only philosophy creates concepts in the strict sense” and the “exclusive right of concept creation secures a function for philosophy.”
Rodowick’s Subtle Nudges of Deleuze Towards and Into the Film as Philosophy Position

Let us now reconnect with current ideas about film as philosophy that reference Deleuze. First of all, there are certainly scholars who follow Deleuze’s separation between philosophy and (however philosophically inclined) cinematic thinking. Then there are scholars who utilize a looser Deleuzian frame to argue for their own ideas about film as philosophy, in which film is said to philosophize affectively and poetically in ways explicitly described as non-conceptual. Quite a few, however, exemplified by Sorfa above, claim that Deleuze himself argued that films can do/be philosophy. In the introduction to a recent anthology called Film as Philosophy, editor Bernd Herzogenrath makes a partly similar statement while also going into the issue of concepts: “If the rubric of film as philosophy claims films or cinema can do philosophy, then it is not the institutionalized version of academic philosophy (i.e., the production of propositional knowledge) but rather what Deleuze and Guattari call the ‘creation of concepts.’” However, while Herzogenrath thereby brushes up against the problem discussed here, he goes on to describe this in terms of Deleuze’s notion of a new image of thought more broadly instead of his definition of concepts, so that it appears that those two things are the same in Deleuze, which they are not. In an editorial for a special issue on Jean-Luc Godard, John E. Drabinski more aptly and directly points towards this article’s concern: “If philosophy, as Deleuze has it, is primarily concerned with the creation of concepts, then Godard’s cinema can be said to create concepts in sound and image.” An intriguing suggestion that, unfortunately, is not further developed or investigated in relation to Deleuze’s writings.

The most developed and sophisticated engagement with Deleuze for arguments related to the idea of film as philosophy, warrants more detailed examination. In the final book of his rich and rewarding trilogy on film theory, the humanities, and philosophy, D.N. Rodowick experimentally explores intersections between art, cinema, philosophy, and concepts from closely studied Deleuzian (along with Cavellian) perspectives. It is a tour de force in many regards. Nonetheless, those of his arguments that specifically pertain to film as philosophy, hovers between three partly conflicting positions: 1) “film is philosophy,” 2) film as “a becoming-philosophy tending toward conceptual formation” and 3) film as that which “may inspire philosophy to give form to a concept” but whose own figures of thought are always “preconceptual.” Now, the relation between above positions 1 (film is philosophy) and 3 (film as preconceptual) would not necessarily be contradictory, if he did not explicitly argue that the first position was also claimed by Deleuze: “Deleuze and Cavell,” Rodowick writes, “comprehend cinema as expressing ways of being in the world and of relating to the world such that cinema is already philosophy.” He then qualifies this to mean that cinema thinks similar problems as philosophy, and that it does so
“preconceptually in aesthetic form.” But this is actually a shift rather than a qualification, since it does not explain how Deleuze could have “comprehended cinema” to be “already philosophy” given that cinema – however advanced in its thought – is preconceptual and philosophy is chiefly defined by its creation of concepts. Rodowick similarly writes about “an active philosophy immanent to the Image – a philosophy of the image given in or through images”29 with the implication that this is Deleuze’s position. But how could it be his position, given it would amount to philosophy without concept creation? At times Rodowick seems to try to solve this by including into his sentences some ambiguities regarding Deleuze’s very division between cinema and philosophical concept creation (a division Rodowick is carefully upholding at other times). “Deleuze sees conceptual creation in the movement- and time-images,” he for instance writes at one point.30

Along with these less convincing efforts to push Deleuze into the film-is-philosophy position, however, Rodowick also provides more useful and thought-provoking nudges of Deleuze towards (but not into) this position. This involves finding similarities in formal structure between how Deleuze describes images in Cinema and philosophy in What is Philosophy? They can be boiled down to two types:

1. Similarities in formal logic between cinema and philosophy. E.g. Deleuze describes concepts as well as movement- and time-images as fragmentary open wholes, and filmic images/figures involve planes of immanence rather than planes of composition.

2. Filmic images and figures of thought understood as maps or sketches of the intensive features of concepts.31

While Rodowick still never brings this to bear against Deleuze’s categorization of film as always preconceptual, especially the second type of similarity is relevant for a more speculative discussion of what philosophical conceptualization in and through film could mean from a Deleuzian perspective. We will therefore reconnect towards the end with the similarities found by Rodowick. But if a filmic figure of thought can sketch the intensive features of concepts, as Rodowick argues, what are those intensive features? By what definition does a concept even have intensive features?

Deleuze’s Concept of Concepts

Deleuze’s definition, as Daniel Smith notes, “differs significantly from previous conceptions of the concept.”32 The famous critique in Difference and Repetition against a traditional philosophical manner of thinking that Deleuze calls representation, includes a critique of representational concepts (although they can in the end be revealed as multiplicities too, beyond their immediate function in given contexts). The representational concept he critiques, equals
a term with a fixed meaning with a given place in a syllogism or serving a function in a proposition: it abstracts the essence of a phenomenon or idea according to a logic of (static) identity and opposition/difference in relation to other concepts. The component parts of each representational concept are themselves presupposed as identities, under a head concept that brings them together in a generalized, abstracted identity. As such, it subordinates difference to identity, which bars a concept of difference in itself (although dialectics can splice identities as part of complex contradiction-driven movements, difference is still reduced to negativity – and to abstract, not real enough movements – and is typically related to a larger general concept, and for these reasons it hides positive movements of differentials, and thereby upholds the subordination of difference to identity). Representational concepts can certainly be a legitimate means for making sense of relations on the level of facts and actualities. They are limited, however, as means for understanding the problematic, multiplicity-like levels of reality that according to Deleuze are the concern of philosophy.

In *What is Philosophy?* Deleuze more explicitly and systematically provides his own definition of concepts: a specific kind of philosophically defined multiplicities. A concept condenses a finite number of “intensive” components – of which each can itself be regarded as a concept condensing components, ad infinitum – that lack spatiotemporal coordinates and are “neither constants nor variables but pure and simple variations” that “are processual, modular.”33 A concept is still highly structured and defined; it organizes its own components in a “consistency” – internally by reciprocal determinations between components (that are simultaneously distinct and inseparable in partially overlapping zones of indiscernibility) which also entail “trac[ing] the contour of its components” by a point “in a state of survey” that “at infinite speed” is “endlessly traversing” the components which nonetheless are of a finite amount which makes the surveying relative, determined; and externally through its complex coexistence with other philosophical concepts and the varying problem to which it responds (and without which it would have no meaning).34

While a concept results from intense work with real problems, a concept does not mirror or simply reference what it grips outside of philosophy: Concept creation involves co-creation in and through whatever is gripped in reality – it means bringing its specificities into a realm of philosophical thought, with a rigor and precision that stays true to its logic of multiplicity, and reworking it into a concept on a plane of immanence, which means it is given philosophical properties (and in a manner that, furthermore, aims to maximize potentials for change).

Although this creative work is certainly formed in and through considerations of identities and facts (all multiplicities are found within or among them), such identities and facts are not treated as self-identical starting points or end goals of abstraction. Rather, the concept extracts from identities
the multiplicities that are their generative conditions, and which reveals that their status as identities is an (objective, not illusory) effect of underlying generative movements, rather than static essences, movements that also make up potentials for the new. Consequently, what the concept grips, and creates in and through, is the (virtual) structure of the generative differentials – simpler: tendencies – that condition more stable-appearing and actual phenomena or ideas.

Now, a complication here is that Deleuze reimagines “Ideas” in a way that is structurally similar – both concepts and Ideas are understood as multiplicities. While there is therefore a certain analogy between Deleuze’s notions of concepts and Ideas, they are not the same thing. Concepts are multiplicities, but “not every multiplicity is conceptual,” and “An idea is […] not a concept, it is not philosophy. Even if one may be able to draw a concept from every idea.” Ideas, furthermore, are everywhere; they are for Deleuze basically an immanent organizing principle of the universe to put it in the most general terms (the making immanent and multiplicity-like of Ideas is the precise way that Deleuze reverses the Platonic notion of Ideas). Ideas are “problematic,” and we may experience them in things or situations (or ourselves) as that which appears more profound in them. Some may appear demanding and disturbing and force us to really think. There are obviously non-philosophical creative thought responses to human encounters and engagements with such problematic Ideas. If philosophy’s response is in the final instance concept creation, art or cinema responds by creating thought in the form of blocks of sensations or movement/durations.

The Term “Concept” in Deleuze’s Discussion of Eisenstein

In Chapter 7 (“Thought and Cinema”) of Cinema 2, Deleuze actually does write about cinematic expressions of “concepts.” These expressions, however, are discussed as part of the representational thought logic underlying the classical cinema of the movement-image, here exemplified by Eisenstein, in which films tend to indirectly represent – however formally inventive – an organic totality, a rational whole in the sense of a “concept” that “is presupposed,” both as “the logos which unifies the parts,” and a more vague, affective sense of a coherent totality. Even “the fundamentally open character of the whole does not compromise [this organic] model, on the contrary,” Deleuze writes, since the plurality of images is “internalized in a concept as the whole which integrates them” along with “the ideal of knowledge as harmonious totality.”

As Deleuze here uses the term concept both with reference to his notion of representational thought, and more directly to Eisenstein’s own use of the term in his theoretical writings, he references an understanding of concept clearly in conflict with his own. Furthermore, these concepts cannot really be understood as philosophical concepts, even non-Deleuzian notions of
philosophical concepts, so much as concepts in a much wider sense of the term: what in Eisenstein himself is “the transmuting to screen form” of mostly pre-existing abstract conceptions, ideas, viewpoints, or conventions, collected under a head concept such as the “cosmic celebration of the workers’ triumph.” So concepts here are more like general or abstract ideas. And philosophical concepts, Deleuze writes in What is Philosophy?, “must not be confused with general or abstract ideas.”

PART 2

The Peculiar 1968 Comment on Godard’s New Means

If from his cinema books and onwards Deleuze becomes quite strict with the differences between cinematic forms of thought and philosophical concepts, there appears to be an opening for a more radical relation between cinema and philosophy in an earlier comment on Godard made in a 1968 interview:

Godard transforms cinema by introducing thought into it. He didn’t have thoughts on cinema, he doesn’t put more or less valid thought into cinema; he starts cinema thinking [il fait que le cinéma pense], and for the first time, if I’m not mistaken. Theoretically [À la limite], Godard would be capable of filming Kant’s Critique or Spinoza’s Ethics, and it wouldn’t be abstract cinema or a cinematographic application. Godard knew how to find both a new means and a new “image.”

What is said here? The implication seems to be that Godard found new means to do philosophy in and through film. But in what sense? Would the definition of philosophy as concept creation apply here? Or is this statement rather in line with Cinema 2 in which Godard is central in Deleuze’s discussion of the new image of thought of modern cinema, which precisely do not include concept creation? We should underline how central Godard is at the end of Cinema 2 for Deleuze’s sharp differentiations between filmic thinking and philosophy as the art of creating concepts. While Godard and other “great cinema authors” are indeed described as philosophers/theorists – and Deleuze here basically equates philosophy and theory – this is only in what they say or write outside of their films: “in talking,” Deleuze writes, “they become something else, they become philosophers or theoreticians.” This notion of becoming philosophers through talking, certainly implies an assumption that philosophy can appear when these filmmakers shift to the medium of words, and words only.

The 1968 statement quoted above – which covers the same ground: the relation between thought, cinema, philosophy, and new images – points in a different direction. First of all, while Godard is here said to have introduced
“thought” into cinema, it is assumable that long-time cineaste Deleuze already at this point (later made obvious in his cinema books) considered cinema and its “great cinema authors” to have been thinking long before Godard – representationally or otherwise – and is here likely using the term though as a shorthand for philosophical thought, which the references to Kant and Spinoza further indicate. Now, since a philosophical practice for Deleuze spans more aspects than concept creation – intensive grappling with problems, planes of immanence, conceptual personae (which all form the conditions for concept creation) – Deleuze may have meant that Godard invented means for expressing such other aspects – such as the new image of thought that Deleuze repeatedly comes back to in discussions of both philosophy and cinema (while still keeping them separated)\textsuperscript{47} – rather than filmic means for concept creation. But that would not much explain the reference to Kant, who for Deleuze especially around 1968 epitomizes the old representational image of thought in philosophy (however much he is also credited with revolutionizing the idea of the cogito by fracturing it through introducing the factor of time), and is therefore here not exemplifying the new image of thought, but rather great works of philosophy – and as he describes some of Kant’s work in *What is Philosophy?: “a blast of original concepts.”*\textsuperscript{48} Since planes of immanence and grappling with problems in cinema was not invented by Godard, he must have invented means capable of doing philosophy more fully.

This would only be to say that Godard had invented a filmic form with perhaps yet unrealized potential to fully express philosophy (it is therefore not to say that any of Godard’s actual films fully realized the potential, or that they are (or aren’t) comparable with the philosophical scope or depth of Kant’s or Spinoza’s work). If we connect\textsuperscript{49} this 1968 statement, then, with Deleuze’s later definition of philosophy we can make a crack in the rationale for his distinction between cinema and philosophy, through which could pass the idea that such filmic new means hold the potential – theoretically, at the limit – for philosophical concept creation. Would that be formally possible in light of Deleuze’s later definition of philosophy? Are his later definitions implicitly tying philosophical conceptualization to a given actual form, that of words?

**The Actual, Concrete Forms of Concepts**

This question leads us to look at *What is Philosophy?* from an unusual angle. To the three realms defined in relation to each other – philosophy, art, science – we can add a partly implied analytic division between each realm’s incorporeal, intensive, or virtual components and what could be called their actual or material forms. The incorporeal components of philosophy include most generally planes of immanence, conceptual personae, and concepts, and in art, planes of composition, aesthetic figures, and blocks of sensations.
However, to create them means (for at least parts of the thinking process), as Deleuze writes, to “proceed by” some kind of actual form, from which the incorporeal components are said to be “extracted.” Art proceeds by/extracts from many different materials – stone, steel, a canvas, paint, etc. – and slightly less concretely, lines, colors, shapes, etc. The incorporeal components of a particular painting are unavoidably connected to the paint and the canvas and to its lines and colors – and art is in this way uniquely “preserved” in and through its mostly very concrete material. And we find a similar structure in the *Cinema* books, in which Deleuze discusses the concrete material forms of the moving image, the film strip, camera, projection, video technology, etc., and in the sense of the “technical means which [for instance] directly carry the time-image.” What about the actual forms for the incorporeal elements of philosophy? While philosophy, according to Deleuze, isn’t materially preserved in the same sense as art, philosophy cannot fully exist (as the art of creating concepts) without being carried by an actual form.

Does this form have to be words, and words only? While Deleuze never addresses this question, he makes some statements about the relation between philosophical concepts and words/language. There is the “baptism of the concept” that involves using words “to designate them” (words that outside of or prior to their baptizing function may be archaic, new, familiar, extraordinary, barbarous, shocking etc. – whatever a specific concept demands). Philosophy, he also writes, “uses sentences of a standard language” and even “proceeds by sentences,” and “from sentences or their equivalent, philosophy extracts concepts.” So, the formal articulation of philosophical concepts proceeds through sentences of standard language (more specifically: there is the creation of a philosophical language within language capable of carrying the incorporeal, non-discursive, non-propositional structures of virtual consistency that is a concept). However, Deleuze says nothing about whether words/sentences are the only actual form available for the articulation or “baptism” of philosophical concepts. When writing that philosophy proceeds by sentences, this is part of a paragraph that contrasts how philosophy extracts concepts from language, from how science and art extracts their incorporeal elements from language. And since art extracts from language only when it uses language at all, it would seem that philosophy too could extract concepts from language when they do so, without being by definition tied to only using language. And in stating that philosophy proceeds by sentences “or their equivalent,” despite a lack of further elaboration on what an equivalent could be, this seems to provide a direct opening from sentences solely made up of words.

**Film as a Formal Means, Not a Discipline**

In order for it to make sense to regard film as capable of pushing through these openings, we must think of film as a formal means – as moving image with sound – rather than a field or discipline generalized (with however many
subcategories) as cinema or art.\textsuperscript{55} If cinema (as Deleuze understands the term) is a category comparable to philosophy, film in the sense of moving image with sound belongs to a different kind of category – formal means or media – more comparable to a category like the written word. As a formal means, the written word can be used by different fields or disciplines – including philosophy, science, and art. The moving image with sound should be understood to be similarly open to express whatever.

Including original philosophical concepts? At this point we should be able to say: Why not? Even the traditional concept of concept, with its roots in both conceiving and mental imagery, seem fundamentally unbound by having to come in the form of words. And there is nothing in Deleuze’s definition that in principle ties concepts any more to words. And if we redefine film/cinema as a formal means, as moving image with sound instead of a field or a discipline, we short-circuit Deleuze famous distinction between “having an idea” in the respective fields of cinema/film and philosophy.\textsuperscript{56} So that it becomes possible – in principle – to have an idea of a philosophical concept in and through film (instead of in and through words only). Although, this would of course have to mean the formal renewal of the concept, more specifically, of its actual forms. Regarding the virtual structure of concepts, it would on the other hand still have to be worked out in close accordance with Deleuze’s definitions, so as to make sense for them to be called concepts instead of other kinds of Ideas-multiplicities.

Furthermore, for an actual filmic structure to be capable – like the philosophical language created within language – to carry virtual levels of a concept – the latter being what Deleuze actually defines in What is Philosophy? – it is not enough to find, as Rodowick intriguingly does, some similarities between concepts as fragmented open wholes, and filmic or artistic structures – in general. For Deleuze much in the world is fragmented and open, many things are multiplicities, but very few things are concepts (see discussion above). The question would rather have to be: which filmic structures can create a philosophical-conceptual film language within film language capable of carrying original philosophical concepts, in the precise sense of the virtual structures Deleuze calls philosophical concepts. Instead of talking about film in general, or even general image types, we would have to closely analyze the rare kind of films (or parts of films) that could reasonably be seen as containing potentials for doing so.

**Two Sets of Preliminary Components**

Sections of Godard’s video works appear particularly relevant to investigate from this perspective.\textsuperscript{57} As focused on Deleuze’s thought, however, and on how far it can be stretched in the direction of film as a means for creating philosophical concepts, it is outside the scope of this article to investigate Godard’s video works in themselves. Instead, we will suggest two
sets of possible preliminary components for filmic concept creation that are implied by Deleuze’s own statements on Godard in *Cinema 2*. Two caveats: in this short text, they can only be presented and not fully investigated. Second, it is also not suggested that these sets, even if fully investigated, provide all that is needed for philosophical conceptualization in and through film. It is suggested only that they may provide key foundational means (comparable to how the breakdown of the Movement-Image, according to Deleuze, provided only some of the preliminary components of the new image of thought, not the new image of thought itself).58 The two sets are as follows.

First, Deleuze’s notion of a new analytics in the films of filmmakers like Huillet/Straub, Duras, and Godard. Sound (including speech-acts) stops being a mere component of the visual image and “becomes for itself an autonomous sound image,” and thereby relates more or less non-linearly to the visual image, which on its part has become readable/legible in itself in its (increasingly layered or stratigraphic) entirety. In the disjunctive-conjunctive joining of two such autonomous images, auditory and visual, cinema becomes “truly audiovisual.”59 Instead of being torn apart by its disjunctive aspect, this audiovisuality “gains a new consistency which depends on a more complex link between the visual image and the sound image,” that furthermore calls to be read.60 And also within each image there are non-linear or “irrational” relations, making up “differential” connections on various levels capable of expressing virtual or problematic structures. The “analytic” components combine through a logic of multiplicity, we may say, instead of like parts in a representational whole.

Second, there are remarkable similarities between Deleuze’s discussion in “The Brain is the Screen” of classification as a key part of forming philosophical concepts,64 and his discussion in *Cinema 2* of “Aristotelian” categorization as part of Godard’s (at least 1970s) method of filmic thinking.62 While these terms (with their connotations of traditional representation) are used a bit tongue-in-cheek (referencing Borges’ Chinese taxonomy of animals), and Godard’s categories are “Aristotelian” only as starting points for non-rational series (this category AND this category AND…), these classifications/categorizations are in no way parodies, but re-imagined as flexible, intensive coordinates within fragmented, mobile wholes – problems, multiplicities – instead of static identities in syllogistic systems. Certainly, again, various kinds of Ideas are multiplicities, but only a specific kind of multiplicities are philosophical concepts. However, the closeness between Deleuze’s notion of classification as a key aspect of concept creation and his notion of categorization in Godard’s analytical series suggest a stronger closeness. Deleuze on classification and concept formation: “Every classification is similar: they are flexible, their criteria vary according to the cases presented, they have a retroactive effect, and they can be infinitely refined or reorganized. […] In any classification scheme, some things which seem very different are brought closer together, and others which seem very
close are separated. This is how concepts are formed.”\(^{63}\) And as he writes in *What is Philosophy?*, regarding how concept creation relates to existing concepts, “each concept carries out a new cutting-out, takes on new contours, and must be reactivated or recut.”\(^{64}\) Compared to Deleuze on categories in Godard: “According to Godard, categories are not fixed once and for all. They are redistributed, reshaped and reinvented for each film. A montage of categories, which is new each time, corresponds to a cutting of categories. The categories must, each time, surprise us, and yet not be arbitrary, must be well founded, and must have strong, indirect relations between themselves,” and as such they are “categories of problems which introduce reflection into the image itself.”\(^{65}\) This can in turn be compared to how a concept for Deleuze is “only created as a function of problems which are thought to be badly understood or badly posed” – something he calls the “pedagogy of the concept,” and with how philosophers “are always recasting and even changing their concepts” because they “create concepts for problems that necessarily change.”\(^{66}\) Which can then be further compared to Deleuze’s description (with reference to Daney) of a Godardian pedagogy, how Godard is “finding ‘theorems’ at the edge of ‘problems’,” is “constantly creating categories,” and goes “from problems to categories, even if the categories end up presenting him with a problem again.”\(^{67}\) The Godardian pedagogy means for Deleuze that “we have to read the visual as well as hear the speech-act in a new way.”\(^{68}\) Similarly, a concept, Deleuze writes, “makes us aware of new variations and unknown resonances, it carries out unforeseen cuttings-out.”\(^{69}\)

Curiously, none of this suggests to Deleuze that there may be sketches of concepts – or even more than that – in Godard’s films, as Godard is instead implicitly fitted into the following general category of time-image thought: non-chronological figures of time and the revelation of a certain “powerlessness” in thought, which is to say, thought’s disruptive encounter with the problematic. It seems that Godard has to be put into this category for Deleuze’s more general differentiations between cinematic thinking and philosophical conceptualization to work. But there is nothing stopping us from recutting and reorganizing this categorical differentiation, without really breaking out from Deleuze’s overall thought.

**Film: Moving Images, Sounds, Words, Texts**

If concepts are multiplicities, i.e. mobile compounds of heterogeneous intensive components, wouldn’t it make sense to also “baptize” them with concrete forms that are mobile and heterogeneous more so than words? This has nothing, however, to do with opposing images to words. Words are plentiful in the theory-driven kind of film that could reasonably be investigated as (at least closing in on) articulating original concepts in and through film. As John Lahey Dronsfield states, “the written word has been no more fully and comprehensively introduced into cinema than by Godard.”\(^{70}\)
And to reconnect with the second set of preconditions above: “It is often the case that the written word indicates the category,” writes Deleuze on Godard, “while the visual images constitute the series: hence the very special primacy of the word over the image and the presentation of the screen as blackboard.”71 Or as Georges Didi-Huberman alternatively writes about Histoire(s) du cinema, “Godard is constantly summoning words to be read, to be seen, or to be heard” in a relation that “must then be understood as repeated collision between words and images” in which “images jostle together making words suddenly appear, words jostle making images suddenly appear, images and words collide making thought take place visually.”72

This can be viewed in light of how Godard arguably keeps developing his “new means: “What is shown as a philosophical promise in the late-1960s,” writes Drabinski, “becomes philosophy brought to a dense, polysemic cinematic language in the 1970s and after.”73 We can add to this that many of his videos become increasingly saturated with written words within the frame. Not as added to or determining/being determined by the image (in for instance a Barthian sense), but as woven into time-based, moving audio-visual complexes, in which words and texts become more or less filmic components. Filmic words and texts can thereby take on different senses than in non-filmic forms of speaking or writing. What could be the function of such filmic speaking or writing for creating philosophical concepts in and through film? Are filmic words/texts even required?

Perhaps words help make the philosophical/theoretical aspects more explicit. They will likely also for a long time remain the clearest links to the history of philosophy – and such links are needed: however original, no concept is original in an ex nihilo sense, and as Deleuze writes, “every concept always has a history,” “there are usually bits or components that come from other concepts,” and a ”concept requires not only a problem through which it recasts or replaces earlier concepts but a junction of problems where it combines with other coexisting concepts.”74 As concepts relate to other concepts in this way, words may be needed since most prior philosophical concepts (still) come in the form of words, and words only.

Overall, film with its multiple parts – images, montage, sounds, words, texts – could offer the means for at least two kinds of formal development of philosophy: 1. Extended parameters for “recast[ing] or replac[ing] earlier concepts.” 2. Extended parameters for making up actual structures capable of carrying the virtual components of concepts: from only words, to the more differentiated structure of moving audiovisual compounds, in which various parts of the latter can carry with more direct nuance the virtual, mobile components of the concept. This could include some direct correlations between specific concrete components and specific virtual components. For instance, a concrete part of the form carrying the main virtual component at which a concept often “condenses” (such as the “I” in Descartes’ cogito).75
While the question of which filmic parameter could carry such a particular abstract component could not be answered in advance and in general, given words’ natural link to the history of philosophy, they may function well as concrete carriers of such main points around which the filmic concepts condenses (and which traverses the concept in a state of survey). This obviously does not mean (given our discussion above), they would be a generality that the other filmic parameters fall in line under as affective backing or illustrational extension. It would also not mean assigning the word a strict role in a linear division of labor. Rather, it would be woven into an audio-visual constellation that as a whole carries a conceptual multiplicity.

In a 1976 interview, Deleuze says about Godard’s “aural images” that they on the one hand “don’t seem to have any priority” over visual images, but that on the other hand, “some of [these aural images] have an other side you can call whatever you like, ideas, meaning, language, expressive aspects, and so on [and they] are thus able to contract or capture other images or a series of other images.” Although Deleuze here mostly seems to mean dictating our perception in a partly ordering or normalizing way, this could also be reimagined as a contraction in the sense of indicating the point at which a concept condenses. On the other hand, given the extent to which words and images are at times spiraling around and over each other in late Godard, and given his preference for (clear) images and suspicion of text (at least in theory), it would certainly be reasonable to see images functioning – perhaps interchangeably – as carriers of such condensing main points. In any case, given that film is a hybrid and temporal medium that is literarily in movement, there would be an unavoidable general formal renewal of the concrete form of the concept.

Coda

But again, why the need for philosophy – as the art of creating concepts – to extend its conceptualizing means to include film? Above, this question was answered in the abstract. Let us end with a concrete example: Deleuze’s own ongoing quest to find new means of expression culminated in a failure to find a form for a late book on his concept of the virtual. As Raymond Bellour explains:

In the last words that we exchanged, in the summer before his death, Deleuze evoked […] the difficulties he was having with his book on the virtual, of which only a few pages exist. He said he was looking for a form. To this end, he listened to music (Ravel). And then he said, “I am not going to write fragments after all.” No, not fragments, as this had been done so inventively by Nietzsche, but something new, to go beyond, beyond the shares that had already been touched.
It would be too much of a stretch to speculate on whether film could have offered a formal solution for Deleuze in this case. Not just because we do not know exactly what he found so hard to express, but also because he was not trained as a filmmaker and would perhaps not have had enough talent for it if he was. Still Godard once quipped with reference to Cinema (and with echoes from Alexandre Astruc): "All those philosophers, it’s a pity they didn’t make cinema... Deleuze was tempted, but instead of making a film, he wrote ‘a book about’." Godard himself – filmmaker extraordinaire and maker of famously philosophically-inclined films – may have provided a method for “how film could express something,” as Harun Farocki stated in 1981, but as he added, only as an “abstract, empty possibility” and that therefore “the real work has not yet begun.”

2 Since Deleuze’s Cinema books will be examined from this specific and under-explored perspective, the discussion below will not offer (yet another) engagement with the intricacies of their taxonomy of image types, which I have explored extensively elsewhere in e.g. Jakob Nilsson, “Thought-Images and The New as a Rarity: A Revaluation of the Philosophical Implications of Deleuze’s Cinema Books,” Cinema: Journal of Philosophy and the Moving Image 6 (2014): 94-121. With that said, this article does examine some directly pertinent discussions of images from the last chapters of Cinema 2.
3 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition [1968], trans. Paul Patton (London/New York: Continuum, 2004), xxi; Deleuze, “On Nietzsche and the Image of Thought” [1968], interviewed by Jean-Noël Vuarnet, in Desert Islands and Other Texts: 1953-1974, ed. David Lapoujade, trans. Michael Taormina (Los Angeles and New York: Semiotext(e), 2004), 141. In an important book that treats Godard’s video works as “primarily texts in philosophy,” John E. Drabinski aptly mentions in his introduction how cinema as philosophy can be a response to the Deleuzian problem of the formal renewal of philosophy. In this book, however, this is investigated in terms of Godard’s film-philosophical contributions to problems of difference, otherness, and the unspeakable/unrepresentable, read through a Derridian and Levinasian conceptual frame. Drabinski thereby does not explore in itself the question for the present article of the formal renewal of philosophical concepts in a Deleuzian sense of concepts. Godard Between Identity and Difference (New York: Continuum, 2008), 4-8.
In the first part of this article I use the terms film and cinema fairly synonymously. In the second part, however, the two terms will be partly distinguished and film will be defined as the moving image with sound, in ways and for reasons that will be clarified.


13 Ronald Bogue suggests instead that this absence of explicit discussion of cinema may be explained by “the fact that cinema blurs the line between philosophy and the arts, a line Deleuze [is] intent on sharpening in *What Is Philosophy?,*” Bogue, “To Choose to Choose - to Believe in This World,” in *After-images of Gilles Deleuze’s Film Philosophy*, ed. D. N. Rodowick (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 128. Bogue, however, does not expand on how such a line is blurred (or why it would be more blurred than the line between philosophy and literature) or, most importantly, how this would relate to Deleuze’s definition of philosophy as the art of creating concepts.

14 Jeffery Bell conceives of the pre-philosophical plane of immanence as a problematic structure/space/plane/field (in a Deleuzian sense of problem/problematic), in *Deleuze and Guattari’s What is Philosophy?: A Critical

18 Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, 218. I read as the cinematic equivalent of such “half philosophy” Deleuze’s labeling in Cinema 2 of Resnais’ films as a marriage [noce] between philosophy and cinema (209) (although the two “spouses” seem to a large extent divided along 1. words on the soundtrack 2. other filmic parameters). The limited space here prevents me from developing this point further.
19 Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, 5, 8. How would conceptual art fit it here? Deleuze recognizes conceptual art as a recent attempt “to bring art and philosophy together” but argues, first, that conceptual art does not “substitute the concept for the sensation” but “create sensations and not concepts;” second, that conceptual art tends to dematerialize (through generalization) and to neutralize its plane of composition so that it becomes “informative” with the sensation depending “upon the simple ‘opinion’ of a spectator who determines whether or not to ‘materialize’ the sensation’, that is to say, decides whether or not it is art;” and third, that the concept nonetheless involved is reduced to an impoverished conception of concept: the concept reduced “to a doxa” (198). Deleuze’s own concept of concepts is discussed below.
20 For example, Robert Sinnerbrink, New Philosophies of Film: Thinking Images (London/New York: Continuum, 2011).
21 See Daniel Frampton, Filmosophy (London/New York: Wallflower Press, 2006). While Stephen Mulhall does not reference Deleuze, he intriguingly mentions that films (that do philosophy) can engage with what appears to be a Nietzschean sense of concepts. However, such engagement is not discussed in term of films as the means for creating such concepts, but in terms of “interrogation” and “analysis” of existing concepts. Mulhall, On Film: Thinking in Action, 2nd Edition (London/New York: Routledge, 2008), 4-6, 87, 94.
23 First of all, while Deleuze does say in a 1983 interview that “concepts themselves are already images; they are images of thought,” he still conceives of concepts as images and filmic images as different modalities of thought expression; as he also says here: “Philosophy is about concepts. […] Film creates another kind [of image]:
movement-images and time-images.” “Portrait of the Philosopher as a Moviegoer,” in *Two Regimes of Madness*, 213. Second, Deleuze will in his later more detailed definitions of concepts and images of thought (as discussed above and below), separate them as different (however intertwined) aspect of philosophy, in which an image of thought is the terrain that orients philosophical ideas as they emerge, most generally in the sense of a set of preconceptual assumptions about what it means to think (the latter of course also refers back to Deleuze’s critique of the image of thought in the 1960s).


26 Rodowick, *Philosophy’s Artful Conversation*, xv, 158.


28 Rodowick, *Philosophy’s Artful Conversation*, 179.

29 Rodowick, *Philosophy’s Artful Conversation*, 158.


31 For both types, see Rodowick, *Philosophy’s Artful Conversation*, 119f, 127, 133, 136f, 143, 160f.


36 Deleuze, “What is the Creative Act?,” 318.

37 For more on Deleuze’s concept of “Ideas” see chapters 4 and 5 in his *Difference and Repetition*; and for more on how Deleuze reimagines Platonic Ideas as immanent multiplicities, see Daniel W. Smith, “The Concept of the Simulacrum: Deleuze and the Overturning of Platonism,” *Continental Philosophy Review* 38 (2006): 89-123.

38 Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, 159.

39 Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, 210, see also 213.


41 Eisenstein, *Film Form*, c.f. 25, 30, 37, 58, 60-61, 63.


As Rodowick writes: “A slippage is obvious here, with theory standing in for philosophy.” *Philosophy’s Artful Conversation*, 109.


This connection - following a brief suggestion by Drabinski (who also references Deleuze’s 1968 statement on Godard) - is additionally supported by Ian Buchanan’s idea (setting up his quest to re-read Deleuze’s cinema project from the perspective of schizoanalysis) that “we reject this specious segmentation of Deleuze’s corpus and instead take seriously Deleuze’s demand that we take an author ‘as a whole’,” so that there “is nothing to stop us as readers from joining the dots ourselves.” Buchanan, “Five Theses of Actually Existing Schizoanalysis of Cinema,” in *Deleuze and the Schizoanalysis of Cinema*, eds. Ian Buchanan and Patricia MacCormack (London/New York: Continuum, 2008), 14, 2. I should clarify, however, that in the present article this means reading and selecting certain “dots” within the whole of Deleuze’s thought, and doing so from the perspective of the present article’s particular film-philosophical questions, which may mean omitting considerations of debates and scholarship that examine other implications of the same bits in Deleuze’s thought.


55 The term moving image with sound is here understood in accordance with how D.N. Rodowick re-imagines Noël Carroll’s criteria for a media category called moving images, now defined as a plural and variable general medium (without static essence) that includes all forms of moving images: celluloid, analog video, digital, etc. While preserving their “relative distinctness” and “variable specificity,” they unite through a logic of Wittgensteinian family resemblance. Rodowick, *The Virtual Life of Film* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 38, 41, 86.
56 Deleuze, “What is the Creative Act?” 312, 316.
58 I discuss this in more detail in Nilsson, “Thought-Images and The New as a Rarity,” 108f.
60 Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, 252.
61 Gilles Deleuze, “The Brain is the Screen” [1986], in *Two Regimes of Madness*, 285-287.
63 Deleuze, “The Brain is the Screen,” 285-286.
65 Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, 185, 186.
70 Lahey Dronsfield, in a close but also critical dialogue with Deleuze, goes somewhat further than the latter in holding out the key position of the written word as seen in the frame in Godard, in arguing that the disjunctive-conjunctive relation is not only between the audio image and the visual image (with uttered words part of the former and written words as part of the latter), as Deleuze would have it, but also in relation to a third (at least partly) autonomous image of the written word, which concerns “showing words on the screen” that are “repeating as an image a word spoken” in a
manner that “displaces the word” as speech act (and vice versa), and that through a “play of the separateness and non-separateness of image and text” along such lines, in which images “have to pass through the word” and vice versa, “the text is confronted with itself as an image” and vice versa, in ways that make “sensible something about the text” that would be otherwise invisible or inaudible” all for the sake of trying to “renew it in its possibility,” Lahey Dronsfield, “Pedagogy of the Written Image,” Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy vol. XVIII, no. 2 (2010): 87-105.

71 Deleuze, Cinema 2: The Time-Image, 185.
73 Drabinski, “Philosophy as a Kind of Cinema,” 4.
74 Deleuze and Guattari, What Is Philosophy?, 15, 18. Daniel W. Smith breaks down how concepts for Deleuze - especially Deleuze’s own concepts - are becomings on several levels: philosophers picking up and reconceiving concepts from others, alternations of the internal components when a philosopher reworks a concept from a previous work (or even alters it within a work), and finally within each concept since it is made up of intensive components instead of identities. Smith, “On the Nature of Concepts,” 62-73.
78 Astruc wrote in his famous essay on the camera pen that “a Descartes of today would already have shut himself up in his bedroom with a 16mm camera and some film, and would be writing his philosophy on film: for his Discours de la Methode would today be of such a kind that only the cinema could express it satisfactorily,” Alexandre Astruc, “Naissance d’une nouvelle avant-garde: la caméra-stylo,” Écran français (30 March, 1948).