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Martin Shuster


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Martin Shuster
Goucher College

As the contemporary nation state order continues to produce genocide and destruction,¹ and thereby refugees, and as the national and international landscape continues to see the existence of refugees as a political problem, Jean Améry’s 1966 essay “How Much Home Does a Person Need?” takes on a curious urgency. I say ‘curious’ because his own conclusions about the essay’s aims and accomplishments appear uncertain and oftentimes unclear (note how Améry himself surprisingly suggests that his remarks will have “little general validity” – a statement that will need to be properly situated).² My aim in what follows, then, is twofold. First, I intend to make clear the rich, suggestive, but perhaps underdeveloped phenomenological assumptions involved in this essay. Second, I want to show—but, unfortunately, only show—how these assumptions and Améry’s analysis points to a problem at the heart of contemporary conceptions of statehood, one which demands significantly more discussion.

Notions of ‘home’ and ‘homesickness’ have had a prominent place in philosophy, especially from Kant onwards, even more so in phenomenology.³ In many ways, it is obvious that Améry stands in this tradition with this essay, although he is not invoking (and indeed, despite his affinity for Sartre’s work, likely not familiar with) these debates in any detailed or scholarly fashion. His approach will be reflected in my own, where my aims will be to fill in some of the phenomenological details, but not to engage the various phenomenological debates in any robust fashion.

As mentioned, Améry takes himself to be writing in a sort of autobiographical mode of reportage, where “little general validity” is to be drawn from his account. This point, however, is immediately tempered by his suggestion that the homesickness (Heimweh) he is describing is “totally new and not determined by any conventional emotions recorded in literature” (H 50). It strikes me as most helpful to see Améry’s claim about ‘general validity’ as oriented around the thought that his remarks are not
meant to reveal something about what it means to be a refugee – his account is not pitched at that level of generality, for that would merely be an autobiographical account. Instead, Améry is concerned with a distinct sort of—according to him: radically new—homesickness, one that he certainly experienced, but one which requires a particular analysis. This is one way to understand why Améry’s account is not solely or merely autobiographical (hence my use of ‘sort of autobiographical’ above): it is a form of phenomenological analysis, where there is an important difference between “the object of knowledge and the act of knowing.” In other words, what interests Améry is not the psychological state of homesickness, but rather something like the ontological quality of homesickness: that human subjectivity becomes a certain way under certain conditions. These conditions themselves are historical—contingent—but the deformations of subjectivity that they engender are not; those will apply generally to all who undergo these conditions. Yet not all refugees do undergo these conditions, and thus Améry’s hedging about general applicability. This, at least, is the sort of inflection and stress I put on his claim that, “my, our homesickness was alienation (Selbstentfremdung) from the self” (H 43). What is the nature of this homesickness?

Homesickness: Self and World

Initially, it is easiest to answer this question by pointing out what is not homesickness. It is not the sort of homesickness one feels when one chooses exile from a country with which one presently disagrees. In such a case, this is still one’s country—one might return (H 42-43, see especially the joke about Remarque on 43). Similarly, it is no sort of self-pity or reminiscence or nostalgia (H 51), where one pines for the way things were (or even how one thinks they were). What Améry is after is none of these psychological phenomena, or indeed any other strictly psychological phenomenon. Instead, the sort of homesickness he describes revolves around losing one’s self (see especially the discussion of self-destruction and loss of self at H 51ff), a self that Améry implies depends on having a sense of temporality (H 44-45, 57, 58-59), a distinct and unique name (H 45), mastery of and within one’s own language (H 48, 52-53), and bodily stability and security (H 46).

The loss of self that Améry is referencing here is a loss of world. It is this unstated premise that deserves some discussion. First, it ought to be made clear how exactly ‘world’ and ‘self’ might be taken to hang together, to depend on one another. Second, it ought to be underscored how exactly when one loses the former, one loses the latter. Although both points have been made by philosophers as diverse as Davidson, Rorty, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein, neither point is immediately obvious (or at least it hasn’t been to a large swathe of philosophical interlocutors). Améry writes that:
Home is security (Sicherheit), I say. At home we are in full command of the dialectic of familiarity (kennen) and recognition (erkennen), of trust and confidence: since we are acquainted (kennen) with our surroundings, we recognize (erkennen) them, and they dare us to speak and act—we have justified confidence in our proficiency (Kenntnis) and insight (Erkenntnis) (H 47, translation modified).

Note how the orientation is thoroughly phenomenological, where the focus is on our practical engagement with the world as opposed to any theoretical understanding or knowledge of it (flag, then, the use of ‘kennen’ as opposed to ‘wissen’). One can compare this to the sort of conceptualizations of ‘being-in-the-world’ that Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty (and likely Husserl) pursued, where “the main areas of my body are devoted to actions, and participate in their value…but [also where] our body is not merely one expressive space among the rest…but is the origin of the rest…that which causes them to begin to exist as things.” In other words, we are fundamentally embodied creatures who exist—via our bodily existence and comportment—in a word of significance and salience, a world, one might say, of “affordances.” Home, on this view, and in the words of one commentator on Merleau-Ponty, is a “second body.” The body exists, allowing one the (a) world; it finds itself already always immersed and embedded in particular practical projects of “absorbed coping.” The home, then, taken in this expressive sense, is exactly a sort of second body, in that it allows one to pursue one’s projects, extending one’s lines of salience and one’s possibilities for action, giving them a necessary qualitative nexus of stability and, importantly, security. Take this passage from *Phenomenology of Perception*:

I arrive in a village for my holidays, happy to leave my work and my everyday surroundings. I settle in the village, and it becomes the centre of my life. The low level of the river, gathering in the maize crop or nutting are events for me. But if a friend comes to see me bringing news from Paris, or if the press and radio tell me that war threatens, I feel an exile in the village, shut off from real life, pushed far away from everything. Our body and our perception always summon us to take as the centre of the world that environment with which they present us. But this environment is not necessarily that of our own life. I can ‘be somewhere else’ while staying here, and if I am kept far away from what I love, I feel out of touch with real life.11

Améry’s focus is exactly on this feeling of being ‘out of touch.’

And this is why he describes various ways one might mitigate this (H 44). If one possesses religion, one might feel ‘at home’ in this way in a variety of ways: from seeing something divine everywhere to feeling the
presence of God with one to understanding that whatever one is currently experiencing is part of some divine plan (just to give some examples). Similarly, with money, one is able to purchase a sort of security and stability that one might otherwise not have, indeed, one might feel as if the whole world—all of its regions, no matter how broad spatially—are yours (for better and for worse, depending). With money, one doesn’t feel ‘out of touch,’ exactly because money gives one a surrogate touch, in the form of those one might hire, e.g., in the form of possible minions that extend one’s reach and one’s comfort, extend one’s home. The same is true, by differing but related mechanisms, of fame. And, yet, to all of these—as stories from the Nazi genocide (and others) persistently demonstrate—there are limits and exceptions. These are, at best, substitutes for home, for feeling ‘in touch,’ for safety.

Involved in this sense of safety is above all a bodily integrity (H 46), since that is the point of origin with respect to one’s being-in-the-world. One’s self—whatever else it might undertake or perform—requires a body already always involved in and thoroughly saturated by a variety of comportments, saliencies, and engagements. Essential to that self is a particular historical depth: one’s institutions, one’s projects, one’s innermost desires and concerns, all have a historical valence. History is here in the service of life, if that is understood as the idea of giving vivacity to one’s present bodily integrity by embodying it with a depth that reveals how these institutions, projects, desires, and aims are mine, mine to the extent that they allow me to pursue being me within them. They are thereby shown to be hospitable to me, welcoming my projects instead of rejecting them, indeed, ultimately welcoming me instead of rejecting me—safety instead of annihilation.

Homesickness: Language and World

Intimately bound up with this point about the ‘ontology’ of existence and one’s dependence on having a proper horizon and a proper being-in-the-world for one’s projects, is also a point about language. As Améry puts it, “every language is part of a total reality (Gesamtwirklichkeit) to which one must have a well-founded right of ownership if one is to enter the area of that language with a good conscience and confident step” (H 53-54). This point ought to be understood as point congruous with the sort of claims one finds in ordinary language philosophy, especially in the work of Wittgenstein and Austin, especially as the two have been inflected by Stanley Cavell. As Cavell explores in great depth, it just is the case that:

We learn and teach words in certain contexts, and then we are expected, and expect others, to be able to project them into further contexts. Nothing insures that this projection will take place (in particular, not the grasping of universals nor the grasping of books of
rules), just as nothing insures that we will make, and understand, the same projections.¹⁵

It just is the case that words and what they mean, what they fundamentally do, changes depending on the context(s) in which they operate. This is the significance of Améry’s elaboration of his encounter with the SS guard who originated from his regional locale. The inflections, the words, the manner of speaking, was, in a deep sense, Améry’s own. He and the guard shared a form of life at the most intimate level, and yet, because of the context, it forcefully strikes Améry that their words could no longer have the same traction they might otherwise have. Language, of course, is in part, about words, but it is also dependent on acknowledgment,¹⁶ on the complex background that allows those words to ‘work,’ on the material conditions of existence from moment to moment; in short, on others, for better and for worse. This is exactly why Austin speaks of a ‘linguistic phenomenology,’ all phenomenology carries a linguistic component, just as any linguistic operation betrays a phenomenology.¹⁷ Indeed, on this point, compare Améry’s claim that “every language is part of a total reality” to Austin’s own claim in How to Do Things With Words, that, “the total speech act in the total speech situation is the only actual phenomenon which, in the last resort, we are engaged in elucidating.”¹⁸

Améry’s point about homesickness is a point about what happens when this sense of home—as a phenomenological rootedness in the world, a rootedness that depends on all of the complex routes of salience and action that make up an individual within a particular world—is destroyed or destabilized or shrunken (H52). As he strikingly puts it:

Faces, gestures, clothes, houses, words (even if I halfway understood them) were sensory reality, but not interpretable signs. There was no order for me in this world. Was the smile of the police official who checked our papers good-natured, indifferent, or mocking? Was his deep voice resentful or full of goodwill? I didn’t know. Did the old bearded Jew, whose gurgling sounds I nevertheless grasped as sentences, mean it well with us or did he hate us, because by our mere presence on the streets of the city we incited against him the native population, which was already tired of foreigners, afflicted by economic troubles and therefore tending toward antisemitism? I staggered through a world whose signs remained as inscrutable to me as Etruscan script. Unlike the tourist, however, for whom such things may be piquant form of alienation, I was dependent on this world full of riddles. The man with square skull, the police agent with the resentful voice, the gurgling Jew were my lords and masters. At times I felt more vulnerable before them than before the SS man at home, because of him I had at least known with certainty that he was stupid and mean and that he was after my life (H47).
What’s remarkable about these thoughts is that Améry cuts to the core of the homesickness that interests him, and it is not a homesickness that depends on anything like hatred or violence (although, of course, it by no means excludes such things); instead, the homesickness he describes reveals how one’s world becomes impoverished of routes of salience and action. With such a reduction in the qualitative richness, and thereby the possibilities, that make up a world, one finds a concomitant reduction in the richness of one’s self.

Heidegger describes an entirely analogous phenomenon in his 1929/1930 lecture courses, when he speaks of a sort of boredom engendered in modernity, where “the beings that surround us offer us no further possibility of acting and no further possibility of our doing anything.” Earlier in his lectures, Heidegger had noted that in such an experience of boredom, “the whole situation and we ourselves as this individual subject are thereby indifferent; indeed this boredom does not even let it get to the point where such things are of any particular worth...instead it makes everything of equally great and equally little worth.” In turn, this phenomenological experience is entirely analogous to the sort of uncanniness (Unheimlichkeit) that Heidegger had earlier described in Being and Time with the experience of ‘angst,’ where we are ‘fetched’ out of our “entangled absorption in the ‘world,’” where our “everyday familiarity” has collapsed.

Améry’s remarks about temporality ought to be understood in this same phenomenological register. Because any particular, present ordinary familiarity depends on a certain temporal depth, where one’s projects are qualitatively located within a broader web of significance that anchors the present to the past, the sort of (forced) exile that Améry describes robs one of such depth. As he puts it: “I had no passport, and no past, no money, and no history. There was only a line of ancestors, but it consisted of sad landless knights, stricken by an anathema. In addition, they had been subsequently deprived of their right of residence, and I had to take their ghosts along into exile” (H 44). Of course, Améry is not unaware of the possibility of immigration, of what “is called finding a new home” (H 47). He is not minimizing the possibilities of the/a future. He is, however, noting difficulties in relying on the future as a means for minimizing the phenomenological destruction and alienation that exile breeds. He notes that even in the case of such a new home, unless one is exiled as a child (in which case one’s ‘world’ is, in many ways, not yet entirely or thoroughly one’s own—not yet formed), “penetrating the [new or unfamiliar] signs will be not a spontaneous but rather an intellectual act, one combined with a certain expenditure of mental effort” (H 48, emphasis added). In this way, no matter what one’s comfort or familiarity, indeed even one’s absorption in the land to which one is exiled, one will lack a certain qualitative sense of security. As Améry puts it, “just as one learns one’s mother tongue without knowing
grammar, one experiences one’s native surroundings. *Mother tongue and native world grow with us, grow into us, and thus become the familiarity that guarantees us security*” (H 48, emphasis added).

The extent and nature of this insecurity is entirely proportional to the extent and nature of one’s future possibilities (H 58f). This is how to take Améry’s remark, as he describes sitting in a deportation train, that, “for even if I was not a decipherable past and present, at least I was a future: perhaps a man who will kill an SS General, perhaps a worked in New York, a settler in Australia, an author in Paris writing in French, the clochard on the Seine quay having a good time with his bottle of rotgut” (H58). (Note incidentally the extent to which the equation between self and world is inadvertently stressed in Améry’s remarks: he was not a decipherable past, not that he ‘did not have’ a decipherable past). Améry’s ultimate insight about any futural temporality, however, is that “the credit of the person who is aging depletes” and “his horizon presses in on him, his tomorrow and day-after-tomorrow have no vigor (Kraft) and no certainty (Gewißheit)” (H 58). This should not be surprising, for even with the possibility of a future, it just is the case that any such future depends on a present that is itself available only in virtue of a (particular) past. In such a case, the scars of exile are omnipresent even if they fade; they leave their mark in the form of lacunae, holes of absence and regret, lines of instability, and routes of limitation, emptiness, and dead-end. As Améry puts it, in this deeper sense, “there is no ‘new home’ … whoever has lost it [a homeland] remains lost himself, even if he has learned not to stumble about in the foreign country as if he were drunk, but rather to tread the ground with some fearlessness” (H 48, emphasis added).

This analysis about the impossibility of a novel home might strike one as difficult to endorse. After all, don’t immigrants consistently make new homes? Indeed, homes which are built on the tail end of the worst possible human atrocities and calamities? I do not know how to adjudicate the soundness of Améry’s remarks on this point. They likely strike one as plausible, or they simply do not: one either feels—no matter how adjusted and comfortable a refugee might become—that the world of the refugee qualitatively possesses an irredeemable hole that perpetually undermines, at least to some extent, any potential project, any future. There just is the sadness and the loss that comes with creation of such a new home, in a new place. This is what Améry means when he talks about dying “without a past,” where an essential element of who one is, in Améry’s words, is ‘repudiated’ (widerrufen), simply canceled (H 60). In this vein, the soundness of Améry’s claims ought to be weighed by a consideration of his—and, in fact, any person’s—particular experience of exile and thereby particular standpoint.
Conclusion

Putting the stress on the phenomenology of Améry’s account brings into focus another issue that otherwise remains, at best, somewhat mysterious, and, at worst, entirely embarrassing: Améry’s invocation of and steadfast attachment to the importance of a ‘fatherland’ (Vaterland). Indeed, it is exactly because Améry’s approach is phenomenological, and because the phenomenological experience in question is not solely restricted to ‘exile’ and ‘homesickness,’ but trades also on the experience of loneliness and loss of sense, that it becomes apparent how Améry’s analysis rests on a deeper understanding of home than has been so far suggested. Améry strikingly writes that, “home ceases to be home as soon as it is not at the same time also (sobald sie nicht zugleich auch) fatherland” (H 55). Of course, given his own experiences during the Nazi genocide, Améry is neither crass nor sensationalistic about this point: he rejects any extremist understanding of this notion in imperialistic terms (H 55) just as vigorously as he rejects any abandonment of this notion in favor of cosmopolitanism (H 55-56). How? And on what grounds?

Améry links the experience of “shelter in an autonomous social body representing an independent governmental entity” to the experience of a fatherland; in turn, the loss of such shelter instantiates homelessness (H 54). It is, then, something like this political notion that grounds his phenomenological analysis. Putting things in this way, suggests a powerful analogy to Hannah Arendt’s work. For Arendt, who is also engaged in a thoroughly phenomenological project, the possibility of the sort of being-in-the-world upon which Améry’s meditations on home and homesickness rest, depend upon human plurality. Such human plurality, in turn, suggests the notion of human rights. In other words, human plurality is a condition for the existence of a common world, which is itself a requirement for any person’s particular being-in-the-world. Améry’s invocation of a fatherland trades exactly on this point: on such a view, it just is the case that we need some political (legal) mechanism to guarantee our home (in the qualitatively rich, phenomenological sense outlined above). That, combined with his phenomenological reliance on the importance of a home, and the declared impossibility of ever gaining a ‘new’ one, leads Améry to link ‘homeland’ and ‘fatherland’ in this intimate fashion, with the latter denoting the alleged political essence of being-at-home—sociality—as ‘πατρίς’ (patris), fatherland, i.e., the origin of patriotism in the experience of being a compatriot. At the same time, it still is worth asking why this link ought to be drawn as tightly as Améry alleges? Especially, why is it the case that an individual cannot feel at home in new place, and thereby adopt a new fatherland? (Surely, this is a procedure that Améry—with his new adopted name—was only too intimately familiar with, for better and for worse…and so his own judgment in this essay, and, grimly, ultimate judgment later in life).
In response, Améry marshals two strands of argument, and they each point to a still unresolved problem in politics and political theory, a problem to which Arendt was especially sensitive and interested in. First, as seen already, Améry suggests that, because ‘being-at-home’ is anchored to a temporal past vivified by relations of recognition (relations that might be cancelled through exile), ‘being-at-home’ is never achieved in the same qualitatively rich fashion in a new locale. One is never again ‘at home,’ even when comfortable; the achievement always carries an intellectual demand that undermines its quality as home (H 48). Second, like Arendt, Améry appears to be convinced that such a phenomenological standing, such a being-at-home can only be guaranteed through rights that must be enforced by the structure of statehood. As Arendt points out, any legal invocation of ‘human rights’ as a guarantee both arising and flowing from the fact of human plurality remains entirely abstract. Rights are only ever actual when guaranteed to particular people, within particular contexts; they are never abstract. Arendt rightly notes that, man had hardly appeared as a completely emancipated, completely isolated being who carried his dignity within himself without reference to some larger encompassing order, when he disappeared again into a member of a people. From the beginning the paradox involved in the declaration of inalienable human rights was that it reckoned with an “abstract being who seemed to exist nowhere.”

Exactly because this problem persists to the present day, and exactly because we as yet have no mechanism for enforcing rights except within particular states, Améry’s analysis, intimately connected to this point about rights, remains timely. As Arendt clearly puts it, “the right to have rights, or the right of every individual to belong to humanity, should be guaranteed by humanity. It is by no means certain whether this is possible.” She continues, stressing that, “contrary to the best-intentioned humanitarian attempts to obtain new declarations of human rights from international organizations, it should be understood that this idea transcends the present sphere of international law which still operates in terms of reciprocal agreements and treaties between sovereign states; and, for the time being, a sphere that is above the nations does not exist.” Things have not changed, although technological advances may augur the possibility of alternative ways of organizing ourselves. Critically elaborating everything involved in this point requires understanding the complex relationship between modern conceptions of agency (autonomy) and modern conceptions of how the state both forms and guarantees such agency. This is a task that I cannot undertake here. I only want to conclude by stressing, as I have throughout, that there is a powerful phenomenology of home in Améry’s essay that leads us to these questions of agency and statehood.

2 Jean Améry, “How Much Home Does a Person Need?,” in *At the Mind’s Limits: Contemplations by a Survivor on Auschwitz and Its Realities* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), 42. Henceforth cited as H in the body of the text. Although not cited, I have consulted the German and modified the translation where necessary. See *Jenseits Von Schuld Und Sühne: Bewältigungsversuche Eines Überwältigten* (München: Szczesny Verlag, 1966).


5 This is one way to understand both the contemporary power and form of Ta-Nehisi Coates, *Between the World and Me* (New York: Spiegel & Grau, 2015).


13 There are, of course, various ways to inflect this point, take the point and how it plays out differently in thinkers as diverse as Hegel, Heidegger, Gadamer, and Rorty, just to name a few.


20. Ibid., 137.


28. There are strong connections here to Emmanuel Levinas’s work, for more on the Arendt and Levinas connection, see Anya Topolski, Arendt, Levinas and a Politics of Relationality (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015).


30. Ibid., 299. Emphasis added.

31. The theorist who has thought about this issue in detail recently is Jacqueline Stevens, States without Nations: Citizenship for Mortals (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011). Stevens account, however, still relies on states, and while the call for entirely open borders would likely mitigate the concerns Arendt outlines, it strikes me that it would not eliminate them. There is much more to be said on this point.