Améry’s Duress

Jeffrey Bernstein

Améry’s Duress

Jeffrey Bernstein
College of the Holy Cross

And if one forced him to look at the light itself, wouldn’t he have pain in his eyes and escape by turning back toward those things he was able to make out, and consider them clearer in their very being than the ones pointed out to him?

– Plato, Republic¹

You don’t want to listen? Listen. You don’t want to know where your indifference can again lead you and me at any time? I’ll tell you. What happened is of no concern of yours because you didn’t know, or were too young, or not even born yet? You should have seen, and your youth gives you no special privilege, and break with your father.

– Jean Améry, At the Mind’s Limits²

Introductory Remarks

If truth hurts, this is no doubt because it is often enough forced on us. And the question as to whether the reception of “nice,” “easy” truths is similarly an outcome of coercion negates itself in its very formulation—we do not ask “why are things the way they are?” from a feeling of comfort; the plaintiff cry of “how, then, shall we live?” does not come to us out of a sense of security. Indeed, insofar as truth overtakes us and interrupts the conventions of our lives, it occurs to us quite apart from our ordinary desires and wants. We are thus faced with a paradox: what claim can truth make on a being that “doesn’t need it and doesn’t care about it—since it doesn’t at all concern his needs”?³ When one considers that the awareness of truth is indexed to lived experience, the paradox is only heightened.
An instance of this paradox haunts the texts contained in Jean Améry’s 1966 volume *At The Mind’s Limits: Contemplations By A Survivor On Auschwitz And Its Realities.* In the final essay of his volume, reacting to Robert Mizrahi’s claim that the Shoah “is henceforth the absolute reference point for every Jew,” Améry holds that,

I am convinced that not every Jew is capable of thinking out this relationship. Only those who have lived through a fate like mine, and no one else, can refer their lives to the years 1933-1945. By no means do I say this with pride . . . Rather it is with a certain shame that I assert my sad privilege and suggest that while the catastrophe (*Katastrophe*) is truly the existential reference point for all Jews, only we, the immolated (*Geopferten*) are able to spiritually relive the catastrophic event as it was or fully picture it as it could be again.

For Améry, even if we would wish to think the relationship between Jews and the Shoah, we cannot. And yet, he continues to write: “You don’t want to listen? Listen. You don’t want to know . . . I’ll tell you.” This is the truth that Améry’s text forces us to acknowledge. Yet, what are we to make of Améry’s defiant tone amidst the seeming impossibility of communicating a situation precisely insofar as that situation exceeds the capacities and desires/needs of people who were not there? This paradox is, in no way, unique to Améry’s corpus. It is the central concern of all attempts to bear witness to genocide and its aftermath. If Améry’s rendition is more striking, this can only be a result of its extreme and unrelenting character. There is no access to Améry’s experience for people absent from the horror. Yet Améry continues nonetheless. He is communicating that which, by his own account, cannot be communicated. He is forcing the impossible on his readers.

Nor is this all. It is not simply that, in speaking to us, he speaks only to the survivors. Améry makes no pretense to addressing all survivors. He limits his narrative to those who have (as it were) no recourse to the traditions of insight through the names “Jerusalem” and “Athens”. About the former, Améry states: “In my deliberations, I am unable to consider Jews who are Jews because they are sheltered by tradition. I can speak solely for myself—and, even with caution, for contemporaries, probably numbering into the millions, whose being Jewish burst upon them with elemental force, and who must stand this test without God, without history, without messianic-national hope. For them, for me, being a Jew means feeling the tragedy of yesterday as an inner oppression.” As a Jew whose existential induction into the religion came by means of the Nuremberg Laws of 1935, Améry credits little to traditional Judaism except for a respect and admiration borne from the ability of the Orthodox Jew (along with the Christian, and the Marxist) to withstand the inferno of Auschwitz as a result of religious (and political) commitments. But if traditional Judaism is reduced to practical efficacy in extreme situations, this is miles beyond the
practical impoverishment of intellectually- and philosophically-minded individuals: “In the camp the intellect in its totality declared itself to be incompetent”\textsuperscript{11}; “You do not observe dehumanized man committing his deeds and misdeeds without having all of your notions of inherent human dignity placed in doubt . . . And so I dare to say that we didn’t leave Auschwitz wiser and deeper, but we were no doubt smarter.”\textsuperscript{12} Smarter, that is, than to believe that the life of contemplation amounted to anything other than a malicious joke in circumstances where individuals can be reduced to a zone of indistinction between human and nonhuman.\textsuperscript{13} Améry thus speaks from a place outside of tradition, convention, and contemplation. He speaks as an Überwältigter—one who was overcome. In Primo Levi’s parlance, Améry speaks as a drowned person.\textsuperscript{14}

We grant all of this. Who are we to do otherwise? We manifestly do not live in the camps.\textsuperscript{15} And we cannot empathize with the man who is “plagued by dreams such as that he is no longer living at all, that he was sent to the ovens in 1944 and his whole existence since has been imaginary, an emanation of the insane wish of a man killed twenty years earlier.”\textsuperscript{16} Moreover, our Judaism (if not traditional) is nowise a product of forceful coercion, and our intellectual strivings (imperfect as they are) still stir us. Are we able to learn from Améry? Is Améry able to teach anything to us? Or is the central message of \textit{At The Mind’s Limits} that, after Auschwitz, Jerusalem and Athens are destroyed?\textsuperscript{17} But even then, can we not inquire about what, for Améry, Judaism and philosophy were not—i.e., the ways in which they appear in his text under the sign of radical negation? Is it impossible to re-collect the fragments of philosophy and Judaism in the aftermath of their destruction?\textsuperscript{18}

I believe that—far from being impossible or illegitimate—this is exactly what Améry’s text can teach us. Levi once wrote that his very public argument with Améry (over whether Levi was adopting too forgiving a stance towards the Germans) was “forced” upon him by the latter.\textsuperscript{19} Indeed, just as coercive force plagued Améry in life, so is that force—that duress—a theme that runs through \textit{At The Mind’s Limits}, culminating in the final essay—which will be the focus of the present study. I will show that Améry’s narrative places careful readers under such duress in order to force them to return to the very (Jewish and philosophical) sources that are negated in Améry’s narrative. If Améry’s text adheres to the negativity characteristic of both Sartrean revolt\textsuperscript{20} and the Adornean (interpretation of the Jewish) ban on images/representation,\textsuperscript{21} it drives these figures past the limits that characterize their authors’ thoughts.\textsuperscript{22} Readers are thus forced to recognize (1) an Adornean-style non-identity between themselves and Améry’s narrative and (2) that any claim to such an identity would be a mark of Sartrean bad faith.\textsuperscript{23} Being foreigners to Améry’s text, we are therefore placed in question.\textsuperscript{24} Making one’s own return to the sources thus constitutes a need for careful readers of Améry.\textsuperscript{25} Only through such a return...
can we evaluate whether (1) our Judaism indeed results from anti-Semitic construction and (2) whether our continued study of philosophy results simply from the missed realization of that life.26 It is my contention that Améry’s final text, in At The Mind’s Limits, negatively supplies the fragments for his readers to re-collect. The purpose of the present study is not to determine this remarkable essay; rather, it is to highlight and explore the moments therein where philosophy and Judaism make a forceful return by way of negation. It is to begin to force us, as readers, to confront and take up what is precisely renounced by Améry at every turn in his essay. It is, finally, to place readers under duress. Or better, it is to show readers that Améry’s duress is (in a different way) our own. If the narrative style I adopt is, thus, fragmented—if the notes dealing with philosophy and Jewish thought provide little in the manner of context—this is because Améry’s text describes and registers the complete collapse of context with respect to philosophy and Judaism; the other side to Améry’s forcing a re-collection is the fragmentation of explanation about the fragments that are in need of re-collection. The present study, therefore, registers the shattered character made manifest in a close reading of Améry’s essay.

The Essay’s Title and ‘Being a Jew (Jude zu sein)’

For decades, English-language readers of Améry’s collection have been treated to an elegant final essay entitled “On The Necessity and Impossibility of Being a Jew.” Its logical symmetry alone raises important questions of a general nature about the difficulties of being Jewish after Auschwitz (or, perhaps, even after after-Auschwitz). It would indeed be difficult to improve on the refined quality of the translation. We can only note that, as a translation, it obscures more than it makes clear about Améry’s essay—especially concerning our present purposes. Differently stated, translating the title as “necessity” situates the essay in the very philosophical terrain that ultimately needs to be recovered. For Améry does not have in mind the “Notwendigkeit” that refers, above all else, to Heidegger.27 Still less is he referring to the borrowed Latinate “Necessität” that, despite the twists and turns of multiple translations, is ultimately indexed to the two main sub-definitions of ‘necessity’ (understood as what cannot be otherwise) in Aristotle—i.e., “that without which a joint cause of a thing cannot live” and “[t]hose without which the good cannot be or come to be, or those without which we cannot get rid of or be deprived of the evil”.28 Only the third sub-definition expresses Améry’s intent: “[t]he compulsory, or force”29—and this is exactly why he uses the word Zwang (i.e., forced compulsion, coercion, constraint). In order to better express the distance between Améry’s conception, on one hand, and the philosophical horizon that the other definitions inhabit, I translate Zwang (following Pierre Joris’s translation of Celan) as ‘duress’.30 What my rendering lacks in elegance as “On the Duress and Impossibility of Being a Jew” (hereafter, “Duress”), I
hope it makes up for it by capturing the forced and forcing quality of Améry’s text.

Despite the fact that Améry’s text is deeply beholden to Anti-Semite and Jew, Améry remarkably begins “Duress” with a repudiation of a crucial Sartrean tenet late in that book—i.e., “In effect, the Jew is to another Jew the only man with whom he can say ‘we’.”31 “Not seldom,” Améry writes, “when in conversation my partner draws me into a plural—that is, as soon as he includes my person in whatever connection and says to me: ‘We Jews...’—I feel a not exactly tormenting, but nonetheless deep-seated discomfort.”32 Améry’s discomfort is not the result of Jewish ‘self-hatred’—that is, of not wanting to be Jewish; rather, he says, he cannot be one. At the same time, he is forced to be one by society: “And I do not merely submit to this duress (Zwang), but expressly claim it as part of my person. The duress (Zwang) and impossibility of being a Jew, that is what causes me indistinct pain.”33 Rather than disclosing solidarity (even in an ‘inauthentic’ sense), the plural nominative sets Améry apart from his co-religionists. That he is forced into identity with them by German society (and, as Améry claims, the entire world) does not change the negative affective charge (i.e., deep-seated discomfort, indistinct pain) that Améry experiences over the concrete instantiation of Sartre’s claim.

What, for Améry, does it mean to ‘be a Jew’? From the outset, we learn that it requires neither religious identity nor cultural heritage associated with the Jewish religion: “I don’t believe in the God of Israel. I know very little about Jewish culture. I see myself as a boy at Christmas, plodding through a snow-covered village to midnight mass; I don’t see myself in a synagogue. I hear myself appealing to Jesus, Mary, and Joseph when a minor household misfortune occurred; I hear no adjuration of the Lord in Hebrew.”34 Still less does it spring from the freedom that Sartre bestows on Jews: “Jewish authenticity consists in choosing oneself as a Jew—that is, in realizing one’s Jewish condition . . . He chooses his brothers and peers.”35 Améry’s response: “[D]o I really have [the freedom to choose]? I don’t believe so . . . One can re-establish the link with a tradition that one has lost, but one cannot freely invent it for oneself, that is the problem. Since I was not a Jew, I am not one; and since I am not one, I won’t be able to become one.”36 In good Aristotelian fashion, Améry indicates the temporal causality leading to the creation and transmission of religion. Lacking the necessary causes for such creation and transmission, one lacks the requirements for Judaism to come into being in a person.37 Or, in language at once more Hegelian, more Nietzschean, and more Freudian, Améry holds that “To be who one is by becoming the person one should be and wants to be: for me this dialectical process of self-realization is obstructed. Because being something, not as metaphysical essence, but as simple summation of one’s early experience, absolutely has priority. Everyone must be who he was in the first years of
his life, even if later these were buried under. No one can become what he cannot find in his memories.”

If Améry, therefore, is neither the (inauthentic) Jew who (passively) speaks in the plural nominative, nor the (authentic) Jew who chooses his Jewishness, what kind of Jew is he? He is a Jew by virtue of his being forced to be one. Although this only emerges in its full extremity in the Nuremberg Laws, Améry prefigures this scene for us when he speaks of the reactions his neighbors had to his mixed family background. ‘Being a Jew’, for Améry, is a condition one finds oneself in as a result of duress. We have little wonder, therefore, over his explanation for his essay: “It is with this duress (Zwang), this impossibility, this oppression, this inability that I must deal here, and in doing so I can only hope, without certainty, that my individual story is exemplary enough also to reach those who neither are nor have to be Jews.” Put differently, while ‘being a Jew’ cannot be positively grasped without having been through the camps, it can be approached negatively (i.e., ‘without certainty,’ only to be ‘reached’). As indicated earlier, this amounts (intentionally or not) to an instance of the Adornean methodological ban on images. This, however, in no way prevents us from recognizing the distance between Améry’s narrative path and our own.

At moments, Améry’s negativity seems to risk throwing him into doubt about his own narrative identity:

Thus I am not permitted to be a Jew. But since all the same I must be one and since this compulsion excludes the possibilities that might allow me to be something other than a Jew, can I not find myself at all? . . . Since the duress (Zwang) exists—and how compelling it is!—perhaps the impossibility can be resolved. After all, one wants to live without hiding, as I did when I was in the underground, and without dissolving into the abstract. A human being? Certainly, who would not want to be one. But you are a human being only if you are a German, a Frenchman, a Christian, a member of whatever identifiable social group. I must be a Jew and will be one, with or without religion, within or outside a tradition.

‘Being a Jew’, therefore, is an individual—perhaps radically singular—experience. It depends on no tradition or social group. And it is far more concrete than the thrownness of which Heidegger speaks insofar as it involves being forced into a situation by others. Given Améry’s strong identification with French culture despite his not ‘being French’, one cannot help but recall (via juxtaposition) a French thinker who (when not narrating about a country foreign to his own) wrote elegantly about the relation of individuals to collectives: “Our fathers did not have the word individualism, which we have forged for our own use, because in their day there was no such thing as an individual who did not belong to a group and could see himself as standing absolutely alone.” In one respect, therefore, ‘being a
Jew’ is a fundamentally modern phenomenon. However, as described centuries earlier by a Jewish poet living in Spain, it is also the condition of the philosopher.43

At any rate, the full awareness of his being a Jew under duress begins in 1935:

I was sitting over a newspaper in a Vienna coffeehouse and was studying the Nuremberg Laws, which had just been enacted across the border in Germany. I needed only to skim them and already I could perceive that they applied to me. Society concretized in the National Socialist German state, which the world recognized absolutely as the legitimate representative of the German people, had just made me formally and beyond any question a Jew, or rather it had given a new dimension to what I had already known earlier, but which at the time was of no great consequence to me, namely, that I was a Jew . . . I am sure certain that in that year, at that moment when I read the Laws, I did indeed already hear the death threat—better, the death sentence—and certainly no special sensitivity toward history was required for that.44

The condition of ‘being a Jew’ needed no special attunement to history,45 no metamorphosis in outward appearance: “After I had read the Nuremberg Laws, I was no more Jewish than half an hour before.”46 All it required was that society, hitherto largely uninterested in Améry, openly and uniformly deem him to be a Jew. It required that the famous Sartrean dictum be actualized—the anti-Semites had finally invented the Jew.47

The consequences of this invention are, for Améry, clear and striking: “To be a Jew, that meant for me, from this moment on, to be a dead man on leave, someone to be murdered, who only by chance was not yet where he properly belonged; and so it has remained, in many variations, in various degrees of intensity, until today.”48 We should note that the extreme character of ‘being a Jew’ is due, in large measure, to the classical determination of ‘chance’ as given by Aristotle—i.e., a coming-together of indefinite causes that produce a certain result.49 ‘Being a Jew’ thus entails an enforced societal individualization, the death of which is primary, and the living of which is accidental. Yet even the fear of death was not, for Améry, the most extreme character of ‘being a Jew’. Rather, it was the process of degradation and the concomitant loss of dignity occurring as both its most immediate and long-ranging effect that discloses the ultimate horror of this condition.

Degradation and Dignity

Beginning his discussion of the degradation of Jews, Améry fully acknowledges both his own debt to Sartre and the limitations of that debt:
“Jean-Paul Sartre, already in 1946 in his book *Anti-Semite and Jew*, offered a few perceptions that are still valid today. There is no ‘Jewish Problem,’ he said, only a problem of anti-Semitism; the anti-Semite forced the Jew into a situation in which he permitted his enemy to stamp him with a self-image. Both points appear to me to be unassailable. But . . . Sartre could not describe the total, crushing pressure (*Pression*) of anti-Semitism . . . [nor could he] comprehend it in its entire overwhelming might (*Kraft*) . . . [I]n the years of the Third Reich the Jew stood with his back to the wall, and it too was hostile. There was no way out . . . All of Germany—but what am I saying!—the whole world nodded its head in approval of the undertaking.”

Notable in this passage are two moments: First, while Sartre grasps the dialectical relation between anti-Semite and Jew (i.e., that the Jew exists because the anti-Semite invents him), he fails to fully appreciate the extent to which the anti-Semitic character of Germany—with the tacit or explicit approval of the rest of the world—robbed the Jew of precisely the freedom that would allow Sartre to state that “[t]he moment [the Jew] ceases to be passive, he takes away all power and all virulence from anti-Semitism.” While Améry will eventually grant a certain moderate amount of such freedom in his discussion of revolt, it remains the case that such freedom amounted to impotence in the face of the Third Reich. Second, Améry’s image of the Jew “standing with his back to the wall” cannot help but remind us (in the context of the present study) of Plato’s parable of the Cave. This reminder, however, explicitly takes the form of a negative movement: In the Cave parable, the cave-dwellers innocently walk along the wall and see shadows until they are (mysteriously) freed to make an ascent (however difficult it may be) to light. In sharp contrast, a cosmopolitan and en-light-en ed society descends into one of the darkest periods of world history in which the Jews are (at best) restrained, (more often) menaced, and with the ultimate aim being to show Jews that “our sole right, our sole duty, was to eliminate ourselves from the world (*uns selber aus der Welt zu schaffen*).” This is the near-logical conclusion to a process of daily indoctrination that held that Jews were “lazy, evil, ugly, capable only of misdeed, clever only to the extent that we pulled one over on others . . . Our hideous faces, depraved and spoilt by protruding ears and hanging noses, were disgusting to our fellow men, fellow citizens of yesterday. We were not worthy of love and thus also not of life.” Little wonder then, as Améry notes, that the suicide rate of Viennese Jews showed an increase. At the point where “the brightest and most upright Jewish minds, authentic or inauthentic, capitulated to Streicher’s anti-Semitic image of Jews in *Der Stürmer*,” Germany had become one large cave containing a “wall of rejection.”

Améry again stresses that there was a direct path from the Nuremberg Laws to the camps. The Nuremberg Laws, in spelling out the judgment against Jews, contained within it (in protean form) all the actualities of Auschwitz, Treblinka and Bergen-Belsen. And we again see the negation of
the classically construed ascent from darkness to light. In a context chronologically closer to Améry, one thinks (with some trepidation) of Schelling’s famous statement: “All birth is birth from darkness into light; the seed kernel must be sunk into the earth and die in the darkness so that the more beautiful shape of light may lift and unfold itself in the radiance of the sun.”58 Adorno supplies the speculative negation of this view: “No universal history leads from savagery to humanitarianism, but there is one leading from the slingshot to the megaton bomb.”59 Améry’s response is at once less general than Adorno’s and more saturated with negativity. For him, the descent into degradation leads to his attempt at “the reattainment of dignity.” This aim accompanies Améry for the rest of his life, is at the basis of his revolt against society, and (one assumes) lay unfulfilled for the rest of his life. It certainly lay unfulfilled at the writing of “Duress”: “For me, until today, this is not completed (ist . . . nicht abgeschlossen).”60 Primo Levi is not incorrect to hold that, for Améry, the concepts of identity and dignity “coincide.”61 Yet we also must not understate the importance of life as well:

If I was correct that the deprivation of dignity was nothing other than the potential deprivation of life, then dignity would have to be the right to live. If it was also correct when I said that the granting and depriving of dignity are acts of social agreement . . . so it would be senseless to argue against the social body that deprives us of our dignity with the claim that we do indeed ‘feel’ worthy . . . It is certainly true that dignity can only be bestowed by society . . . Still, the degraded person, threatened with death, is able—and here we break through the logic of the final sentencing—to convince society of his dignity by taking his fate upon himself and at the same time rising in revolt against it.62

If there exists a genuine and unhindered Sartrean moment of freedom in Améry, it is here. Améry’s statement coincides with Sartre’s view that “Jewish authenticity consists in choosing oneself as Jew—that is, in realizing one’s Jewish condition.”63 For Améry, this realization amounts to nothing less than taking the entire weight of National-Socialist degradation and world indifference and—in the language of Kierkegaard—concentrating it into “one act of consciousness.”64 This “act (Akt),” involves “the absolute (uneingeschränkte) recognition that the verdict of the social group is a given reality.”65 Were this act of consciousness to terminate in the simple acceptance of societal reality, however, Améry’s experience would more closely resemble Kierkegaard’s Knight of Infinite Resignation than what actually transpired—i.e., it would amount to the simple acceptance of fate; it would amount to “flee[ing] before [the death sentence] by withdrawing into interiority (Innerlichkeit) [and] would have been nothing but a disgrace.”66 In sharp contrast, and much like the Knight of Faith who irrationally gains the love of the woman who simultaneously rejects him, Améry’s act leads him in a direction equally as improbable. For he also understood that “while I
had to accept the verdict as such, I could compel (zwingen) the world to revise it. I accepted the judgment of the world, with the decision to overcome it through revolt.” At first, this revolt takes the form of joining the resistance. In the camps, however, it becomes at once more specific, more definitive, and more decisive: “I finally relearned what I and my kind often had forgotten and what was more crucial than the moral power to resist: to hit back.” Améry’s account is worth quoting at length:

Before me I see the prisoner foreman Juszek, a Polish professional criminal of horrifying vigor. In Auschwitz he once hit me in the face because of a trifle; that is how he was used to dealing with Jews under his command. At this moment—I felt it with piercing clarity—it was up to me to go a step further in my prolonged appeals case against society. In open revolt I struck Juszek in the face in turn. My human dignity lay in this punch to his jaw—and that it was woefully thrashed, meant nothing to me . . . there are situations in life in which our body is our entire I (Ich) and our entire fate. I was my body and nothing else . . . My body, when it tensed to strike was my physical and metaphysical dignity . . . As (als) the punch, I was myself—for myself and for my opponent.

The single act of consciousness—the acceptance of societal verdict—thus leads Améry to both the semi-concealed revolt of joining the resistance and the “open” revolt of striking Juszek. In striking him—in becoming the physical act—Améry discovers the long, slow, and never completed process of reattaining dignity. Améry notes that he “became a person not by subjectively appealing to my abstract humanity but by discovering myself within the given social reality as a revolting (revoltierender) Jew and by realizing myself as one.” Here, the existing English translation of “rebelling Jew” fails to do justice to the extremity of Améry’s situation as well as to the dialectical character of Améry’s Sartrean conception of revolt. If the reattainment of dignity through revolt consists both (1) in the recognition of the Jew in the image of Streicher’s characterization (and accepted by society) and (2) in the subsequent rising up against that image, then Améry can be a ‘Jew in revolt’ only insofar as he takes on the persona of a ‘revolting Jew.’ Bleak as this view may be, it is crucial to Améry’s point.

Unlike the Kierkegaardian Knight of Faith, Améry’s revolt has no fulfillment: “The ordeal (Prozeß), I said, went on and still goes on. At this hour (zur Stunde) I have neither won nor lost.” Anti-Semitism certainly did not end after the war, as Améry had imagined and hoped it would. Moreover, unlike the war years, the physical form of revolt dissipated:

I could not very well sew on a yellow star without appearing foolish or eccentric to myself. There also was no longer any opportunity to punch the enemy in his face, for he was not so easy to recognize anymore. The reattainment of dignity . . . remained a
need (Nötigung) and desire. Except that I had to recognize even more clearly than in the days when physical revolt was at least possible that I was confronted with duress (zwang) and impossibility.73

For Améry, the wound inflicted on him was now becoming more difficult to treat insofar as the infection was becoming more disparate. And this difficulty in no way involved his relation to anti-Semitism (which, in any case, was a problem only for the anti-Semites), but only his own existence.74 The question thus transforms from “How can I survive in the camps with dignity?” to something like “How can I persevere in the world?” Or, as Améry grimly muses, “Often I have asked myself whether one can live humanly in the tension between anxiety (Angst) and rage (Zorn).”75

**Living as ‘Being a Jew’**

Up to this point, readers may wonder why I have focused on re-collecting fragments of philosophy in Améry’s “Duress” rather than fragments of Jewish thought. Certainly Améry’s background, as well as his acceptance of the Sartrean construal of Judaism, makes any discussion of traditional Jewish sources difficult. However, there is one moment in his essay where Améry negatively compels the reader to re-collect almost the entire history of a central tenet of Jewish thought. It is to this moment that I now turn as a way of discussing the question of what living as ‘being a Jew’ means for Améry.

In returning to the question of the duress and impossibility of being a Jew, Améry makes a remarkable statement—one, to this day, worthy of shudder:

> On my left forearm I bear the Auschwitz number; it reads more briefly than the Pentateuch or the Talmud and yet provides more thorough information. It is also more binding than basic formulas of Jewish existence. If to myself and the world, including the religious and nationally minded Jews, who do not regard me as one of their own, I say: I am a Jew, then I mean by that those realities and possibilities that are summed up in the Auschwitz number.76

It is a harsh statement, to be sure. It is a revolting (again, in both senses of the term) assertion of a reality and authenticity born through horror, torture, and misery. But it is also more. We glean a sense of how much more, when we return to the Scriptural passage (Deuteronomy 6: 5-9) that the passage more or less explicitly renounces:

> Hear O Israel! The Lord is our God, the Lord alone. You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your might. Take to heart these instructions with which I
charge you this day. Impress them upon your children. Recite them when you stay at home and when you are away, when you lie down and when you get up. Bind them as a sign upon your hand and let them serve as a symbol on your forehead; inscribe them on the doorposts of your house and on your gates.77

I believe we should not err by over-valuing the first sentences of this passage (dealing with God) in relation to Améry’s text. As a non-believer, the question of God is a non-issue for him. Nor is personal belief in God the cornerstone of Judaism. Nor is personal belief in God the cornerstone of Judaism. It is, in fact, the other sentences in the passage that Améry’s text devastates. In holding that the number inscribed into his arm both provides more useful information than the Pentateuch or Talmud, and is more binding than basic formulas of Jewish existence, Améry is taking aim not simply at the connection between Judaism and divinity. Rather, he is calling into question Judaism as a transmissible tradition. The Deuteronomic passage—the central prayer in all Jewish services—speaks not only of ‘information’ to which Jews ought to adhere but also registers the need of, and highlights the modes of, handing down Judaism to future generations. The laying of tefillin (i.e., wearing of phylacteries) and the posting of mezuzot (parchments inscribed with traditional religious Jewish texts and attached inside a case) on the doors of houses bears witness to Judaism as a living tradition—one that responds by means of interpretation to the circumstances inhabited by Jews. We might consider only the most prominent examples of this: For the medieval Rabbinic commentators Rashi and Nahmanides, the inscription of Judaism, by means of the mezuzah, referred to the marking of a communal space for Judaism.78 Samson Raphael Hirsch (writing in the 19th century both in reaction to, but also as a product of Enlightenment liberalism), extends this reference to both public/communal and private/individual spaces.79 The rabbinic persona Abba bar Alihu (drawing on Proverbs 6:22) homiletically describes the mezuzah as a guardian of Jewish life.80 Finally, the Zohar interprets the Deuteronomic passage as being directly (if esoterically) indexed to the Ten Commandments—81—they therefore have a direct connection to the ethical, legal, and political roots upon which Jewish life becomes intelligible.

As a result of Améry’s experiences in the camps, culminating in the tattoo forced on him in Auschwitz, this entire constellation is negated. Améry, of course, does not claim that it is negated for all Jews. By bringing to our attention the extreme possibility present in the camps, however, we are compelled to wonder how we would fare in the camps. Améry’s negation calls into question even the efficacy of the very narrative of transmission undergirding the connection of the Written Law of the Torah with the Oral Law that would eventually come to constitute the Talmud.82 If one reflects on the foundational character of this transmission-narrative (i.e., for diasporic communities over the past two millennia), one glean the radicality of Améry’s otherwise laconic statement. The character of this
negation is, quite simply, inversion. Rather than the inscription guarding the Jewish people by reminding them of the Jewish law, the inscribed number in Auschwitz amounts to a reminder of the law of the camps requiring individual and collective servitude to the guard. In sharp contrast to the imperative to teach generations a series of commandments leading to an intelligible manner of living, the Auschwitz number inscribes a punishment (in similar fashion to Kafka’s “In the Penal Colony”) the intelligible character of which extends no farther than showing the prisoners that they are literally marked for death. And instead of transmitting a teaching to future generations in the manner of a vibrant and living tradition that activates both body and mind, the number singularizes one into a mute object—a passive recipient, a pin cushion. These, for Améry, are “the realities and possibilities that are summed up in the Auschwitz number.” They are at once more concrete and more delusional than “the basic formulas of Jewish existence.” Yet Améry has succeeded in helping us re-collect the very tradition that he has negated; he has not negated that tradition for us because we do not have the experience of the camps. Is this intentional? We are not told and, therefore, we cannot be sure. However, it is clear that, after a certain point in his life, Améry himself was at least somewhat aware of the tradition he negates. Why then is he not able to re-collect it for himself?

Here we return to issues of a more philosophical character. At this point, Améry concerns himself with the question as to how existence can or ought to be defined. “It does not matter,” he holds, “whether an existence can be positively defined”83. Already, then, we see that Améry’s inability to re-collect the Jewish tradition stems from his renunciation of a certain mode of definition. If a negative definition of existence is equally as good as a positive definition, then the entire tradition of Jewish thought is (in the language of Aristotle) accidental. Again we return to the Sartrean horizon (if with a small modification): “[E]ven if the others do not decide that I am a Jew . . . I am still a Jew by the mere fact that the world around me does not expressly designate me as a non-Jew. To be something can mean that one is not something else.”84 Despite the fact that Améry clearly accepts the Sartrean distinction by which existence precedes essence, he has—with the force of a lightning-bolt—negatively supplied us with the Aristotelian conception of ‘essence’: “things which are not said of other subjects I call ‘essential,’ but things which are said of other subjects I call ‘attributes.’”85 Following him, Maimonides articulates it in a manner of which Améry’s statement is a clear echo: “The characteristic by which one species may be recognized and differentiated from another and which constitutes its essence is called difference . . . It is fitting that we investigate in this manner every species until we know its constitutive difference.”86 In construing the condition of ‘being a Jew’ negatively — “as a non-non-Jew, I am a Jew”87 — Améry’s thinking remains indexed to the classical conception of essence as constitutive difference. But (as intimated earlier), if the essence of ‘being a Jew’ is contained in the definition ‘non-non-Jew’, this in no way supplies Améry
with any need to return (once again? for the first time?) to any positive determination of Judaism. In the end, Améry is left with a Judaism formed under duress:

[S]ince being a Jew not only means that I bear within me a catastrophe that occurred yesterday and cannot be ruled out for tomorrow, it is—beyond being a task (Aufgabe)—also fear. Every morning when I get up I can read the Auschwitz number on my forearm, something that touches the deepest and most closely intertwined roots of my existence; indeed, I am not sure if this is not my entire existence . . . every day anew I lose my trust in the world . . . The Jew without positive determinants, the catastrophe Jew, as we will unhesitatingly call him, must get along without trust in the world.”

With this, we have come full circle. Améry finds that the constitution of a plural nominative for the catastrophe Jew is problematic because it references no positive determinations: “With Jews as Jews, I share practically nothing.” In the end, Améry finds such constitution in the “solidarity in the face of threat . . . the solidarity of revolt”—i.e., the link that one catastrophe Jew shares with another based on shared horror, misery, and knowledge of the extreme possibilities contained in being a Jew: “I can be a Jew only in anxiety (Angst) and rage (Zorn), when—in order to attain dignity, anxiety transforms itself into rage.”

Conclusion

Remembering that we are neither children of the camps nor children of the assimilation (as it occurred in 19th and 20th century Germany), we are tempted to raise the paradoxical Adornoan question at the heart of what he calls ‘metaphysical experience’: “Can this be all?” Even Adorno acknowledges the inevitability of this question. Even if the expectation of an
answer to this question amounts to a “waiting in vain,” it nonetheless remains true that “nothing could be experienced as truly alive if something that transcends life were not promised also; no straining of the concepts leads beyond that. The transcendent is and it is not. We despair of what is, and our despair spreads to the transcendental ideas that used to call a halt to despair.”96 I believe that Améry’s “Duress” performs this dialectic of ‘transcendence’ as well as any text of the twentieth and twenty-first century. In showing (by way of negation) the extreme limit that faces both philosophy and Judaism, Améry’s text (in the manner of Spinoza’s *Ethics* and Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*) sends us right back to the beginning in order to re-collect those traditions for ourselves.

This is not to suggest that Améry promises redemption through this return—Améry’s texts hold no comfort for readers. His essays on the camps and their horrific aftermath sound the warning bell about the manner in which human dignity becomes lost and in which it may yet become lost again. Moreover, this extreme possibility evinces a notable indifference to political form and organization. Yet, in his radical negation of Judaism and philosophy, Améry succeeds in transmitting to his readers moments in both traditions—this despite or because of the growing historical distance from the Nazi catastrophe in which such readers find themselves. He certainly was unable to provide for himself that which was closed off to his own past—i.e., a transhistorical horizon in which he could find solace. But although one can only construe his own life as a species of hell, the urgent provocations contained in his writings may yet constitute for his posthumous readership—in however attenuated a way—something like a blessing.97

---


4 The English title (sans subtitle) is taken from the first essay in Améry’s 1966 volume. It bears little relation to the original German title: *Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne: Bewältigungsversuche eines Überwältigten* [Beyond Guilt and Atonement: Attempts to Come to Terms With by One Overcome]. *Traduttore tradittore*. The translation of Améry’s text is from 1980. It certainly served the purpose of introducing Améry to a large (and largely popular) English-speaking audience. It conveys the general sense of what Améry communicates quite adequately. That adequacy, however, does not hold for a philosophical interpretation of the texts contained therein. In order to heighten some of the nuances in Améry’s text—in particular, the final
essay—I will emend them without discussion. Discussions in the body of the text will be reserved for only the most significant changes. For the German of Améry’s text, I use Jean Améry, *Werke—Band 2: Jenseits von Schuld und Sühne, Unmeisterliche Wanderjahre, Örtlichkeiten*, ed., Gerhard Scheit (Stuttgart, Germany: Klett-Cotta, 2002).

5 AML, 92.
6 AML, 93.
7 AML, 96.
8 In this respect, my study takes, as its point of departure, Jacob Howland’s acknowledgement of the impossible character of Améry’s undertaking (see Jacob Howland, “Intellectuals at Auschwitz: Jean Améry and Primo Levi on the Mind and Its Limits,” *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, 29: 3 [Winter 2015], 369).
9 AML, 94.
10 AML, 12-15.
11 AML, 19.
12 AML, 20.
14 This statement requires qualification: In *If This Is A Man*, Levi considers the figure of the drowned in terms of the *Musselmänn*. Améry, in contrast, distances his inquiry from the *Musselmänn* in order to consider the effect that the camps had on those who were precisely not on the brink of death (AML: 9). Nonetheless, the descriptions that Améry provides of life in the camp and after compel readers to wonder whether those two could be distinguished with any level of precision.

As concerns Judaism—irrespective of one’s level of traditionality and observance, Stefan Zweig’s pages on 20th century Jews are disconcertingly accurate: “[T]he most tragic part of this Jewish tragedy of the twentieth-century was that those who were its victims could not see what the point of it was, and knew they were not to blame. When their ancestors had been cast out in medieval times, at least they had known what they were suffering for—their faith and their law” [Stefan Zweig, *The World Of Yesterday*, trans., Anthea Bell [Lincoln, NE: University Of Nebraska Press, 2009], 453]. Julia Kristeva’s account of abjection is also instructive in this context (Julia Kristeva, *Powers Of Horror: An Essay On Abjection*, trans., Leon S. Roudiez [New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1982], 2-15.
15 See Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, trans., Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 166-180. Agamben’s claim here is, of course, not that the biopolitical character of the West has literally encamped humanity. Nonetheless, the claim that the camp becomes the organizing principle or destiny of the West renders conceptually indistinct the situation in which Améry found himself and the ones we find ourselves today.
17 Readers might wish, at this point, to consult Jonathan Lear’s account (in Jonathan Lear, *Radical Hope: Ethics In The Face Of Cultural Devastation* [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006] of the following statement by Plenty Coups concerning the history of the Crow nation:
“[W]hen the buffalo went away the hearts of my people fell to the ground, and they could not life them up again. After this nothing happened” (2). Lear’s reflection: “We are trying to grasp an extreme possibility of human existence—in part so that we can grasp the scope and limits of human possibilities” (9-10); “[T]he crow have lost the concepts with which they would construct a narrative” (32); “This is how I interpret Plenty Coups’s witness: to a loss that is not itself a happening but is the breakdown of that in terms of which happenings occur” (38).


Cf., Sartre’s preface to Fanon’s *The Wretched Of The Earth*: “The contradiction of both claiming and renouncing the human condition is an explosive one” (Jean-Paul Sartre, *Colonialism and Neocolonialism*, trans., Azzedine Haddour, Steve Brewer and Terry McWilliams [New York, NY: Routledge, 2006], 164). While the term ‘revolt’ is justifiably more closely associated with the work of Albert Camus, I believe that Sartre clearly has this in mind when he deploys the language of claiming and renunciating one’s condition. It is also clear that Améry has Sartre in mind during his own discussions of being a Jew in revolt. Certainly Camus saw this figure as present in Sartre’s *Nausea* (Albert Camus, *Lyrical And Critical Essays*, ed., Philip Thody, trans., Ellen Conroy Kennedy [New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1970], 201-202).

The materialist longing to grasp the thing aims at the opposite: it is only in the absence of images that the full object could be conceived. Such absence concurs with the theological ban on images. Materialism brought that ban into secular form by not permitting Utopia to be positively pictured; this is the substance of its negativity” (ND: 207). See also Semprun: “They stand amazed before me, and suddenly in that terror-stricken gaze, I see myself—in their horror. For two years, I had lived without a face. No mirrors, in Buchenwald” (Jorge Semprun, *Literature or Life*, trans., Linda Coverdale [New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1997], 3).


“[Améry’s writings] dispense with any kind of literary stylization which might encourage a sense of complicity between the writer and his readers” (W.G. Sebald, *On The Natural History Of Destruction*, trans., Anthea Bell [New York, NY: Random House, 2003], 151; see also, 154, 156).


This gesture would constitute the opposite of (and opposition to) Kertész’s question “Can the Holocaust give rise to new values?” (Imre Kertész, *The Holocaust As Culture*, trans., Thomas Cooper [London, UK: Seagull Books, 2011], 77).

27 Needful (Not) indeed . . . is meditation on the drawing near of this destiny of philosophy.”; “All necessity (Notwendigkeit) is rooted in a need (Not).” (Martin Heidegger, *Contributions To Philosophy (Of The Event)*, trans., Richard Rojcewicz and Daniela Vallega-Neu [Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2012], 33, 37).


29 *Metaphysics*, 78 (1015a27).


31 ASJ, 101.

32 AML, 82.

33 AML, 82.

34 AML, 83. Ten years later, in a 1977 radio address (published as “Being a Jew: A Personal Account,” Améry will modify this claim slightly in holding that “everything connected with my origin was known to me. [My parents] concealed nothing from me, but things Jewish were not a topic of conversation.” (See Jean Améry, *Radical Humanism: Selected Essays*, trans., Sidney Rosenfeld and Stella Rosenfeld [Blomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1984], 12).

35 ASJ, 136-137.

36 AML, 83-84; my emphasis.


39 AML, 83.

40 AML, 82-83; my emphasis.

41 AML, 84.

42 Alexis de Tocqueville, *The Ancien Régime and the French Revolution*, trans., Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 91. Tocqueville does immediately go on to say that French society was made up of many such groups, all of which thought only of themselves. In this way, the mid-level social groups in France prepared later generations for the individualism known today.


72 AML, 92.
73 AML, 92.
74 AML, 92.
75 AML, 100.
76 AML, 94.
83 AML, 94.
84 AML, 94; my emphasis.
87 AML, 94.
88 AML, 94-95.
89 AML, 95.
90 AML, 97.
91 AML, 97.
92 AML, 98-9.
93 AML, 100.
94 AML, 100.
95 ND, 375.