Is it possible to think a public space in such a way that its visitors would not be merely impelled to occupy it as a ready-made site, but would need to contribute to its invention or to countersign the project? This initial question would not seek to verify the adequation of a plan with its actualization, where the plan would precede its concrete layout. Attempts to assess whether the effect or use of a site correspond to or depart from a previous plan proceed from the notion that a site is a set of potentially interpretable encoded signs, which may be more or less competently deciphered. What happens, however, when at its inception, the very project of a public site puts into question access to a readable interiority? In other words, such a public project would be rethinking the conditions of address and reception, and beyond that, the function of the public space. Along with other disciplines or within its own field, architecture has challenged the seeming self-evidence of several of its axioms and effects, for example, architecture’s embodiment of a “metaphysics of presence and the present” (Grosz xiii), its anthropocentrism—Peter Eisenman says that “the notion of the human body as the source-authority of scale” has to be subverted (Chora L. Works 71)—and its relation “to objects and primarily to solids” (Grosz xxi). The extent to which many architects have sought of late to destabilize functionality in designs, “to transcend use” in Eisenman’s words (9), is indicative of a double reflection on space in general and on specific forms of inhabitation in particular. At stake would be, as Eliza-
beth Grosz argues, how to experience space as "the ongoing possibility of a different inhabitation" (9), a formulation that deemphasizes the primacy of the plan or the architectural blueprints, aptly invokes dynamism over stasis, and names becoming over being.

Two designs undertaken in Paris in the 1980s and 1990s (La Villette and the Parc André Citroën) have arguably made the wager of enacting a project which defies the presenting or representing of a prior conception, calling for the time of the not-yet (a question at the limit of temporality), or oddly figuring the non-representable or the non-place (a turn to another spatiality). The design of the master plan of the park at La Villette was awarded to the architect Bernard Tschumi in 1983 and completed in 1995. At Tschumi's invitation, Eisenman and Jacques Derrida were asked to work together on one of La Villette's gardens (Chora L Works 125). Independently of that project, Derrida wrote an essay on Tschumi's design, Point de Folie - Maintenant l'architecture, and in addition, his original collaboration with these architects was documented in Chora L Works. Unlike Tschumi's plan, which preceded theirs, Eisenman/Derrida's design was ultimately not laid out, but as we shall see, congruence between the two projects is nevertheless discernible, partly because Derrida's work has been a significant reference for Tschumi as well as for Eisenman. In addition, both architects have demonstrated an affinity for certain forms, such as the point grid structure, devised beforehand by Tschumi in London ("Joyce's Garden") and by Eisenman ("Cannaregio project") in Venice, which motivated Tschumi's invitation in the first place (Chora L Works 82-83).

Completed in 1993, the Parc André Citroën was designed by two teams, the landscape architect Gilles Clément being entrusted the north side of the park together with the architect Patrick Berger. In his writings on landscape and on this park in particular, Clément develops a thinking of space that relies on the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze (and Félix Guattari). Grosz has evaluated in her work the possibility of "the becoming-philosophy of architecture" being effected through "the becoming-architecture of philosophy" (64). It is a challenging task to which I hope to contribute in addressing the designs of La Villette and the Parc André Citroën. But in addition to unfolding an "adhesion"—Eisenman's word to describe his collaboration with Derrida (Chora L Works 111)—between Tschumi/Eisenman/Derrida, on the one hand, and Clément/Deleuze/Guattari, on the other, I also want to examine
points of convergence between Deleuze and Derrida, which explains why in my analysis, Tschumi's design can also be said to be in dialogue with Deleuze, and Clément's with Derrida. Thus, my essay is inscribed within the task of assessing the "nearly total affinity" (Derrida 2001), which also implies—since Derrida qualifies "total" with "nearly"—the "point of diffraction" (Lawlor 124), between Derrida and Deleuze. On the one hand, I contend that the architects who are linked here with these philosophers remarkably embody what defies representation, such as Deleuze's "becoming" or Derrida's "beyond being" (in Lawlor's formulation [136]). Furthermore, I examine the ways in which what has been gathered under the name "khôra" in Derrida and "rhizome" in Deleuze intersects and enables a different thought of the political. Both khôra and rhizome name places refractory to the proper, and both give place to another thinking of the time/space of the political. Both exceed all cosmologies, understood as discourses of origin and structure, and both are deployed in relation to writing. It is the "zone of proximity" (A Thousand Plateaus 273) of khôra and rhizome that will be under study. If "public space" primarily refers here to public parks—and parks have always presupposed a political and philosophical stance coextensive to them—it also points to a site where politics or the public state of affairs (perhaps also res publica) might take place otherwise. In that respect, both Tschumi and Clément are well aware of the legacy a landscape designer inherits today with a view of transforming it. Under the heading, "An Urban Park for the 21st Century," Tschumi objected in his competition document to Olmsted's 19th-century conception of a park excluding the city from its midst, and mimicking nature. "Against passive 'esthetic' parks of repose," Tschumi advocates instead "new urban parks based on cultural invention, education, and entertainment" (Tschumi 2000, 55). As for Clément, he interrogates the traditional attribution of the management of the land to the gardener, investigating biodiversity and the intervention of the visitor in a less controlled public space.

Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari have spoken of their collaboration, remarking for instance that "Since each of us was several, there was already quite a crowd" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 3). Collaboration already takes each and every one of the participants elsewhere than the place and time of the self-same and permanent Subject, but it only is one indication among others, a symptom that their thought does not operate from such a premise. In the working
sessions about La Villette, Peter Eisenman points out that each participant’s text already was “a text on a text” (Chora L. Works 33): Derrida’s Khôra addressing Plato’s Timaeus, and Eisenman’s taking up Derrida’s text on a text. Chora L. Works dismisses the notion of a textual commentary occasioned by an architectural project, in order to promote a more unusual process by which “the project’s only being” would be constituted by what Eisenman calls a “registration” of these former texts on texts within the project (33). When he adds that the structure of registration is “analogic,” however, has Eisenman not risked reintroducing the possibility of chronology and of at least a metonymic resemblance between texts and an architectural design? This question is addressed by Derrida in Point de Folie, in which he cautions against an understanding of Tschumi’s designs as a mere “analogical transposition or even an architectural application” of the language of deconstruction (15). Derrida resists that notion, which to him is at all events inapplicable, since “deconstructive strategies begin or end by destabilising exactly the structural principle of architecture (system, architectonics, structure, foundation, construction, etc.)” (15). Instead, he assesses Tschumi’s Folies of La Villette as “the obligatory route of deconstruction in one of its most intense, affirmative and necessary implementations” (15). In other words, as he also declares about the work of Eisenman, “if deconstruction means something or is at work somewhere, . . . it does not consist only in semantic analysis, discursive statements but does something . . . through that form of architecture” (Chora L. Works 105). In both cases, the affirmation in question is not only an analogical vocabulary, but a constructive process operating a difference within the very signs and forms of another discipline, here architecture.

If analogy remains part of the design of Eisenman/Derrida, it is therefore not to be understood as a mere transcription by the architect of the philosopher’s discourse. It is also provoked by their project of enacting a choric space in their assigned garden at La Villette. As Derrida remarks in his essay on Plato’s Timaeus, it is difficult to foreclose entirely the question of analogy when addressing Khôra. This failure to prevent it was anticipated by Plato, since analogy is in effect not avoided in Timaeus itself, even though khôra is also declared there to exceed and precede the opposition between the sensible and the intelligible, the proper and the figurative senses, etc., oppositions which anchor the resource of, and recourse to analogy. It is as though we did not have access to khôra in our language, so no mere interpretive
negligence contributes to inducing what Derrida calls “retrospective projections” or “teleological retrospections” (Derrida 1995, 93) in the discourse on khôra. Khôra is not; it is not like anything, it “anachronizes being” (94). Derrida shows that with a necessity so difficult to escape, the very discourse which attempts to comprehend or name khôra tends to fall back on markers which are anachronistic to it: figures like a mother, a nurse, etc, are examples of Khôra’s names found in Timaeus, and repeated by Plato’s interpreters (93). If it were possible to avoid that anachronism, one would need to think Khôra as “before before” (Chora L Works 35), that is to say, before any “before” can be opposed to an “after,” when these terms are not polarized, or are not yet. At least two discourses are shown by Derrida to be inadequate to khôra: one is ontology, and the other is the recourse (one, that would, however, tend to be “inevitable”) to tropology and anachronism. Derrida addresses both issues together when he considers another name given to Khôra in Timaeus, that of “receptacle” (Derrida 1995, 95). Khôra as receptacle receives without possessing, and strangely gives place without being affected by, owning, or having properly what takes place in it. On the one hand, khôra does not “give place by receiving” (95), but it “gives nothing,” either, “in giving place or in giving to think” (96). “Receiving” and “giving” are to be read beyond the logic of the gift or present, and that of the debt: “The expression to give place does not refer to the gesture of a donor-subject, the support or origin of something which would come to be given to someone” (100). Each of these terms (the donor-subject as origin; the place as gift to be deciphered and taken; the addressee in debt, receiving) is inadequate to what takes place without reappropriation in Khôra. Instead, khôra is the place of indifference and impassivity: “Khôra is not a subject...The hermeneutic types can inform, they can give form to khôra only to the extent that, inaccessible, impassive, ‘amorphous’ (amorph on, 51a) and still virgin, with a virginity that is radically rebellious against [rebelle à] anthropomorphism, it seems to receive these types and give place to them. But if Timaeus names it as receptacle (dekhomenon) or place (khôra), these names do not designate an essence” (Derrida 95). Khôra “gives place” from the position—which is not one—of a “non-place” (Chora L Works 34).

The Eisenman/Derrida project entails schematizing a process of “registration” of Derrida’s Khôra, by evincing in the project its very lack of representability. While Khôra as such cannot give place to an
architecture, since it defies the “as such,” they propose instead that “the non-representable space could give the receiver, the visitor, the possibility of thinking about architecture” (35). Something more or in excess of a project which remains non-totalizable (34) would signal and compel the visitor’s countersignature and the advent of another relation to time and space in and for the city. Put differently, this corresponds to what Derrida expounds as “maintenant” in his essay on Tschumi, Point de Folie. Left in French by the translator, “maintenant” refers to a maintenance in the architectural, but one that gives its due within the work to dislocation, “implement[s] it as such in the space of reassembly” (17), indicating as well the imminence, the promise of an event (5). In Chora L. Works, Derrida also suggests that what maintains architecture “has to do with the signature, with the promise” (111).

How is it concretely approached in the Eisenman/Derrida design? As a take on the “impossible surface” of Khôra (10), one of the proposals that prevailed consisted in constructing a structure that would “prohibit access to the surface,” but allow the visitor, through a basement, to discern the surface as if it were a negative (92). Eisenman states in that respect that glass “indexes an absence, a void in a solid wall. Thus glass in architecture is traditionally said to be both absence and presence” (187). In the design, the public having access to the level beneath, and being detoured thus from any other access to the garden, would “see the inverse of everything: the surface as a ceiling and all of the articulations, the solids and voids of the surface, in inverse” (91). Let’s note that this inversion or reversibility of features is also a characteristic of Tschumi’s design. This is the case with the Folies, which are recursive cubic structures of the same dimension regularly placed according to a point-grid system (Tschumi 2000, 57). Yet none of these structures is exactly the same, and their functional purpose is not predetermined. By superimposing to this point grid two other systems (lines and surfaces), Tschumi aimed to emphasize permutation and substitution over a homogeneous whole (Tschumi 1987, VII), while contesting the privilege of any organizing element (VI). In addition, if any “analogy” was enabling his project, Tschumi conceded that of film: “the world of the cinema was the first to introduce discontinuity—a segmented world in which each fragment maintains its own independence, thereby permitting a multiplicity of combinations (VI). This is why Tschumi also referred to his design at La Villette as “a series of cinegrams” (VI). In that respect, one of the dismissed
proposals of the Eisenman/Derrida project involved the recourse to photography or video on the site (48), while retaining at the end, as I have already mentioned, the notion of the “negative.” With his Park of cinegrams, Tschumi is also in proximity, though he never mentions it explicitly, to Deleuze’s work on the “movement-image,” summarized as “the acentered set of variable elements which act and react on each other” (Deleuze 1997, 217). In anticipation of our turn to Deleuze, let us note that with the movement-image, Deleuze, who compares great cinema directors to architects and thinkers (xiv), is at work, as he often is, on the middle by ascribing movement in cinema to the intermediate image (2).

In what sense can it be said that khôra provides another space of, and for the political in Derrida’s reading? To begin with, in Greek the common noun khora includes “the sense of political place or, more generally, of invested place” (Derrida 1995, 109). But Derrida addresses the other political dimension of the unplaceable place (111) by examining Socrates’ position as to place in Timaeus. First, Derrida shows that because he is the recipient, or, already in analogy with khôra as well as commanded by the discourse on khôra, the receptacle of the narratives of Critias and Timaeus, Socrates is ready to receive. On the one hand, Socrates privileges the “situation, the relation to place” and claims that “the absence of a proper place” prevents poets and sophists “from understanding these men who, being philosophers and politicians, have (a) place [ont lieu], that is, act by means of gesture and speech, in the city or at war” (107). But on the other hand, Socrates excludes himself from the group belonging to a proper place, that is to say, also from the political. He “operates from a sort of nonplace” but, as Derrida says, in order to say to the other: “You alone have place.... you have (a) place, have (a) place, come” (108). The ethical relation to the other is not only one of dislocation and dispossession of the self, but also the dislocation of the place as location. The non-place of Socrates signals that of khôra. Khôra gives thought to another site of politics and politics of places, it gives a hospitable place to the other: Have a place, come! Therefore, the non-representability or non-presentation of the “registration” of Khôra in La Villette must be understood in its political acuteness: the conditions for inhabiting this locus, and the locus itself, are to be invented, in a way which will go beyond debt and even beyond the reference to man’s centrality. At this point Derrida’s thought on democracy as the to-come, as a “non-
presentable concept” which belongs to the time of the promise (Derrida 1997, 339), can be articulated with that project. In Politics of Friendship, Derrida wonders whether part of the inheritance of “democracy” can be assumed in spite of, or against what has also in that name been restricted to the regime of the “proper”: “What still remains or resists in the deconstructed (or deconstructible) concept of democracy to orient us without end? To order us not only to start a deconstruction but to keep the old name? And still to deconstruct in the name of a democracy to come? . . . Would there still be in the concept of eudoxia (reputation, approbation, opinion, judgment), and in the concept of equality (equality of birth (isogonia) and equality of rights (isonomia)) a double motif which could, interpreted differently, withdraw democracy from autochtonic and homophyllic rootedness?” (Derrida 1997, 103-04). The withdrawal from rootedness can be learnt from Khôra, which is pre-conceptual, a place that is neither present nor ideal, and as such may open on to a possible politics, in which the position of the other is unpredictable and left undetermined.8

The Parc André Citroën opened to the public in September 1993. The park evidences a discontinuous interplay between a traditional reception of the landscape garden and another fundamentally different conception. The traditional reading is still possible in some parts of the park (such as the “orangerie” pavillons and canals reminiscent of the 17th century French formal garden), even though these traditions are already inflected and parodic. For instance, the hothouses occupy the dominant position formerly attributed to the mansion or palace, and are “inhabited” by plants, not humans, while the canals do not run along the axial lines of the formal model. Clément’s own contribution to the design of that park entailed devising what he calls a jardin en mouvement (“garden in movement”), which puts into question the prevision of the gardener by allowing the plants to grow of their own accord, and calls for an active irruption of the visitor, who is asked to contribute to the very appearance of the garden.9 Clément pinpoints what constitutes the specificity of this space by linking the public embrace of its potentialities with freedom: “Understood at first as a space of liberty, it is occupied as such, that is to say, freely, with all the questions that the use of a place whose rules are still unknown poses” (Clément 1994, 66). In effect, liberty would be called for, like an open invitation, by the very structure of the garden, which Clément defines as “a scenographic unfolding in time” (67).10 These two characteristics
of the garden in movement—an spatio-temporal development, and public liberty—entail that all speculations regarding the garden constantly need to be revised and never stabilize (67). This position is itself derived from Clément's understanding of the vegetal, as what exceeds prevision, especially as far as human management is concerned. In his projects of gardens in movement, Clément gives free rein to "the vagabond behavior" of plants when left unsupervised (Clément 1990, 64). In fallow land, for instance, vagabond plants do not keep to the space initially assigned to them; they migrate of their own accord. Guy Lecerf has pointed out the proximity of Clément's thinking of movement to that of another designer of the turn of the century, Gertrude Jekyll, who associated color with the dynamics of the garden (470). In her Colour Schemes for the Flower Garden, Jekyll discusses what she calls "vagrancy incidents" (134), which consist in the spontaneous appearance of unplanned seedlings. Whereas the traditional gardener would consider the occurrence of an unpremeditated plant to be undesirable, both Jekyll and Clément reappraise the notion of design as a preconceived space, and let vagrancy contribute to the (future) shape of the garden. Vagrancy or Clément's "movement," if it is not interfered with, entails that the landscape gets permanently modified. By focusing on phenomena like fallow land or floods, that is to say by privileging motion over stabilized form, Clément emphasizes that the garden in movement, and indeed landscape in general, "carries within it, at the moment when it is viewed, the disappearance of the forms that reveal it" (Clément 1995, 531). Deleuze and Guattari have linked movement with becoming, in the sense of constant process: "Movement becomes the process of absolute deterritorialization" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 282). Clément's garden in movement functions like a rhizomatic space: "[The rhizome] has neither beginning nor end, but always a middle (milieu) from which it grows and which it overspills" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 21).

Gilles Deleuze's writings take place in the middle of an interrogation of spatiality, or to put it more simply, they happen in "the middle." It is indeed a constant trait in Deleuze not only to read a thinker, as he does for instance in the case of Spinoza, "by way of the middle" (Deleuze 1988, 122), but what is more, to "install [him]self on this plane [of immanence]—which implies a mode of living, a way of life" (122). This plane is not given in advance, but must be constructed (123). Diagrammatics, rhizomatics, cartography, de- (or re-
territorialization, are markers which trace spatial and temporal lines. But these markers also involve the “ethological” relation of bodies to one another: “So an animal, a thing, is never separable from its relations with the world” (125). In that respect, François Zourabichvili notes that “The Deleuzian cogito is an ‘I inhabit”’ (73). In a dialogue with Claire Parnet, Deleuze recapitulates the “assemblages” that “we” (individuals, groups, socio-political fields) are: “we are made of lines” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 69). These lines are different and coextensive, they are “immanent, caught up in each other... entangled” (71), and rhizomatics, micropolitics, etc., would be names for the study of these lines. Assemblages are segmented by molarities and molecularities, and if at times he seems to oppose thereby “history” to becomings, the former enveloping a plane of organization/transcendence, and the latter a plane of consistence/immanence, Deleuze insists that “the two [are] working in each other... there is no dualism between the two planes” (86). In other words, for Deleuze, the point is to think the other of the molar in terms that would not be of opposition to it, because that moment would in fact duplicate the Same. The only way out of dualism, and indeed out of the counting and accounting of numbers, for multiplicity in Deleuze has nothing to do with numbers, consists in displacing dualism “when one discovers between the terms, whether two or more, a narrow pass like a border [bordure] or frontier which will make of the ensemble a multiplicity” (85).

Deleuze’s denunciation of dualism, or binary logic, or then again of the “One that becomes two” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 5), explains his approach to numbers, and especially his way of reading the triad. Since binaries do not escape a logic of duplication of the One or the Same, the number three looks like the desirable third interrupting that logic, but it does so only to the extent that the interruption does not constitute an alternative to dualism/the One, or a dialectical outcome, but ruins counting and accounting. For instance, in A Thousand Plateaus, writing or thought is deployed in three different ways: the root-book or the tree as the image of a cosmos with a center and unity; the fascicular root as the image of a chaosmos, of the world as chaos; and the rhizome as subterranean stems or bulbs and tubers, a book-rhizome as an assemblage with the world (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 5-6). Though apparently opposed, or because of their opposition, both the root-book and the fascicular root are said to belong to the
thought of the One. As for the rhizome, it neither contains nor counters prevailing arborescent logic. For one thing, it “contains lines of segmentarity according to which it is stratified, territorialized..., as well as lines of deterritorialization” (9). But it is also fleeing elsewhere, out of that logic. Therefore, when Deleuze mentions three lines—a molar line, a molecular line, and the line of flight (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 76ff)—, not only does his wavering as to the number of lines (93) emphasize his awareness of a possible relapse into dualism; it also enacts a way out of counting in order to think a numberless “multiplicity of dimensions, lines, and directions” (86). For Deleuze, the escape or way out is unexpected, unpredictable, it is what is called, among other names, a line of flight. It is unexpected because it is not, but becomes is not given, but has to be traced. Deleuze insists that the line of flight carries away (82), and that becoming is silent, happens elsewhere, behind the thinker’s back, “a third which always comes from elsewhere” (82).

Deleuze and Guattari have written on the rhizome, but they go further in claiming to write rhizomatically (Rhizome, A Thousand Plateaus). Writing, or the book, has a relation to the world, a relation which has been misconstrued as mimetic. Instead, for Deleuze and Guattari, “the book forms a rhizome with the world” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987,11), or the book is a becoming-world, in the specific sense that “becoming” has for them, that is, a becoming-with and not into something. Whether they talk about the rhizome or about becoming, Deleuze and Guattari insist on the relation of heterogeneities to the outside: “that which one becomes becomes no less than the one that becomes” (305). Writing is rhizomatic or a rhizome-book (23) and connects with the world to the extent that it is not an image of the world. Is the rhizome an other space, the space of the other? An assemblage, a rhizome is a system with several characteristics, which, however, defy representation, not because they are strictly speaking unrepresentable, but because they are not already given, or they are not, as Deleuze and Guattari suggest in the examples of the becoming-wasp of the orchid, and the becoming-orchid of the wasp. At stake in rhizomatic writing and immanence is another space, also for and of the political: Becomings, micro-becomings allow for “another politics, another time, another individuation” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 70). Not without danger, however, and more than one danger.
Deleuze and Guattari do not minimize the possible failure of the process or of becoming: “You may make a rupture, draw a line of flight, yet there is still a danger that you will reencounter organizations that restratify everything...from Oedipal resurgences to fascist concretions” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 9). The danger of rigid lines of segmentation is increased by the possibility of reterritorialization or crystallization, and this danger is often called “fascism” (precisely or loosely) by Deleuze and Guattari. The second line is not without danger either, that of entering a “black hole” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 97) from which no escape is possible. Moreover, the danger of the line of flight is the most acute since it is “inherent in any line that escapes, in any line of flight or creative deterritorialization: the danger of veering toward destruction, toward abolition” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 299), an abolition and destruction that also affect others (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 99). Therefore every line has its dangers, which are both accidental to, and part of the rhizome or assemblage of multiplicities. These formulations of the rhizome have to be taken together in their heterogeneity, a heterogeneity that prevents totalization: on the one hand, the attempt to think what is not already given, a space (that of politics, of writing, etc.) that would not reproduce the preexisting. And on the other hand, the danger, which is not, however, a failure of thinking the rhizome. In that respect, Deleuze insists that there is no prescription for averting danger or any recipe explaining how to face it successfully (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 108). At stake in the rhizome is where and how to “trace a line of flight or of deterritorialization which is at one with its own politics and its own strategy” (103). That line is not pretraced, but must be invented, experiments in socio-political fields must “baffle expectations” [déjouer les prévisions] (111).

At this juncture, an articulation, almost a translation, can be posited between Deleuze’s becoming (devenir) and Derrida’s to-come (à-venir), both happening in a time/space that would arrive as the unexpected, defeating the horizon of prevision. Both Derrida and Deleuze make an incisive distinction between the future and the time of the event, the latter being the temporality of “à-venir” or “devenir.” In Negotiations, for instance, Deleuze speaks of the difference between becoming and history (170): “What history grasps in an event is the way it’s actualized in particular circumstances; but the event in its becoming escapes history” (170). In that interview he also asserts (as
he also does in a dialogue with Claire Parnet) that “people’s revolutionary becoming” (171) has nothing to do with the future of the revolution. And this difference is what allows for a new type of revolution, or in other words, for the irruption of the new. Zourabichvili emphasizes that what interests Deleuze is to describe the temporality of that irruption or of the event as such, not the temporality of “the new situation or the new middle, but of the between-two-middles” (74). When he examines the implications of affirming becoming, Zourabichvili adds that the temporal mode of becoming can only be grasped “at the limit of the livable: it threatens the present and thereby the identity of the subject who affirms it. . . : the other excludes me, who will surge in my place” (75). This formulation will recall Derrida’s *arrivant*, “the coming of the other, the absolute and unpredictable singularity of the *arrivant*” of the other who “comes before me, before any present, thus before any past present, but also what, for that very reason, comes from the future [venir] or as future [venir]: as the very coming of the event” (Derrida 1994, 28). For Deleuze as well as for Derrida, “this affirmation of the future differs from any anticipation” (Zourabichvili 75), and no event would happen without this difference. Where Derrida underscores what in the promise is inseparable from the threat, Deleuze speaks of “coefficients of chance and danger” involved in lines, spaces, and becomings (Deleuze 1995, 34). Derrida and Deleuze certainly inflect differently, in their respective idiom, the unforeseeableness of the event, but in each case, its unfolding has a “concrete” impact, as Deleuze shows. Derrida’s urgent call for justice, for a “democracy to-come,” and Deleuze’s “ethology” —as he writes in his study on Spinoza, “no one knows ahead of time the affects one is capable of; it is a long affair of experimentation” (125)— are not only thoughts of another temporality but also of other topologies.

In a remarkable way, Clément’s garden in movement brings together the reflections of Deleuze and Derrida. As we have already mentioned, the very structure of Clément’s garden emphasizes becoming. The lack of stability and cohesiveness in the location is construed by Clément as “a fugitive encounter that illuminates a piece of time” (Clément 1990, 99). If the garden always differs from itself, it can also force the recognition of that self-difference in the onlooker, which makes familiarity with the space difficult for the visitor. In a sense, therefore, the park is still expected to elicit a response from the visitor, and much is expected from the disorientation that it will induce.
at first. Above all, Clément makes this response accidental, not essential to the landscape. In describing an ecosystem that can include human beings, but does also minimize man’s assumed centrality, Clément talks of a space which is indifferent to man’s gaze, and which can live on autonomously, not only without man, but also after him. Thus, Clément’s garden in movement also prevents an autochtonic reading of the space of the garden. The public park is not construed as an exclusive place, or a place of exclusion. The garden refutes modes of appropriation and functions instead in the way Jacques Derrida has analyzed in his reading of khôra, as a non-place, impassive, amorphous, which, however, gives place. By insisting on the undeterminable movement of the garden, Clément points to another ethics of inhabiting space, one that remains unplanned and left open to possibilities. This reflection determines in turn a political relation that Clément derives from “the ethical field” of landscape (Clément 2004, 28). Writing in the form of a manifesto in favor of “the Third-Landscape,” in explicit reference to Emmanuel Sieyès’s revolutionary demands in What is the Third-Estate? (13), Clément delineates a space which metonymically represents neither power nor submission. The Third-Landscape structurally designates what is at process in fallow land, or in what he also calls abandoned land (“de/aiss!”), in “reserves,” which are subtracted from an anthropic territory, in sum wherever human decision is withdrawn, bringing out “the undecided mode of the Third-Landscape” (9). As far as plants are concerned, the Third-Landscape constitutes both a refuge and “the location of possible invention” (30). In his elaboration of gardens in movement, Clément was already attentive to the possibility of unprogrammed biological invention, happening (or not) by chance encounters. In this essay, he explicitly draws the political and ethical consequences of inhabiting such a space. First, the stakes of the Third-Landscape are not territorial (27). The determination of form is left open, as much as the relation to time. The Third-Landscape can be planned, but remains unpredictable in time (49), a formulation which may recall Eisenman’s and Derrida’s interpretation of La Villette, where the model remains short of the mode of reading and inhabiting the location. Likewise for Clément, the user of the Third-Landscape cannot be anticipated through an institution (architects, politicians, and others). Rather, that space includes, as he aptly notes, “reserves and questions” (61). In that sense, the Third-Landscape indicates an ethical position that can be
generalized beyond it (and in fact, Clément often posits a planetary scope for *le délaisé* [for instance, 25]): the absence of program also gives rise to chances of existence (50), incalculable biological invention nourishes becoming (56), while undecided space also promotes a non-appropriable “common space of the future” (63).

If landscape architects have been “receptive” to the thought of Derrida and Deleuze, it is because both think time/space in a way which does not sidestep what Derrida names “unconditional hospitality” (Derrida 2000, 147), involving “giving place to a concrete politics and ethics” (149). Not only is the temporality and form of the place interrogated by landscape designers in the light of Derrida's khôra or Deleuze's rhizome. The discrepancy between what remains unconditional in hospitality and its actualized conditions (or lack thereof) also triggers an ethical reflection in which public places perform a crucial role. Without foreclosed modes of inhabiting them, with an emphasis on process and non-totalization, public parks indeed provide, for more reasons than one, a breath of fresh air within the city.

*University of Florida*

**Notes**

1 In *Chora L. Works*, the architect Peter Eisenman gives an example of suspended interiority: “I once did a house with a room that you could look into but that you could never enter; you could feel its presence in every other room of the house. This had the effect of always making one feel outside of the house, because the ultimate interior was inaccessible” (34).

2 The visitor’s “reception” of such a possibility in architecture depends first on defamiliarization, which is likely to trigger the invention of new modes of inhabitation. One example of that process can be found in Bernard Tschumi’s notes on his design of the Parc de La Villette: “Exploding programmatic requirements throughout the site onto a regular grid of points of intensity (a mark, a trace). Hence the different types of activities are first isolated and then distributed on the site, often encouraging the combination of apparently incompatible activities (the running track passes through the piano-bar inside the tropical greenhouse)” (Tschumi 1987, 4).

3 Leonard Lawlor’s *Thinking through French Philosophy* (especially chapter 8), and Paul Patton and John Protevi’s edited volume, *Between Deleuze and Derrida*, are examples of such an undertaking. In *Architecture from the Outside*, Elizabeth Grosz investigates each philosopher’s contribution to “think[ing] architecture differently” (59), with more emphasis, however, on Deleuze (see
in particular chapters 4 and 6), whose relation to architecture must be inferred, since unlike Derrida, he did not directly participate in any architectural project.

4 In *Deleuze and the Political*, Paul Patton also argues that there is “a strange proximity” between Deleuze and Derrida (15). Elsewhere, Tamsin Lorraine explores “a line of flight between the two [Deleuze and Derrida]” (Patton and Protevi 31). It is probably not accidental that when a link is made between the two corpuses, it so often relies, at least initially, on a Deleuzean idiom (zone of proximity, line of flight), to address what brings them together and divides them at the same time. What Lorraine (31) immediately invokes as a difference of reticence with regard to ontology on the part of Deleuze (less reticent) and Derrida (more reticent) may partly explain why Deleuzean concepts more readily suggest themselves when assembling the two. Certainly, Derrida’s “quasi” concepts relating to time/space, such as *difference* and *trace*, are thought “without presence,” thus withdrawing themselves from the possibility of re-presentation. However, with *becoming* and *rhizome*, for instance, Deleuze complicates, to say the least, the notion of a *representable* topography.

5 Quotations from *Khôra* are taken from the English translation of that text in Derrida’s *On the Name*, and not from the different translation found in *Chora L Works*. The citations from *Chora L Works* refer to the transcripts of the meetings between Eisenman, Derrida, and others.

6 See Plato’s *Timaeus* on Khôra: “but now the argument compels us to try to describe in words a form that is difficult and obscure” (49a); “but we shall not be wrong if we describe it as invisible and formless, all-embracing, possessed in a most puzzling way of intelligibility, yet very hard to grasp” (51b); “third, space… which is apprehended without the senses by a sort of spurious reasoning and so is hard to believe in—we look at it indeed in a kind of dream” (52b). See Derrida’s commentary (Derrida 1995, 90).

7 Deleuze’s statement, “More important than thought, there is ‘what gives to think’” (Deleuze 1972, 161), performs a reflection related to Derrida’s on “giving” and “receiving”—in Deleuze, what matters is neither actualized nor an outcome, but gives place. See also *What is Philosophy?* “one does not think without becoming something else” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 42).

8 The geographical position of La Villette joins Paris to the suburbs (Tschumi 2000, 57), *lieu with banlieue*—an intermediate location, neither central nor excluding.

9 Tschumi also discusses movement as “one of the generating factors of architecture” (Tschumi 2000, 226), and is particularly interested in the interaction of “vectorized movement” (such as elevators) with static spaces, noting that the latter can be activated “through the motion of the bodies that populate them” (226), thus emphasizing, like Clément, the irruptive role of the human body within the ensemble.

10 For an assessment of Clément’s “garden in movement” in relation to other parts of the park, I take the liberty of referring to the concluding
chapter of my *On Other Grounds*, which begins to draw connections between Clément, Deleuze, and Derrida.

11 In contradistinction, therefore, with tradition's assessment of plants: in Plato's *Timaeus*, the plant is said to be "always entirely passive... So it is a creature with a life of its own, but it cannot move and is fixed and rooted because it has no self-motion" (105).

12 Throughout this essay, "Deleuze" will often stand for "Deleuze and Guattari," or "Deleuze and Parnet" as well. The writing signed Deleuze always points to alterity, to a traversed authorship, an ethical practice which enacts rhizomatic writing. Examples abound, but I will only mention two instances from *Dialogues*, signed by Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet. No markers ever indicate who speaks when. The separation between paragraphs does not point with any certainty to any of the speakers. In the middle of what can be taken as the recapitulation of Deleuzian concepts (de/reterritorialization), we come to this passage: "What do these words mean, words that Guattari invents..." (Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 88). Even more strikingly, the text does attribute by name one note, and one note only, to "G.D" (and this specific appearance of Deleuze as G.D. has been omitted in the translation) [99; *Dialogues* 167]. In *Negotiations*, Deleuze also says: "Even when you think you're writing on your own [à un], you're always doing it with someone else you can't always name" (141).

13 For instance, when they discuss women's politics, Deleuze and Guattari suggest a way of traversing the molar in a way that would touch on it while altering it: while they concede that it is necessary for women to conduct molar politics, they find "danger" in this thinking (in a sense of danger that I will return to). Instead, molecular women's politics would consist in "slipping" into molar confrontations, passing under or through them" (Deleuze and Guattari 276).

14 Deleuze writes in his letter-preface to Jean-Clet Martin's *Variations*, that "'Rhizome' is the best word to designate multiplicities" and that "One Thousand Plateaus is devoted to multiplicities in themselves (becomings, lines, etc.)" (8).

15 A comparable image is invoked when Deleuze talks of movement in *Cinema 1*: "You can bring two instants or two positions together to infinity; but movement will always occur in the interval between the two, in other words behind your back" (1).

16 Paul Patton calls *Anti-Oedipus* and *One Thousand Plateaus* "overtly political books" (1), and "entirely work[s] of political philosophy" (9).

17 It is true that in *Logic of Sense*, Deleuze writes of an event that would be "willed" (149), which seems in contradiction with an affirmation without anticipation. But in this section, Deleuze speaks against the "resentment of the event", to which he opposes another ethical stance, that of a body which "wills now not exactly what occurs, but something in that
which occurs, something yet to come [à venir] which would be consistent with what occurs, in accordance with the laws of an obscure, humorous conformity: "the Event" (149).

Works Cited


